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Admissibility of Refusal to Submit to Blood Alcohol
Test
James C. Hauser*
Introduction
Neither the United States Supreme Court nor the Florida Su-
preme Court has yet ruled whether a defendant's refusal to take the
Blood Alcohof Test1 is admissible evidence. The legal issues involved
came into focus in Schmerber v. California,2 where the the Supreme
Court ruled that a defendant did not have a fourth or fifth amendment
right to resist the withdrawal of blood which would be tested to mea-
sure the alcoholic content of his bloodstream. Justice Brennan, speak-
ing for the majority, ruled that the results of the blood alcohol test
were not testimonial in nature and did not infringe on the defendant's
fifth amendment right not to incriminate himself.3 However, the Court
left unanswered the question of whether admission into evidence of a
defendant's refusal to submit to the blood alcohol test would violate his
fifth amendment rights.
After Schmerber, Florida's legislature passed an Implied Consent
Statute. The statute stated that any person accepting the privilege of
driving in Florida consented in advance to permit a blood test if he
were arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol [DUI].5 If the
alcohol level equalled or exceeded 0.10% by weight of his blood, the
defendant was presumed to be under the influence of alcohol.8 If a de-
* County Judge, Ninth Judicial Circuit of Florida; J.D. Boston University, 1973;
B.S. University of Pennsylvania Wharton School of Finance, 1970.
1. The term "test", unless otherwise stated, means any and all tests given to the
defendant to determine the level of alcohol in his blood stream.
2. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
3. Id. at 763, citing Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245 (1910).
4. FLA. STAT. § 322.261 (1969).
5. FLA. STAT. § 322.261(1)(a) (1979).
6. FLA. STAT. § 322.262(2)(c) (1979).
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fendant refused to take the test, his license was suspended for six
months.7
In order to determine whether a defendant's refusal to take the
test is admissible, four issues must be examined. The analysis will focus
on the courts' choice of words in expressing their holdings.
First, does introduction of a defendant's refusal violate his fifth
amendment right concerning self incrimination? Since the defendant is
required to take the test, his refusal may be testimonial in nature,
thereby compelling him to testify against himself.8 Introduction of his
refusal might be impermissible comment by the prosecutor on the right
of the defendant to remain silent.9
Second, does a defendant have the statutory right not to take the
test?10 If a defendant does have such a right, it would be unfair and a
denial of fundamental due process to penalize his exercise of that right
by admitting his refusal."' Since the Florida Statute requires informing
a defendant his license will be suspended for three months, but does not
specify his refusal would be admissible, the legislature may have in-
tended to prohibit the refusal from being admitted into evidence.
Third, would the probative value of such a refusal be outweighed
by its prejudicial effects?1 2
Fourth, regardless of a defendant's statutory or constitutional
rights, are there instances where admitting a defendant's refusal would
be fundamentally unfair?'3
7. FLA. STAT. § 322.261 (1969) (amended 1970). The amendmenf lowered the
suspension period to three months. FLA. STAT. § 322.261(1)(a) (1979).
8. See text accompanying notes 16-27 infra at 210-15.
9. See text accompanying notes 28-41 infra at 216-18.
10. See text accompanying notes 44, 50-77 infra at 219-29.
11. See text accompanying notes 45-49 and note 78 infra at 220-21. See Gay v.
Orlando, 202 So. 2d 896 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1967); but see State v. Duke, 378 So.
2d 96 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1979). Neither case fully explains the legal consequences
of admitting or not admitting such evidence. The conflict was resolved in Miller v.
State, 403 So. 2d 1307 (Fla. 1981) discussed in text accompanying notes 99-102 infra
at 236-37.
12. See text accompanying notes 79-94 infra at 230-34.
13. See text accompanying notes 95-110 infra at 235-38.
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Fifth Amendment Right
Background
In Schmerber, the defendant refused to take a breathalyzer test;
the refusal was admitted into evidence by the trial court. Because the
defendant failed to object to the admission of his refusal at trial, the
Supreme Court declined to decide whether the refusal was admissible.
The Supreme Court nevertheless discussed the issue in a footnote:
This conclusion would not necessarily govern had the State
tried to show that the accused had incriminated himself when told
that he would have to be tested. Such incriminating evidence may
be an unavoidable by-product of the compulsion to take the test,
especially for an individual who fears the extraction or opposes it
on religious grounds. If it wishes to compel persons to submit to
such attempts to discover evidence, the State may have to forgo the
advantage of any testimonial products of administering the test -
products which would fall within the privilege. Indeed, there may
be circumstances in which the pain, danger, or severity of an oper-
ation would almost inevitably cause a person to prefer confession to
undergoing the 'search,' and nothing we say today should be taken
as establishing the permissibility of compulsion in that case. But no
such situation is presented in this case.
Petitioner has raised a similar issue in this case, in connection with
a police request that he submit to a 'breathalyzer' test of air ex-
pelled from his lungs for alcohol content. He refused the request,
and evidence of his refusal was admitted in evidence without objec-
tion. He argues that the introduction of this evidence and a com-
ment by the prosecutor in closing argument upon his refusal is
ground for reversal under Griffin v. California. We think general
Fifth Amendment principles, rather than the particular holding of
Griffin, would be applicable in these circumstances, see Miranda v.
Arizona. Since trial here was conducted after our decision in Mal-
loy v. Hogan,. . . making those principles applicable to the States,
we think petitioner's contention is foreclosed by his failure to object
on this ground to the prosecutor's question and statements. 14
14. 384 U.S. at 765 n.9 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
2111Refusing Blood Alcohol Test
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Decisions in Foreign Jurisdictions
First, since the defendant is required to take the test, his refusal
may be "testimonial" in nature thereby compelling him to testify
against himself.
The majority of cases hold that a defendant's refusal to take the
test is not testimonial in nature.1 5 Since the fifth amendment right not
to incriminate oneself protects testimony but not conduct, such deci-
sions permit a court to admit the defendant's refusal. In deciding this
delicate issue, it is necessary to determine what the United States Su-
preme Court meant in footnote nine in Schmerber.
Newhouse v. Misterly offered an explanation of the Schmerber
footnote:
'If it wishes to compel persons to submit to such attempts to dis-
cover evidence, the State may have to forgo the advantage of any
testimonial products of administering the test - products which
would fall within the privilege.' In context the Court seems here to
be talking of an incriminating statement by the accused which is
induced by the requirement that the test be taken. See United
States v. Wade.
The second portion of footnote 9 muddies up the waters some-
what. It discusses a 'similar issue,' i.e., the consequences of refusing
to take the test.
Read together to us the two portions of the Schmerber foot-
note indicate that a refusal to take a blood test is not a testimonial
'statement' within the Fifth Amendment; rather, it is best de-
scribed as conduct indicating a consciousness of guilt. See People v.
Ellis. Nonetheless, the reference to the Miranda footnote can be
read to imply that where an underlying right to refuse such a blood
15. People v. Sudduth, 65 Cal. 2d 543, 421 P.2d 401, 55 Cal. Rptr. 393 (1967);
Campbell v. Superior Court, 106 Ariz. 542, 479 P.2d 685 (1971); Commonwealth v.
Rutan, 229 Pa. Super. 400, 323 A.2d 730 (1974); Welch v. District Ct. of Vermont,
594 F.2d 903 (2d Cir. 1979); People v. Thomas, 46 N.Y.2d 100, 385 N.E.2d 584, 412
N.Y.S.2d 845 (1978) appeal dismissed sub nom Thomas v. New York, 444 U.S. 891
(1979); Newhouse v. Misterly, 415 F.2d 514 (9th Cir. 1969); Davis v. State, 367
N.E.2d 1163 (Ind. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1977); Hill v. State, 366 So. 2d 299 (Ala. Crim.
App. 1978); State v. Meints, 189 Neb. 264, 202 N.W.2d 202 (1972); City of Wauke-
sha v. Godfrey, 41 Wis. 2d 401, 164 N.W.2d 314 (1969); State v. Holt, 261 Iowa
1069, 156 N.W.2d 884 (1968); State v. Dugas, 252 La. 345, 211 So. 2d 285 (1968).
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test is present, it would be improper to draw adverse inferences
from failure of the accused to respond to a request for a blood test
because the accused would thereby be penalized for exercising his
rights to refuse the test.16
A similar view was expressed by Chief Justice Traynor of the Cal-
ifornia Supreme Court in People v. Ellis.1 7 That decision held admissi-
ble a defendant's refusal to submit to voice exemplars. 18 Justice Tray-
nor explained why footnote nine of Schmerber never intended to
suppress a defendant's refusal to do a legally required act.
We are aware that the United States Supreme Court in
Schmerber v. State of California has cautioned that in some cases
the administration of tests might result in 'testimonial products'
proscribed by the privilege. We do not believe, however, that the
inferences flowing from guilty conduct are such testimonial prod-
ucts. Rather, the court's concern seemed directed to insuring full
protection of the testimonial privilege from even unintended coer-
cive pressures. In the case of a blood test, for example, the court
considered the possibility that fear induced by the prospect of hav-
ing the test administered might itself provide a coercive device to
elicit incriminating statements. Such a compelled testimonial prod-
uct would of course be inadmissible.19
Justice Traynor explained that unlike confessions, which might be
coerced, no useful purpose would be served in excluding a defendant's
refusal to take a voice identification test.
A suspect asked to speak for voice identification is not sub-
jected to the same psychological pressures said to be generated by
a demand for testimony. It is no more unfair to ask a suspect to
speak for voice identification than to ask him to appear in a lineup
for visual identification. The psychological pressures are reduced to
the same degree, through a limitation of alternatives. Deceit is im-
probable; the simple choice for a guilty person is between conduct
16. 415 F.2d at 518 (citations omitted).
17. 65 Cal. 2d 529, 421 P.2d 393, 55 Cal. Rptr. 385 (1966).
18. The Court in United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 (1973), held that voice
examplars were admissible.
19. 65 Cal. 2d at 538, 421 P.2d at 398, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 390 (citations omitted).
213 1
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likely to expose incriminating evidence and inferences as to guilt
likely to flow from a successful refusal to participate.
A voice test, however, contemplates no such intrusion into privacy;
no disclosure of thought or privately held information is requested.
One's voice is hardly of a private nature. It is constantly exposed to
public observation and is merely another identifying physical
characteristic.
It thus appears that an extension of the privilege to voice iden-
tification would serve none of the purposes of the privilege. It
would only exclude evidence of considerable importance when vis-
ual identification is doubtful or impossible. . . denial of access to a
pertinent identifying trait can only weaken a system dedicated to
the ascertainment of truth.20
A small minority of cases have held that a defendant's refusal to
take the alcohol test is testimonial in nature;21 thus to permit his re-
fusal into evidence would violate his fifth amendment right against self-
incrimination. These courts have also ruled that since the defendant is
required to take the test, his decision to take or not to take the test is
"compelled" by the state.
In Clinard v. State the Texas appellate court reasoned:
A defendant's silence or negative reply to a demand or request by
an officer made upon him while under the necessary compulsion
attendant with custodial arrest, which demand or question reasona-
bly called for an immediate reply by the defendant is clearly a tacit
or overt expression and communication of the defendant's thoughts
in regard thereto. Doyle v. Ohio. The obvious purpose and certain
result of proving a person accused of intoxication refused a request
to take a blood test is to show the jury that the accused, with his
full knowledge of the true amount he had consumed, thought that
20. Id. at 535, 421 P.2d at 396, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 388 (emphasis added) (footnote
omitted).
21. State v. Andrews, 297 Minn. 260, 212 N.W.2d 863 (1973); Clinard v. State,
548 S.W.2d 716 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977); State v. Wilson, 613 P.2d 384 (Kan. 1980);
People v. Rodriguez, 80 Misc. 2d 1060, 364 N.Y.S.2d 786 (Sup. Ct. Bronx Cty. 1975).
Rodriguez seems to be overruled by People v. Thomas, 46 N.Y.2d 100, 385 N.E.2d
584, 412 N.Y.S.2d 845 appeal dismissed sub nom Thomas v. New York, 444 U.S. 891
(1979). See also Note, Constitutional Limits on the Taking of Body Evidence, 78
YALE L.J. 1074 (1969).
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he could not afford to take said test. Such was the only reason for
its relevancy. Thus said evidence is without doubt of communica-
tive and testimonial character and not mere factual proof of a then
existing physical characteristic .... 2
But that does not appear to be a fair reading of what Justice Bren-
nan had in mind when he wrote footnote nine in Schmerber. This au-
thor is persuaded by the reasoning of Newhouse s and Ellis24 that what
Brennan intended was to forbid actual statements made by the defen-
dant out of fear of taking the test. For example, if the defendant stated
he did not want blood withdrawn because he had consumed ten beers,
the statement concerning how much beer he had consumed would not
be admissible.
Even if defendant's refusal were considered "testimonial" in na-
ture, there remains the question of whether the defendant is really
compelled to refuse the test. Numerous courts have compared refusal
to take the test with a defendant's attempted escape.25 Both have been
held admissible as indicating a course of conduct by the defendant.
However, one court distinguished a defendant's escape which was ad-
missible from a defendant's refusal to take a test.
[T]he distinction lies in the fact that the escape and flight are not
compelled or even requested; whereas, if an accused under custo-
dial arrest is requested or offered a chemical test for intoxication,
anything he does other than affirmatively agree to same is a refusal
to submit. Thus escape and flight are not 'compelled', a necessary
factor under the fifth amendment, but a refusal to take a chemical
test by silence or negative reply to a State's request or offer is
compelled. 28
Is it truly fair to say that a defendant is compelled not to take the test?
People v. Thomas explained why there is no such compulsion:
In no way in such a circumstance is there any compulsion on the
22. 548 S.W.2d at 718 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
23. 415 F.2d 514 (9th Cir. 1969).
24. 65 Cal. 2d 529, 421 P.2d 393, 55 Cal. Rptr. 385 (1966).
25. See text accompanying notes 88-92 infra.
26. 548 S.W.2d at 718-19.
2151
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defendant to refuse to take the test - the conduct which is the sub-
ject of the challenged evidence; on the contrary the compulsion is
to take the test. Submission to the test, not its evasion, was what
was desired by the police officers in this case.2
Second, does admission into evidence of a defendant's refusal to
take the test constitute impermissible comment on a defendant's right
to remain silent?
In Griffin v. California,28 the Supreme Court ruled that a prosecu-
tor could not comment on a defendant's refusal to testify at time of
trial. The Court recently ruled that this principle is so important that if
the defendant requests, a judge must inform the jury that a defendant's
refusal to testify can not be considered by the jury as inferring his
guilt.219
One court has ruled directly that admission of a defendant's re-
fusal to take the test constitutes impermissible comment on his right to
remain silent.8 0 As authority for this position, Johnson v. State cited
the Florida case of Gay v. Orlando.1 However, the Georgia court mis-
understood Gay, which specifically held comment on a defendant's re-
fusal to testify was not comment on his right to remain silent. Judge
Eberhardt's dissent (in a 4-3 decision) 'strongly criticized the majority:
The refusal to take the test is not to be equated with the fail-
ure of the accused to take the stand and make an unsworn state-
ment or testify in his own behalf. We agree readily that is it im-
proper for the court or the state's counsel to make reference to
that. But that is not a circumstance connected with the arrest - it is
something which happens in the course of the trial itself.8 2
The majority of cases have held that admission of a defendant's
refusal does not constitute impermissible comment on a defendant's
27. 46 N.Y.2d at 108, 385 N.E.2d at 588, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 849 (emphasis in
original).
28. 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
29. Carter v. Kentucky, 101 S. Ct. 1112 (1981).
30. 125 Ga. App. 607, 188 S.E.2d 416 (1972). But see also People v. Hayes, 64
Mich. App. 203, 235 N.W.2d 182 (Ct. App. 1975), discussed at note 49 infra.
31. 202 So. 2d 896 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1968).
32. 125 Ga. App. at 617, 188 S.E.2d at 422.
1216 Nova Law Journal 6:1982 1
10
Nova Law Review, Vol. 6, Iss. 2 [1982], Art. 1
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol6/iss2/1
Refusing Blood Alcohol Test6:1982
right to remain silent.33 In explaining why admitting a defendant's re-
fusal would not be an impermissible comment on the right of a defen-
dant to remain silent, the Supreme Court.of California stated in People
v. Sudduth:
The sole rationale for the rule against comment on a failure to tes-
tify is that such a rule is a necessary protection for the exercise of
the underlying privilege of remaining silent . . . A wrongful re-
fusal to cooperate with law enforcement officers does not qualify
for such protection. A refusal that might operate to suppress evi-
dence of intoxication, which disappears rapidly with the passage of
time . . ., should not be encouraged as a device to escape
prosecution.'"
Decisions by Florida Courts
First, no Florida appellate court has ruled that comment by a
prosecutor on a defendant's refusal to do a lawfully required act consti-
tutes impermissible comment on the defendant's right to remain silent.
Second, with one exception, the Florida appellate courts have
ruled that a defendant's refusal to do a lawfully required act is not
testimonial in nature; therefore, a defendant's refusal is admissible.3 5 In
following the majority trend, the Florida Supreme Court explained why
33. People v. Sudduth, 65 Cal. 2d 543, 421 P.2d 401, 55 Cal. Rptr. 393 (1967)
cert. denied 389 U.S. 850 (1967), reh. denied 389 U.S. 996 (1967); Hill v. State, 366
So. 2d 296 (Ala. Crim. App. 1978) affd 366 So. 2d 318 (Ala. 1979); People v.
Thomas, 46 N.Y.2d 100, 385 N.E.2d 584, 412 N.Y.S.2d 845 (1978) appeal dismissed
sub nom Thomas v. New York, 444 U.S. 891 (1979); Newhouse v. Misterly, 415 F.2d
514 (9th Cir. 1969); State v. Meints, 189 Neb. 264, 202 N.W.2d 202 (1972); City of
Westerville v. Cunningham, 15 Ohio St. 2d 119, 239 N.E.2d 40 (1968); Davis v. State,
367 N.E.2d 1163 (Ind. Ct. App. 1977); City of Waukesha v. Godfrey, 41 Wis. 2d 401,
164 N.W.2d 314 (1969); State v. Holt, 261 Iowa 1069, 156 N.W.2d 884 (1968); State
v. Dugas, 252 La. 345, 211 So. 2d 285 (1968).
34. 65 Cal.2d at 546, 421 P.2d at 403, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 395.
35. State v. Esperti, 220 So. 2d 416 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1969) (defendant's
refusal to submit to a nitrate test to determine gunpowder residue held admissible);
Clark v. State, 379 So. 2d 97 (Fla. 1980); Lusk v. State, 367 So. 2d 1088 (Fla. 3d Dist.
Ct. App. 1979); Joseph v. State, 316 So. 2d 585 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1975) (defen-
dant's refusal to give voice exemplar admissible); Smith v. State, 394 So. 2d 407 (Fla.
1981) (defendant's failure to explain possession of recently stolen property held
admissible).
217 1
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such refusal is not testimonial in nature:
[Defendant's] privilege against self-incrimination would not have
been violated by compelling him to speak the words spoken by the
extortionist, and therefore his refusal to speak was not an exercise
of this right. Since the fifth amendment offers no protection against
compulsion to submit to a voice exemplar and since it does not
privilege refusal to submit, the admission of [defendant's] refusal
into evidence was not error.36
The only Florida appellate court to state that a defendant's refusal
was "testimonial" in nature was Gay v. Orlando,7 decided prior to the
passage of Florida's Implied Consent Law. The Fourth District Court
of Appeal stated: "In the case before us petitioner was confronted with
a choice of either voluntarily submitting to the test or refusing and
thereby making a self-incriminating statement. While the results of a
properly admitted breathalyzer test are not -within the privilege, self-
incriminating testimonial by-products are.""8
The Gay rationale was strongly criticized by the Second District
Court of Appeal in State v. Esperti.3 9 In admitting evidence of defen-
dant's obstruction of police attempts to administer a test measuring
gun powder burns, the court stated that "his actions were a direct by-
product, not of the administration of the test, but of the wrongful re-
fusal to submit thereto; and wrongful conduct poisons its own fruit. ' 0
Esperti pointed out that Gay's statment that defendant's refusal was
testimonial was pure dicta. The Second District declined to be bound
by such dicta.4 '
Thus Florida courts other than Gay have uniformly ruled that a
defendant's refusal to do a lawfully required act is admissible evidence.
Comment on a defendant's refusal does not constitute comment on a
36. 379 So. 2d at 102.
37. 202 So. 2d 896 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1967).
38. Id. at 898.
39. 220 So. 2d 416 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1969).
40. Id. at 419.
41. Id. The dicta in Gay was also criticized in Becker, Admissibility of Testimo-
nial By-Products of a Physical Test, 24 U. MIAMI L. REV. 50 (1969). Becker
prophecized that future Florida courts would follow Esperti rather than Gay. His pre-
diction proved correct.
218 6:1982 1Nova Law Journal
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defendant's right to remain silent. Nor is the defendant's refusal to do
a lawfully required act "testimonial" in nature. Florida is in accord
with the majority of states throughout the country which have decided
this issue; the majority position is the better reasoned one. In Florida
the fifth amendment self-incrimination clause should not constitute a
barrier to admission of a defendant's refusal to take the test.
Statutory Right Not to Take the Test
Decisions From Foreign Jurisdictions
In order to fully understand whether in Florida a defendant has
the statutory "right" to refuse the test, it is necessary to compare Flor-
ida's Implied Consent Law with those of other states. Some states stat-
utorily permit a defendant's refusal to be admissible evidence, 42 other
states statutorily prohibit such refusal to be admissible evidence. 43 Un-
fortunately, Florida Statute Section 322.261 fails to specifically indi-
cate whether a defendant's refusal to take the test would be admissible.
First, does the state statute give the defendant the "right" to re-
fuse the alcohol test? A large number of state statutes, while not spe-
cifically stating whether a defendant's refusal is or is not admissible, do
state that a defendant has the right not to take the test.44 In states with
42. a) Alabama: ALA. CODE § 32-5-192(a) (1975); Hill v. State, 366 So. 2d 318
(Ala. 1979). b) Arizona: ARz. REv. STAT. § 28-692-H (1981); Campbell v. Superior
Court, 106 Ariz. 542, 479 P.2d 685 (1971). c) Delaware: 21 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 21, §
2749 (1979); State v. Lynch, 274 A.2d 443 (Del. Sup. Ct. of New Castle 1971); War-
ren v. State, 385 A.2d 137 (Del. 1978). d) Iowa: IowA CODE § 321B.11 (1975); State
v. Tierman, 206 N.W.2d 898 (Iowa 1973). e) North Carolina: N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-
139.1(f) (1978); State v. Flannery, 31 N.C. App. 617, 230 S.E.2d 603 (1976). f) Ver-
mont: VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 1205(a) (1981); State v. Welch, 136 Vt. 442, 394 A.2d
1115 (1978).
43. a) Illinois: ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 95 , § 11-501(h) (Smith-Hurd 1981); Peo-
ple v. Boyd, 17 Ill. App. 3d 879, 309 N.E.2d 29 (1974). b) Maine: ME. REv. STAT.
ANN. tit. 22, § 1312(8) (Supp. 1981); State v. Gillis, 199 A.2d 192 (Me. 1964). c)
Maryland: MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 10-309(a) (1980). Davis v. State, 8
Md. App. 327, 259 A.2d 567 (Ct. Spec. App. 1969) (construing the prior statute, MD.
ANN. CODE art. 35, § 100(c) (1954) (repealed 1969). d) Massachusetts: MAss. GEN.
LAws ANN. ch. 90, § 24(1)(e) (1969 & Supp. 1981); Commonwealth v. Scott, 269
N.E.2d 454 (Mass. 1971).
44. a) State v. Oswald, 90 S.D. 342, 345, 241 N.W.2d 566, 568 (1976) quoting
219 1Refusing Blood Alcohol Test16:1982
13
et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue
Published by NSUWorks, 1982
such statutes, courts held that a defendant's refusal is not admissible.
They did so on fundamental fifth amendment due process grounds.
These courts reasoned that since a defendant has a statutory right to
refuse the test, it would be grossly unjust to penalize a defendant, other
than by statutorily suspending his license, for exercising that right. In
State v. Oswald,5 the South Dakota Supreme Court explained:
In the case before us the Defendant was informed of his statutorily
guaranteed right and, for whatever reason we do not know, he
elected not to submit to the test. Certainly it is unfair to create by
statute a right not to submit to a chemical test and to allow the
accused to exercise that right and then in open court before a jury
to permit testimony concerning that refusal which can all too easily
work in the minds of the jury members to the prejudice of the
defendant. 46
The court went on to adopt the position of the Oklahoma Supreme
Court in Duckworth v. State:4"
'[T]he defendant's refusal to take the test was used by the state in
its case in chief for purely prejudicial purposes. The accused's re-
fusal should have ended the inquiry on the subject. It ill behooves
the courts to say you have a right to refuse to do something, which
may prove either beneficial or detrimental to you, and yet, notwith-
S.D. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 32-23-10 (1976): "such person shall be requested by said
officer to submit to such analysis and shall be advised by said officer of his right to
refuse to submit to such analysis." (emphasis added). b) People v. Hayes, 164 Mich.
App. 203, 235 N.W.2d 182 (1975); MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 257.625(a) (1967);
Collins v. Secretary of State, 384 Mich. 656, 663, 187 N.E.2d 423, 426 (1971) quoting
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 257.625(d) (1967): "A person under arrest shall be ad-
vised of his right to refuse to submit to chemical tests; and if he refuses the request of a
law enforcement officer to submit to chemical test no test shall be given." (emphasis
added). c) State v. Stuart, 157 A.2d 294 (D.C. 1960). See also Washington v. Parker,
16 Wash. App. 632, 633, 558 P.2d 1361, 1362 (1976); WASH. REV. CODE § 46.61-505
(repealed 1968): "Evidence of the chemical analysis or scientific breath test of any kind
of such person's blood shall not be admissible unless such person shall have been ad-
vised by the person given the test. . . that such person has a constitutional right not to
submit to such test." (emphasis added).
45. 90 S.D. 342, 241 N.W.2d 566 (1976).
46. Id. at 346, 241 N.W.2d at 569.
47. 309 P.2d 1103 (Okla. 1957).
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standing your right to do so, we will permit your refusal to be
shown and enable the state to destroy your right and achieve indi-
rectly by innuendo what it was prevented by law from accomplish-
ing directly. We can conceive of no greater inconsistency."48
An appellate Michigan court took a similar view in People v.
Hayes:
Under § 625a, an individual arrested for drunk driving has a
choice. He can either submit to a test the results of which could
create a virtually irrefutable presumption of guilt against him, or
he can refuse the test and suffer the revocation. If the fact that a
defendant has chosen not to submit to a test can be placed before
the jury as an inference of his guilt, then he will be put in the
position of having to risk providing evidence for the prosecution by
submitting to the test or of certainly providing it by refusing to
submit. It would be fundamentally unfair to put a defendant in
such a 'damned if he does, damned if he doesn't' position. The Leg-
islature provided a definite choice, and we cannot render a decision
which would make that choice an illusory one."
Where a defendant is told he has a right to refuse the test, it would be
unfair to punish the defendant for exercising that statutory right,
Therefore, I believe these cases are correctly decided.
However, in states where a defendant is not specifically given a
statutory or constitutional "right" to refuse, the refusal may be admis-
sible. The majority of states whose statutes do not confer on the defen-
dant the right to refuse the test have permitted such refusal to be ad-
mitted into evidence.50 These courts reasoned that it is a misnomer to
48. 90 S.D. at 347, 241 N.W.2d at 569.
49. 164 Mich. App. at 208, 235 N.W.2d at 185. Although Michigan gave the
defendant the statutory right to refuse the test (see note 44(d) supra), the Hayes court
never relied on that statute. In fact, the court found that whether a particular state
statute gave the defendant a "right" to refuse the test was essentially irrelevant. Id.
50. People v. Thomas, 46 N.Y.2d 100, 385 N.E.2d 584, 412 N.Y.S.2d 845
(1978) appeal dismissed sub nom Thomas v. New York, 444 U.S. 891 (1979); New-
house v. Misterly, 415 F.2d 514 (9th Cir. 1969); State v. Tabisz, 129 N.J. Super. 80,
322 A.2d 453 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1973); State v. Albright, 98 Wis. 2d 663, 298
N.W.2d 196 (1980); State v. Meints, 189 Neb. 264, 202 N.W.2d 202 (1972); People v.
Sudduth, 65 Cal. 2d 543, 421 P.2d 401, 55 Cal. Rptr. 393 (1967); State v. Miller, 257
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state a defendant has a "right" to refuse the test. The best explanation
of how the term "right" has been misused was discussed by Justice
Jasen in his concurring opinion of People v. Paddock:
[The] 'right' of refusal is not really a right in the sense of a funda-
mental personal privilege, but rather was merely an accommoda-
tion to avoid a distasteful struggle to forcibly take blood. Since the
statute itself equates a refusal with guilt (by revoking the driver's
license) and expresses a strong policy to protect the public from the
threat of drunken driving, there appears no compelling reason to
forbid comment on a person's refusal to take a blood test.51
Justice Jasen hit the nail on the head. In general, legislatures rec-
ognized that people under the influence of alcohol tend to be more abu-
sive, obtrusive and combative than they would be if sober. To require
law enforcement officials to withdraw blood or make an accused take a
breath test could easily lead to a pitched battle between police and the
accused. Injuries to either or both could easily occur; hence the neces-
sity for permitting the defendant not to take the test. Others have
reached the same conclusion:
[I]f it be admitted that the privilege of refusal stems from a legis-
lative effort to eliminate unreasonable force in terms of police ac-
tion, the accused has received all benefits due him when he is
granted merely the right [sic] of refusal. For the sake of peace and
order the State has surrendered evidence of significant value and
beneficence at the sacrifice of effective law enforcement should not
be compounded by denying the state the privilege of comment. 52
This explanation for not forcing a defendant to take a blood alco-
S.C. 213, 185 S.E.2d 359 (1971); Gardner v. Commonwealth, 195 Va. 945, 81 S.E.2d
614 (1954); State v. Bock, 80 Idaho 296, 328 P.2d 1065 (1958); City of Westerville v.
Cunningham, 15 Ohio St. 129, 239 N.E.2d 40 (1968); State v. Dugas, 252 La. 345,
211 So. 2d 285 (1968). See also Commonwealth v. Rutan, 229 Pa. Super. 400, 323
A.2d 730 (1974). Pennsylvania subsequently amended its implied consent statute to
prohibit admission of such evidence. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1547(c) (Purdon
1977). See Commonwealth v. Charles, 270 Pa. Super. 280, 411 A.2d 527 (1979).
51. 29 N.Y.2d 504, 506, 272 N.E.2d 486, 487, 323 N.Y.S.2d 976, 977 (1971).
52. Slough & Wilson, Alcohol and the Motorist: Practical and Legal Problems,
44 MINN. L. REV. 673, 705 (1960).
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hol test was adopted in Hill v. State:
Therefore, it seems that the act does not contemplate a per se right
of refusal, rather this acquiescence in refusal is in the posture of
avoiding potential violent conflicts. . . . See Campbell v. Superior
Court. . . 'this language does not give a person a 'right' to refuse
to submit to the test only the physical power [to].' 53
By informing the defendant his license will be suspended, but not
specifying in the statute that a refusal to take the test could be used
against him, legislatures may have intended to prohibit as evidence a
defendant's refusal to take the test.
A small minority of non-Florida courts have held a defendant's
refusal inadmissible, even though the state statute does not specifically
grant a defendant the "right" to refuse.54 These courts reasoned that
when the state legislature imposed a mandatory license suspension that
was the only penalty intended. Legislative silence on the issue of admis-
sibility indicated that refusal would not be admissible. This view was
expressed by the Alaska Supreme Court in Puller v. Municipality of
Anchorage:
An intrinsic aid to statutory construction is found in the maxim
expressio unius est exclusio alterius. The maxim establishes the in-
ference that, where certain things are designated in a statute, 'all
omissions should be understood as exclusions.' The maxim is one of
long-standing application, and it is essentially an application of
common sense and logic.
With respect to AS 28.35.032, we find that the enumeration of cer-
53. 366 So. 2d 318, 323 (Ala. 1979).
54. a) Puller v. Anchorage, 574 P.2d 1285, 1286 (Alaska 1978). ALASKA STAT.
§ 28.35.032 (1978): "If a person under arrest refuses the request of a law enforcement
officer to submit to a chemical test of his breath. . . after being advised by the officer
that the refusal will result in the suspension, denial or revocation of his license, a chem-
ical test shall not be given." b) City of St. Joseph v. Johnson, 539 S.W.2d 784 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1976). Mo. REv. STAT. § 577.050 (1979): "If a person under arrest refuses
upon the request of the arresting officer to submit to a chemical test, which request
... shall inform the person that his license may be revoked upon his refusal to take
the test, then none shall be given." c) Kansas v. Wilson, 5 Kan. App. 2d 130, 613 P.2d
384 (1976). KAN. STAT. ANN. § 8-1001(c) (Supp. 1980): "If the person so arrested
refuses a request to submit to a test of breath or blood, none shall be given."
223 1Refusing Blood Alcohol Test16:1982
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tain sanctions, suspension or revocation of license, and the require-
ment that those sanctions be included in a warning preclude the
imposition of additional consequences. The admissibility of evi-
dence of the fact of refusal would constitute such an additional
consequence. 55
These courts have interpreted their statutes to mean that a defen-
dant has a real choice to refuse and is not merely revoking his previ-
ously granted implied consent to the test. In City of St. Joseph v. John-
son the court commented:
Acceptance by a motorist of a license to operate a vehicle upon the
highways of this state does not amount to an implied consent to
submit himself to chemical analysis when charged with driving in
an intoxicated condition. The sobriquet 'implied consent law' both
misnominates § 566.444 and also misleads as to its legal effects.5"
Of course, whether a legislature intended its silence to prohibit a
defendant's refusal to be admissible is a matter of interpretation for
each state. One could just as easily argue that by never specifically
stating a defendant's refusal is "not admissible" the legislature in-
tended that it be admissible.
Comparison of Florida Statute to Other State Statutes
Florida's Implied Consent Statute does not give a defendant the
"right" to refuse to take a chemical test to determine his blood alcohol
level. Florida's statute has virtually the same language as statutes in
those states which have ruled that a defendant has no statutory "right"
to refuse the breath test. There is no substantial difference between
Florida's Implied Consent Statute and New Jersey's 39:4-50.2(a),
which State v. Tabisz57 held did not grant the defendant a statutory
right to refuse.
55. 574 P.2d at 1288.
56. 539 S.W.2d at 786.
57. 129 N.J. Super. 810, 322 A.2d 453 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1973). But see
Kansas v. Wilson, 5 Kan. App. 2d 130, 132 n.17, 613 P.2d 384, 385-86 n.17, citing
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 8-1001(a) (Supp. 1980). The Wilson court was an appellate court
which felt bound by dicta of the Kansas Supreme Court in State v. Haze, 218 Kan. 60,
1224
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Refusing Blood Alcohol Test
FLA. STAT. § 322.261 Suspension of
license; chemical test for
intoxication.
(1)(a) Any person who shall accept
the privilege extended by the laws of
this state of operating a motor
vehicle within this state shall by so
operating such vehicle be deemed to
have given his consent to submit to
an approved chemical test of his
breath for the purpose of
determining the alcoholic content of
his blood if he is lawfully arrested
for any offense allegedly committed
while the person was driving a
motor vehicle under the influence of
alcoholic beverages. The test shall
be incidental to a lawful arrest and
administered at the request of a
peace officer having reasonable
cause to believe such person was
driving a motor vehicle within this
state while under the influence of
alcoholic beverages. Such person
shall be told that his failure to
submit to such a chemical test will
result in the suspension of his
privilege to operate a motor vehicle
for a period of three months.
N.J. STAT. § 39:4-50.2(a):
Any person who operates a
motor vehicle on any public
road, street or highway or quasi-
public area in this State shall be
deemed to have given his
consent to the taking of samples
of his breath for the purpose of
making chemical tests to
determine the content of alcohol
in his blood. ....
When the implied consent statute is read in its entirety, it is clear
the legislature never intended to give a suspected DUI defendant the
"right" to refuse the test. In enacting Florida Statute Section 322.262,
the Florida legislature specifically gave an individual a "statutory
right" to refuse a pre-arrest breath test to determine the percentage of
alcohol in his blood. "Prior to administering any pre-arrest breath test,
a law enforcement officer shall advise the motor vehicle operator that
542 P.2d 720 (1975). Ironically, this same situation exists in Florida with State v.
Sambrine, 386 So. 2d 546 (Fla. 1980) discussed in text accompanying notes 72-78
infra.
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he has the right to refuse to take such test, and, prior to administering
such test, a law enforcement officer shall obtain the written consent of
the motor vehicle operator." 58
Significantly, no such "right" is given a defendant after he has
been arrested for DUI pursuant to Florida Statute Section 322.261(a).
[W]here language is used in one section of a statute different from
that used in other sections of the same Chapter, it is presumed that
the language is used with different intent. Accordingly, the pres-
ence of a provision in one portion of a statute and its absence from
another are an argument against reading it as implied by the sec-
tion from which it is omitted. 59
The Florida legislature has specifically mandated that a pre-arrest
breath test is not admissible evidence. "The results of any [pre-arrest]
test administered under this section shall not be admissible into evi-
dence in any civil or criminal proceeding." 60 Since the Florida legisla-
ture specifically excluded as evidence a pre-arrest test, by its silence it
appears the legislature intended that a post-arrest test should be
admissible.
It is also necessary to look at the overall purpose of Florida Stat-
ute 322.261 in conjunction with Florida's DUI Statute."' The supreme
court asserted this in Bender v. State: "The overall purpose of this
chapter [322] is to address the problem of drunk drivers on our public
roadways and to assist in implementing Section 316.193 which provides
that driving while intoxicated is unlawful. 62 Thus, when viewing the
legislative purpose as a whole, it does not appear theFlorida legislature
ever intended to prohibit as evidence a defendant's refusal. The Wis-
consin court commenting on legislative silence concerning a defendant's
refusal to take the test stated in State v. Albright:
'[T]he clear policy of the [implied consent] statute is to facilitate
the identification of drunken drivers and their removal from the
highways [and] the statute must be construed to further the legis-
58. FLA. STAT. § 322.261(b)(2) (1979) (emphasis added).
59. 30 FLA. JUR. Statutes § 96 (1974).
60. FLA. STAT. § 322.261(1)(b)(1) (1979) (emphasis added).
61. FLA. STAT. § 316.193 (1979).
62. 382 So. 2d 697, 699 (Fla. 1980).
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lative purpose.' Evidence of refusal is relevant and constitutionally
admissible. We do not interpret the silence of a legislature which
maintained a strong desire to remove drunk drivers from Wisconsin
roads to mean that this relevant evidence is inadmissible in a pro-
ceeding for driving while intoxicated.63
In Florida, unless specifically excluded by the legislature, "all rele-
vant evidence is admissible except as provided by law."'64 Thus, if the
refusal to take the test is relevant, the Florida legislature could have
prohibited admitting this evidence by explicitly saying So. 6 5 Its silence
could easily be interpreted to mean the evidence is admissible.
Florida case law has constantly interpreted the Florida Implied
Consent Statute to require a defendant to take the test unless he re-
vokes his previous consent. 6 Thus, the theory used by Missouri in City
of St. Joseph v. Johnson,67 which indicated that a driver does not agree
in advance to take the test, would not apply in Florida. Seemingly,
Florida courts should adopt the rationale used in People v. Thomas:
"The admissibility of refusal evidence may also be viewed as a permis-
sible condition reasonably attached to the grant of permission to oper-
ate a motor vehicle on the highways of the state."6
During the 1981 legislative session, a bill69 was introduced which
would have substantially amended Florida Statute Section 322.261.
One of the many revisions of this bill contained statutory language spe-
cifically permitting as evidence a defendant's refusal to take a blood
alcohol test. The bill passed the House, but was never voted on by the
Senate. Since the bill contained numerous revisions and was never ac-
tually rejected by the Senate, the failure to pass this bill sheds no new
light on legislative intent regarding the admissibility of the refusal to
63. 98 Wis. 2d at 672-73, 298 N.W.2d at 201, quoting State v. Neitzel, 95 Wis.
2d 191, 193, 289 N.W.2d 828, 830 (1980).
64. FLA. STAT. § 90.402 (1979).
65. See note 44 supra for statutes so worded.
66. Sambrine v. State, 386 So. 2d 546 (Fla. 1980); State v. Smith, 278 So. 2d
281 (Fla. 1976); State v. Riggins, 348 So. 2d 1209 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
"[T]hus it appears that the implied consent in this state may be revoked at the time the
chemical test is suggested by an officer." Id. at 1210.
67. 539 S.W.2d 784 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976). See note 54 supra.
68. 46 N.Y.2d at 110, 385 N.E.2d at 589, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 851.
69. FLA. H.B. 1117 (1981).
!
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take a blood alcohol test.
Florida Decisions on the "Right" to Refuse a Blood Alcohol
Test
Three Florida appellate decisions, State v. Duke, State v. Sam-
brine and State v. Ducksworth, have now dealt with the legal issue of
whether Florida Statute 322.261 gives a defendant the "right" to re-
fuse a blood alcohol test.7 0 None of the courts discussed foreign cases in
their written opinions.
Duke adopted the theory that a defendant may have the physical
power to refuse the blood alcohol test, but not the "right" to do so. In
addition, Duke felt that it would be better public policy not to reward
those who refuse to take the test:
A driver retains the physical power to refuse a sobriety test, but
not the legal right to withdraw his implied consent.
Public policy considerations favor the physical power/legal right
distinction. If Section 322.261(1)(a) is concluded not to be compul-
sory, the driver who refuses the test is penalized only by the sus-
pension of his license for 3 months. However, the driver who takes
the test faces a greater penalty as the results could be evidence
against him at trial. This non-compulsory interpretation would lead
to drivers not taking the test.71
The Duke court went on to hold that a defendant's refusal to take the
test is generally admissible.
In Sambrine the Florida Supreme Court never ruled on the issue
of whether a defendant's refusal is admissible evidence. The issue in
Sambrine was whether a sample of blood taken over the defendant's
objection was admissible evidence. The court held that the legislature
intended to exclude such evidence: "The legislature may have con-
cluded that it was preferable to enforce the implied consent law
through this method [license suspension] than mandate that law en-
forcement officials be required to physically restrain every individual
70. State v. Duke, 378 So. 2d 96 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1979); State v. Sam-
brine, 386 So. 2d 546 (Fla. 1980); State v. Ducksworth, 408 So. 2d 589 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 1981) reh. denied Jan. 25, 1982.
71. 378 So. 2d at 98.
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who refused to submit to the test."'7 2 This author's research of other
states' implied consent statutes indicates that such a conclusion was
correct. Unfortunately, the Sambrine court muddied this entire area of
law by stating:
The Court is not free to ignore such plain language and obvious
legislative intent. Any careful reading of Section 322.261 leads to
the inescapable conclusion that a person is given the right to refuse
testing. If this were not so, it is unclear why the legislature pro-
vided for a definite sanction and a detailed procedure for the en-
forcement of such sanction.7 3
The court's use of the word "right" is troubling for a number of
reasons. First, the court's analysis of the legislature's "obvious" intent
was less than thorough, for it did not consider the legislative intent
evidenced in the different statutory language for pre- and post-arrest
tests. 4
Second, the court never bothered to cite, much less distinguish or
overrule, Duke. Had it done so, it might have seen the difference be-
tween saying a defendant can not be physically forced to take a blood
test and saying he has a "right" not to do so.
Third, the court never analyzed decisions from other jurisdictions
with statutes which did not use the term "right" (and which generally
permit admission of a defendant's refusal) and those states with stat-
utes which used the term "right" (and generally exclude admission of
such a refusal).
What is even more perplexing is that the "right" language was not
essential to the court's decision, hence dicta. Although not binding,
since it emanated from the Florida Supreme Court such language is
considered highly persuasive. 5
In State v. Ducksworth7 6 the Second District Court of Appeal, be-
cause of Sambrine, retreated from Duke. In a terse two paragraph
opinion, it ruled a defendant's refusal to take a breathalyzer test inad-
72. 386 So. 2d at 549.
73. Id. at 548.
74. See text accompanying notes 58-60 supra.
75. Milligan v. State, 177 So. 2d 75 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1965).
76. 408 So. 2d 589 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1981) reh. denied Jan. 25, 1982.
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missible. It upheld a trial court decision that admired the Duke analy-
sis but felt bound by Sambrine.7 Whether the Second District Court
thought Sambrine's use of the term "right" was binding or dicta was
not discussed.
Thus, if the dicta in Sambrine is taken at face value, a defendant
has a right to refuse to take the test. With such a right a defendant's
refusal would be inadmissible since it would violate fundamental fair-
ness by penalizing a defendant for exercising his right.78
However, if the term "right" as used by Justice Atkins is a misno-
mer, then the better reasoning would be to admit the refusal. The pur-
pose of the implied consent statute is to prevent violence by not physi-
cally forcing a defendant to take the test; it is not to give the accused a
better chance to avoid conviction of DU. Further, public policy dic-
tates that a defendant not be "rewarded" for refusing to take the test:
to do so would simply nullify the legislative intent.
Prejudicial Effects Outweighing Probative Value
Decisions in Other Jurisdictions
Courts which have ruled there is no constitutional nor statutory
"right" to refuse the test have uniformly ruled that a refusal has suffi-
cient probative value to be admissible.7" These courts have ruled that a
refusal indicates a consciousness of guilt on the part of the defendant.
It infers that the defendant knew if he took the test, he would fail.
This was expressed by the Supreme Court of Ohio in Westerville v.
Cunningham:
Where a defendant is being accused of intoxication and is not in-
toxicated, the taking of a reasonably reliable chemical test for in-
toxication should establish that he is not intoxicated. On the other
hand, if he is intoxicated, the taking of such a test will probably
establish that he is intoxicated. Thus, if he is not intoxicated, such
77. Ducksworth v. State, # 80-3029-AP-01 at 2 (Fla. 12th Cir. filed Mar. 2,
1981).
78. See text accompanying notes 45-49 supra.
79. See notes 33 and 50 supra. Conversely, those courts which held that a defen-
dant has either a statutory or constitutional right to refuse have ruled that the results
of such tests have no probative value. See text accompanying notes 83-87 infra.
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a test will provide evidence for him; but, if he is intoxicated, the
test will provide evidence against him. Thus, it is reasonable to in-
fer that a refusal to take such a test indicates the defendant's fear
of the results of the test and his consciousness of guilt, especially
where he is asked his reason for such refusal and he gives no reason
which would indicate that his refusal had no relation to such con-
sciousness of guilt.80
These courts have also ruled that no undue prejudice is borne by
the defendants. As Justice Traynor explained in People v. Ellis:
Evidence of the refusal is not only probative; its admission op-
erates to induce suspects to cooperate with law enforcement offi-
cials. Only the overriding interest in protecting the privilege
against compulsory self-incrimination, itself the result of a delicate
balance, prohibits evidence or comment in the refusal to testify
cases. But the privilege itself is not at issue here. Without excep-
tion, none of the reasons that support the privilege lends support to
a rule that would exclude probative evidence obtained from an ac-
cused's effort to conceal nonprivileged evidence.81
Some courts have argued that a defendant is never required to co-
operate with the police, but Justice Traynor rejected this argument:
It has been urged that the privilege reflects an ultimate sense
of fairness that prohibits the state from demanding assistance of
any kind from an individual in penal proceedings taken against
him. . . . Criminal proceedings are replete with instances where at
least passive cooperation of an accused may be constitutionally
required.82
Most courts holding that a defendant's refusal does not have suffi-
cient prolative value have based their decisions on the defendant's stat-
utory or constitutional "right" not to take the test.83 This was ex-
80. 15 Ohio St. 2d 129, 130, 239 N.E.2d 40, 41 (1968).
81. 65 Cal. 2d at 538, 421 P.2d at 398, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 390.
82. Id. at 534, 421 P.2d at 395, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 387.
83. Duckworth v. State, 309 P.2d 1103 (Okla. 1957). See also Engler v. State,
316 P.2d 625 (Okla. Crim. Ct. App. 1957); Johnson v. State, 125 Ga. App. 607, 188
S.E.2d 416 (1972); City of St. Joseph v. Johnson, 539"S.W.2d 784 (Mo. Ct. App.
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pressed by the Missouri court in St. Joseph's:
The admissibility of the refusal as evidence of intoxication in a col-
lateral criminal proceeding, therefore, depends upon whether the
probative value of such evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect.
Our decisions recognize that a motorist must make his choice to
refuse or submit in the atmosphere of his arrest and restraint ...
In this environment, the refusal may result equally from rational
causes of disquiet as from a consciousness of guilt.84
One state, Oklahoma, went so far as to say that a defendant's re-
fusal is of no evidentiary value. In Duckworth v. State, the Oklahoma
Supreme Court said:
The defendant [would be] the victim of prejudice created by no
real fact produced by the test, but by surmise, speculation and in-
nuendo based only on the assertion by the defendant of his funda-
mental right to refuse the test. In no other way can the right to
refuse have any meaning or constitute more than a mere shadow of
substance.85
It must be remembered that this decision came prior to Schmerber and
at a time when the reliability of such tests were seriously in question.88
One court, in State v. Annonymous, ruled that such evidence was
incompetent:
Implicit in such testimony of refusal is the irremediable suggestion
that had the test been given, the results would have been as nearly
infallible on the issue of intoxication, providing either guilt or inno-
cence of the accused, as scientific ingenuity could devise, and, thus,
from a mere refusal to submit to such test, fairly and reasonably,
could be derived an inference of guilt. With this basic assumption
we do not agree. The evidence objected to was incompetent for the
1976); Kansas v. Wilson, 5 Kan. App. 2d 130, 613 P.2d 384 (1976); Washington v.
Parker, 16 Wash. App. 632, 558 P.2d 1361 (1976); Crawly v. State, 219 Tenn. 707,
413 S.W.2d 370 (1967); People v. Hayes, 64 Mich. App. 203, 235 N.W.2d 182 (1975).
84. 539 S.W.2d at 787.
85. 309 P.2d at 1105.
86. The theory in Duckworth was severely criticized at Note, Effect of Comment
on Refusal to Submit to Intoximeter Test, 10 OKLA. L. REV. 331 (1957).
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purpose for which it was offered and should have been excluded.87
But the Connecticut court failed to state why it was incompetent. Jus-
tice Traynor relied upon Professor Wigmore in Ellis:
The inferential chain here is no different from that which
makes any event that does not directly illuminate the circum-
stances of the crime charged a relevant fact. The trier of fact must
reason from, for example, an escape from jail, to a consciousness of
guilt that would motivate the escapee's conduct, and, from that
premise, to the conclusion that such conduct is relevant to the ulti-
mate issue of guilt or innocence.88
Florida Decisions
No appellate Florida court has yet ruled directly on the prejudicial
aspect of admitting the refusal to take an alcohol test. It is, therefore,
important to look at how Florida courts have ruled in analogous
situations.
In Young v. State the Florida Supreme Court held certain photo-
graphs inadmissible because of their inflammatory nature:
Where there is an element of relevancy to support admissibility
then the trial judge in the first instant and this Court on appeal
must determine whether the gruesomeness of the portrayal is so
inflammatory as to create an undue prejudice in the minds of the
jury and detract them from a fair and unimpassioned consideration
of the evidence.89
Florida appellate courts have ruled that a defendant's refusal to
take a "required" test is of sufficient probative value to be admissible.90
In makirig these decisions the courts necessarily have ruled that the
evidence had sufficient probative value to outweigh any prejudicial ef-
87. 6 Conn. Cir. Ct. 470, , 276 A.2d 452, 455 (1971).
88. 65 Cal. 2d at 538 n.12, 421 P.2d at 398 n.12, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 390 n.12.
89. 234 So. 2d 341, 348 (Fla. 1970) quoting Leach v. State, 132 So. 2d 324,
331-32 (Fla. 1961).
90. State v. Esperti, 220 So. 2d 416 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1969) (nitrate test);
Clark v. State, 379 So. 2d 97 (Fla. 1980) (voice identification).
2331Refusing Blood Alcohol Test
27
et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue
Published by NSUWorks, 1982
Nova Law Journal
fects. In describing why the possession of recently stolen property by
the defendant had probative value, the Florida Supreme Court stated
in State v. Young-
Moreover, the inference of guilt that the jury may infer from
the unexplained possession of recently stolen goods does not arise
from the possessor's failure to explain or demonstrate by evidence
of exculpatory facts and circumstances that his possession of the
recently stolen goods is innocent. It is the fact of possession that
provides the basis for the inference of guilt. This inference is
founded on '. .. the manifest reason that when goods have been
taken from one person, and are quickly thereafter found in the pos-
session of another, there is a strong possibility that they were taken
by the latter.'91
The court went on to explain the probative value of such evidence:
It can be seen, therefore, that the rule of evidence respecting pos-
session of recently stolen goods is no different, in kind, from the
rule respecting the probative value of any other circumstantial evi-
dence. Flight, concealment, resistance to a lawful arrest, presence
at the scene of the crime, incriminating fingerprints - the whole
body of circumstantial evidence relevant in a given case - are all
incriminating circumstances which the jury may consider as tend-
ing to show guilt if evidence thereof is allowed to go to the jury
unexplained or unrebutted by evidence of exculpatory facts and
circumstances. 92
Florida has a low threshold for admitting evidence of probative
value. In most states, a court must balance whether the probative value
of evidence outweighs the possible prejudice to the defendant. In Flor-
ida, the proof necessary to admit such evidence is much lower; a defen-
dant's refusal will be admitted unless its prejudicial effect substantially
outweighs its probative value.93
Thus, in determining whether a defendant's refusal to take the test
has sufficient probative value, courts will look to whether the defendant
91. 217 So. 2d 567, 570 (Fla. 1968) cert. denied 396 U.S. 853 (1969).
92. Id. at 571.
93. FLA. STAT. § 90.403 (1979).
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has a statutory or constitutional "right" to refuse. As stated previously,
there is confusion at the appellate level in Florida whether a defendant
has such a statutory "right" to refuse.94 If there is no "right" the evi-
dence will have sufficient probative value; if there is a "right" the evi-
dence would probably be considered too prejudicial.
Violation of Fundamental Due Process
Florida Statute Section 321.261(1)(e) requires a defendant be told
that if he refuses to take the test his license will be suspended for three
months; he need not be told that his refusal might be used against him
at trial. It would, therefore, be possible for a defendant to be misled
into believing that the only consequence of his refusal would be the
suspension of his license.
Decisions in Other Jurisdictions
In Washington v. Parker9 5 the Washington Supreme Court rea-
soned that a defendant would have to be told that his refusal could be
used against him.
In other words, had the statute intended evidentiary use of the
right of refusal, it is logical that the arresting officer would be re-
quired to inform [defendant] that his refusal could be used as evi-
dence in a criminal proceeding as well as the consequential loss of
the privilege to drive. Since the statute does not require such warn-
ing, we conclude that the legislation did not contemplate the addi-
tional consequence."
In Puller v. City of Anchorage the Alaska Supreme Court adopted
a similar rational: "We view the warning requirement as a protective
device to assure an informed choice on the part of the motorist. It
would be unfair to have the driver believe that refusal would have one
consequence and then permit the state to assert an additional
94. For discussion, see notes 50-77 supra.
95. 558 P.2d 1361 (Wash. 1976).
96. Id. at 1363. Washington specifically gives the defendant the statutory "right"
to refuse the test.
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consequence. '9 7
Whether the police are required under the due process clause of
the fifth amendment to give such a warning is an open question. In
answering this question one must first determine what due process re-
quires. The United States Supreme Court set forth a three prong test
in Mathews v. Eldridge:9 8
1. The private interest at stake.
2. The government interest at stake.
3. The risk that procedures used will lead to erroneous decisions.
Applying the first prong, a defendant has a substantial interest in
being warned that his refusal could be used against him at trial. His
refusal might have been based solely on his willingness to accept a
three month suspension for not taking the test; had he known the re-
fusal could be used at trial he might have taken the test. Applying the
second prong, the "cost" to government is minimal; in fact, the only
possible cost might be the exclusion of such evidence where the police
fail to warn the defendant. Finally, applying the third prong, there is a
risk that a defendant might refuse under the mistaken impression the
refusal could not be used at trial. The number of individuals who will
be misled is probably minimal. But common sense teaches us that it
would be better to avoid constitutional problems by requiring such a
warning.
In dealing solely with the issue of whether the police must give the
defendant a warning, the comparison of a defendant's refusal to give a
voice or handwriting exemplar with refusal to give a blood alcohol test
is inappropriate. In the former cases, the defendant is told to take the
test, but he is told nothing else. There is no need to tell him his refusal
could be used against him; there is no possibility he could be misled. In
the latter case, the defendant is told his license will be suspended for
three months if he does not take the test. Without being informed that
his refusal could be used against him at trial, the defendant could be
misled.
Florida Decisions
No Florida court has directly addressed the degree of warning the
97. 574 P.2d at 1288.
98. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
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state must give the defendant before he takes the breathalyzer test.99
Recently the Florida Supreme Court in Miller v. State100 resolved a
conflict between the Second and Fourth District Courts of Appeal 01 as
to the type of warning necessary in vehicle impoundment cases. Miller
was arrested for not having a valid driver's license. The police im-
pounded his car since there was no one else to drive it away. The defen-
dant was never warned by the police that he could prevent impound-
ment by telephoning a friend to drive the vehicle away. The court
required the warning: "[A]n officer, when arresting a present owner or
possessor of a motor vehicle, must advise him or her that the vehicle
will be impounded unless the owner or possessor can provide a reason-
able alternative to impoundment. '10 2
When there is the possibility that a defendant was overtly misled
as to whether he was required to take the blood alcohol test, Florida
courts have held a defendant's refusal inadmissible. In Gay v. Orlando,
the Florida Fourth District Court stated: "Petitioner was told he had a
right not to take the breath analysis test. He chose not to and this fact
was brought out at triai. ' ' 103 Gay held the evidence was suppressable.
Commenting on Gay, the Second District Court in State v. Esperti
said:
In that case the defendant refused to take a breathalyzer test; but
it is patent therein that such refusal did not occur until after the
officer told the defendant that he need not take the test. Evidence
of such refusal was said to be inadmissible, as it should have been,
since if for no other reason, it was violative of due process and fair
99. In State v. Duke, 378 So. 2d 96 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1979) the court
discussed warnings but did not address the issue of warning a defendant that his re-
fusal to take an alcohol test could be used against him.
100. 403 So. 2d 1307 (Fla. 1981).
101. The Second District Court of Appeal held that police need not inform de-
fendants whose vehicles were being impounded that if they could locate a friend to
drive the vehicle away there would be no impoundment. State v. Sanders, 387 So. 2d
391 (Fla. 2d. Dist. Ct. App. 1980); State v. Dearden, 347 So. 2d 462 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1977). The Fourth District Court of Appeal held that police must give such warn-
ings. Session v. State, 353 So. 2d 854 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1977); Jones v. State,
345 So. 2d 809 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
102. 403 So. 2d at 1314 (emphasis added).
103. 202 So. 2d at 898 (emphasis added).
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In State v. Duke the arresting officer told the defendant "I am
now offering to give an approved chemical test of your breath for the
purpose of determining the alcoholic content of your blood. If you re-
fuse to take this test your privilege of operating a motor vehicle will be
suspended for a period of 3 months .... 11o5 The Second District
Court concluded that the defendant could have believed that he had a
choice. Therefore, his refusal could not be admitted. "The defendant
should have been told that the officer was prepared to give an approved
chemical test; that the driver did not have a right to refuse, but if he
did refuse, his license would be revoked for a period of 3 months."1 06
The police of Orange County, Florida, have adopted the warning
suggested in Duke:
You are required by the applicable provision of Chapter 322 of
The Florida Statutes to submit to a breathalyzer test and your fail-
ure to submit to the same will result in the suspension of your driv-
ing privileges for a period of three months. This breathalyzer test is
being given to you as a result of your being charged with the of-
fense of driving while under the influence and is not being given to
you as a continuation of the accident investigation or accident re-
port in this case. Further, the results of this breathalyzer test may
be used against you as evidence in any subsequent criminal pro-
ceeding for the offense of driving while under the influence.107
Other Factors
A defendant's refusal to take a breathalyzer test or have blood
withdrawn may be based on arguably valid grounds. A defendant
might not want blood withdrawn for religious reasons or out of a genu-
ine fear of needles. The defendant might not trust the test or testing
104. 220 So. 2d at 419 (emphasis added).
105. 378 So. 2d at 98 (emphasis added).
106. Id.
107. Orange County, Florida, Sheriff's Department Form "Alcohol Influence Re-
port Interviewer's Dialogue" (emphasis added). In December of 1981 the form was
amended to include the words "[t]he result of this. . . test or your refusal to submit to
this test may be used against you as evidence .. .
1238 6:1982 1
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procedures. If that were in fact proven, one court, Michigan v.Hayes, 10 would suppress the results. Of course, the refusal might also
be because he was so intoxicated that he was unable to make the
"choice." In that case admission of the refusal should be permitted.
Other constitutional rights of the defendant might have been vio-
lated, which would warrant suppression. Suppose, before deciding
whether to take the test, the defendant asked to talk to an attorney. If
the police prevented him from doing so he would be denied his Fifth
Amendment right to consult with an attorney. 10° The violation of this
right would require the evidence be suppressed.
Of course, whether a defendant's refusal is or is not admissible
must be decided on a case by case basis. The Alabama Supreme Court
in Hill v. Staten ° ruled that deciding the reason a defendant refused is
ultimately an issue for the jury. This, of course, might require the de-
fendant to take the stand. However, pursuant to Florida Statute
90.612(2), the trial court would have the authority to limit any cross-
examination by the state to the question of why the defendant refused
the test.
Thus, for the sake of due process and fair play, a defendant should
be told prior to the test that in addition to having his license suspended,
his refusal could be used against him. If a defendant refuses for some
other reason, whether his refusal is admissible must be decided on a
case by case basis. The burden for proving a valid reason for refusing is
on the defendant.
Conclusion
A defendant's refusal to take a breathalyzer test should be admis-
sible evidence in Florida courts. Its admission would neither violate the
defendant's right not to incriminate himself nor impinge on his right to
remain silent. A proper reading of Florida's Implied Consent Statute
indicates that a defendant has no statutory "right" to refuse the test;
thus admission would not violate a defendant's fundamental due pro-
108. 64 Mich. App. 203, 235 N.W. 2d 182 (1975).
109. In State v. Roche, 50 Fla. Supp. 127 (Fla. Orange Cty. Ct. 1980), if prior
to deciding whether to take the test, the police denied the defendant's request to talk to
an attorney, the defendant was deemed not to have refused to take the test.
110. 366 So. 2d 299 (Ala. 1978).
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cess rights; but this issue has been confused by the dicta of Justice
Atkins in Sambrine v. State. A defendant's refusal has sufficient proba-
tive value to be admissible in Florida courts.
Unless a defendant is somehow misled, and this will be substan-
tially avoided if a defendant is told that his refusal could be used
against him at trial, there is no reason why the defendant's refusal
should not be admitted.""1
111. While this article was being printed, the Florida Legislature declared its
position on the admissibility of refusal to take the alcohol test. "Refusal to submit to a
chemical breath or urine test upon request of a law enforcement officer . . . shall be
admissible into evidence in any criminal proceedings." FLA. C.S.-C.S.-C.S.-S.B. 69,
432, 312, 351, 39, 285 (1982), passed by the legislature awaiting the governor's signa-
ture, to be effective July 1, 1982, as FLA. STAT. § 316.1932(1)(a). Blood test refusal
will be admissible under subsection (1)(c) of the statute.
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Florida No-Fault Insurance: Ten Years of Judicial
Interpretation
Patricia V. Russo*
Introduction
The Florida Automobile Reparations Reform Act has been in
place for ten years.1 Although the statement of purpose in the Act itself
is terse,2 the Florida Supreme Court, reviewing the constitutionality of
the Act, gave an enumeration of "permissible legislative objectives." s
Most important among these was the intent to reduce fault-based auto-
mobile accident litigation and to facilitate the timely compensation of
auto accident victims for out-of-pocket losses. 4 In the main, the Act has
* Assistant Professor and Associate Dean, Florida State University College of
Law. LL.M., Yale, 1977; J.D., University of Florida, 1973; B.A., Florida State Univer-
sity, 1965. I thank my colleagues, Larry George and Ken Vinson, for their assistance
and encouragement.
1. Fla. Stat. § § 627.730-.741 (1971), effective January 1, 1972, to be repealed
July 1, 1982.
2. FLA. STAT. § 627.731 (1979) provides:
The purpose of § § 627.730-627.741 is to require medical, surgical, funeral
and disability insurance benefits to be provided without regard to fault
under motor vehicle policies that provide bodily injury and property
damage liability insurance, or other security, for motor vehicles registered
in this state and, with respect to motor vehicle accidents, a limitation on
the right to claim damages for pain, suffering, mental anguish and
inconvenience.
3. Lasky v. State Farm Ins. Co., 296 So. 2d 9, 16 (Fla. 1974); Chapman v.
Dillon, 1982 Fla. Law Weekly 133 (Fla. 1982).
4. 296 So. 2d at 16. A study by the United States Department of Transportation,
completed in 1970, disclosed that auto accidents contributed more than 200,000 cases a
year to the nation's court load, and consumed 17% of the country's judicial resources.
[Reported in Hearings Before the U.S. Senate Commerce Comm., 91st Cong., 2d Sess.
7 (1970)]. (Hereinafter cited as Commerce Comm. Report.)
A study of 1,000 bodily injury claims conducted by the Department of Insurance
for the State of New York disclosed that one out of four people injured in auto acci-
dents recovered nothing under the fault-based compensation system. STATE OF NEW
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met these objectives.5
Amendments of the Act in the intervening years have significantly
reduced no-fault benefits.6 The question whether the reduced benefits
YORK INSURANCE DEPARTMENT, AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE... FOR WHOSE BENEFIT?,
A Report to Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller, 1970, at 18. (Hereinafter cited as Rocke-
feller Report). "[V]ictims . . . face[d] average delays in collecting under auto liability
insurance that [were] ten times as long as delays in collecting under collision, home-
owners, or burglary insurance and forty times as long as delays under accident and
health insurance." Id. at 19. On the average it took 15.8 months to settle liability
claims, and at the end of three years, 12% of claims remained unpaid. Id. at n.26.
Other objectives of the Act enumerated by the Lasky court included the reduction
of automobile insurance premiums and inefficiency in the liability insurance industry;
reduction in public relief rolls; remedy of the inequities in the traditional tort compen-
sation system, whereby minor claims were overcompensated and major claims were
undercompensated relative to their true economic value; and remedy of the pressure
brought to bear upon an injured party to "accept an unduly small settlement of his
claims [to meet] the pressing necessity of paying medical bills. . . . " 296 So. 2d at 16.
That these were worthy objectives is well documented. Under the traditional tort
system, victims whose economic losses were more than $25,000 only recovered about a
third of their losses, while those with losses of less than $500 recovered an average of
four and a half times their economic loss. Commerce Comm. Report at 4-5. Of each
dollar paid into the system for liability protection, only forty cents went to compensate
accident victims. Commerce Comm. Report at 21. From 1960 to July 1970, the cost of
auto insurance went up sixty-five percent while the take-home pay for nonsupervisory
and factory workers during the same period went up only forty percent. Id. at 23.
5. See J. Little, No-Fault Auto Reparation in Florida: An Empirical Examina-
tion of Some of Its Effects, 9 U. MICH. J. LAW REFORM 1 (1975). Professor Little
reported a significant reduction in the time elapsing between accidents and the first
receipt of no-fault benefits, and a settling of claims in amounts much closer to verified
medical losses than under the common law system. Id. at 4. "[C]overage for personal
injury benefits was expanded and the cost of processing claims was reduced." Id. at 5.
"[T]he Florida [no-fault] system can reduce the frequency of personal injury litigation
measurably." Id. at 3.
6. The 1971 Act provided 100% of medical expenses and 85-100% of lost income,
less deductibles. FLA. STAT. § 627.736(1)(1971). It required $5000 of PIP insurance
with a maximum deductible of $1000. FLA. STAT. § 627.739 (1971). Changes in 1976
eliminated the $1000 threshold leaving a threshold based on type of injury. (If one did
not meet the severity-of-injury threshold, one could not sue at common law, but had to
rely exclusively upon no-fault benefits). FLA. STAT. § 627.737(2) (1979). The 1977
changes included the elimination of compulsory liability insurance; reduction in no-
fault medical benefits from 100% to 80%, and reduction in income replacement from
80% to 60% of the lost income. FLA. STAT. § 627.736(1) (1979). An injured party may
recover the balance in a common law tort action. See FLA. STAT. § 627.737(1) (1979).
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provide an adequate alternative to rights taken away by the original
legislation (principally, the right to recover for pain and suffering) has
recently been addressed by the Florida Supreme Court.7 This article
does not review the constitutionality of the Act, as it is probable that
no-fault, in one form or another, is here to stay.8 Rather, I examine a
number of specific cases and issues decided under the Act, highlighting
the patterns and irregularities found in courts' interpretations of the
Act and suggesting instances where the irregularities warrant attention.
This article covers three broad areas: (1) the availability of no-
fault benefits to those injured in or by a vehicle which was not a statu-
torily defined "motor vehicle"; (2) the availability of no-fault benefits
to those injured in an insured vehicle, who own, or live with one who.
owns, an uninsured vehicle, and the availability of benefits to those in-
jured in uninsured vehicles; and (3) the availability of benefits to those
who constructively "own" an uninsured vehicle.
Vehicles Not Statutorily Defined as "Motor Vehicles"
The availability of personal injury protection (PIP) benefits9 to
The 1978 changes increased no-fault benefits to $10,000 (from $5000), expressly ap-
plied the Act to commercial vehicles, tightened the tort threshold to further limit com-
mon law suits, and increased the maximum allowable deductible to $8000. FLA. STAT.
§ 627.739(1) (1979).
7. The Florida Supreme Court recently declared the Act constitutional. Al-
though the no-fault benefits have been reduced from 100% of medical expense to 80%,
from 80% of lost wages to 60%, and the permissible deductible has been increased to
$8,000, the court found the provisions of section 627.737 still provide a reasonable
alternative to the traditional tort action and thus do not violate the right of access to
courts. Chapman v. Dillon, 1982 Fla. Law Weekly 133 (Fla. 1982).
8. See P. Atiyah, No Fault Compensation" A Question That Will Not Go Away,
54 TULANE L. REV. 271 (1980).
The frequency of accidents alone would suggest the permanency of no-fault repar-
tions. Everyone has accidents. Statistics compiled by the Department of Insurance for
the State of New York showed that after twenty years of driving, 99% of drivers had at
least one accident, and an average driver has a 50% chance of an accident every three
years. Rockefeller Report at 3. This is not surprising; for each mile driven, a driver
must make 200 observations and 20 decisions, and the average driver makes an error in
judgment every two miles. Commerce Comm. Report at 23.
9. FLA. STAT. § 627.736(4)(d) (1979) provides:
(4) BENEFITS; WHEN DUE (d) The insurer of the owner of a motor
vehicle shall pay personal injury protection benefits for: 1. Accidental bod-
2431
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those injured in or by a vehicle which was not a statutorily defined
"motor vehicle"10 may be derived from five important decisions:""
Negron v. Travelers Insurance Co., 2 Camacho v. Allstate Insurance
Co.,"3 Heredia v. Allstate Insurance Co. (both the district court and
supreme court decisions), 4 and Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co. v.
Castanga15 a supreme court case which is out of step with all that had
gone before. The disharmony between the Supreme Court's opinion in
Heredia and its opinion in Lumbermens emerges from an analysis
which must begin with Negron.
Negron, an employee of the United States Post Office, was injured
when the government's tractor-trailer, which he was driving in the
scope of his employment, was struck by a private passenger automobile.
The court allowed Negron to recover PIP benefits from the insurer of
his personal automobile (which was not involved in the accident), rea-
soning that (1) Negron was not an occupant of a "motor vehicle" as
that term is defined in the Act;16 (2) Negron's injury was "caused by
physical contact with a motor vehicle";17 therefore (3) Negron was en-
ily injury sustained in this state by the owner while occupying a motor
vehicle, or while not an occupant of a motor vehicle ... if the injury is
caused by physical contact with a motor vehicle.
10. FLA. STAT. § 627.732(1) (1977):
"Motor vehicle" means a sedan, stationwagon, or jeep-type vehicle not
used as a public livery conveyance for passengers and includes any other
four-wheel motor vehicle used as a utility automobile and a pickup or
panel truck which is not used primarily in the occupation, profession, or
business of the insured.
This definition was changed. Ch. 78-374 § 2, 1978 Fla. Laws 1042. See note 58 infra.
11. See also Cavalier Ins. Corp. V. Myles, 347 So. 2d 1060 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 1977) in which Cavalier attempted to deny PIP benefits because the car that
struck its insured was registered in another state. The court held that a vehicle regis-
tered in another state is a "motor vehicle" nonetheless, and awarded PIP benefits. Id.
at 1062.
12. 282 So. 2d 28 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1973).
13. 310 So. 2d 330 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
14. 346 So. 2d 1230 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1977) and 358 So. 2d 1353 (Fla.
1978).
15. 368 So. 2d 348 (Fla. 1979).
16. 282 So. 2d at 29.
17. Id. at 30.
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titled to recover."8
The court supported its conclusion that Negron was not an occu-
pant of a "motor vehicle" by considering the statutory definition of the
term and an administrative interpretation of the statute by the Depart-
ment of Insurance."9 The court rejected the Department's administra-
tive interpretation, which reasoned that because Negron was the occu-
pant of a vehicle not statutorily defined as a "motor vehicle," the
coverage of the Act did not apply to him.20
The court opined: "[W]e take the words '... if the injury is
caused by physical contact with a motor vehicle' to mean if the injury
results from a collision with a motor vehicle."21 The court did not re-
quire that Negron himself come into actual physical contact with a
motor vehicle because it felt such a construction would be "technical,"
and out of keeping with the ordinary meaning of the language of the
Act.2 By so holding, the court declined to limit the benefits of Section
627.736(4)(d)4 to pedestrians-a limitation the legislature may have
intended, because the Act was later amended to make benefits availa-
ble to one injured "while not an occupant of a self-propelled vehicle"
rather than "while not an occupant of a motor vehicle." 23
In Camacho,24 the plaintiff was injured when the truck he owned
and was driving collided with another truck. Like Negron, he applied
18. Id.
19. Id. at 29.
20. Id. at 30.
21. Id. (emphasis added).
22. Id. For other cases in which PIP benefits were awarded to passengers injured
in a vehicle which was not a statutorily defined "motor vehicle", see Gateway Ins. Co.
v. Butler, 293 So. 2d 738 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1974)(passenger in a "public convey-
ance" injured when it was struck by an automobile); and State Farm Mut. Auto Ins.
Co. v. Butler, 340 So. 2d 1185 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1976)(passenger in a "utility
vehicle used in transporting passengers for hire" injured when it hit an automobile). In
both cases, PIP benefits were paid by the insurers of the automobiles involved because
the passengers in the commercial vehicles did not own a car. Thus they had no insur-
ance from which they could collect on a first-party basis. See also Greyhound Rent-A-
Car, Inc. v. Carbon, 327 So. 2d 792 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1976) in which the court
held that a rental car is a "motor vehicle," thus allowing those injured in it to recover
PIP benefits.
23. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Butler, 340 So. 2d 1185, 1186 (Fla.
4th Dist. Ct. App. 1976); Ch. 77-468 § 33, 1977 Fla. Laws 2076.
24. 310 So. 2d 330 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
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for PIP benefits from the insurer of his personal auto. Unlike Negron,
the trial and appellate courts denied coverage.25
The appellate court supported its decision by emphasizing that
"the plaintiff [was] operating a truck used primarily in his business
[and] was involved in an accident with another truck which counsel
stipulated was a 'commercial vehicle.' ",26 "Due to the stipulation of
counsel. . . it is undisputed that the plaintiff was involved with a vehi-
cle which is not a motor vehicle as defined in the Florida Automobile
Reparations (No-Fault) Act."12 7
Why the court attached so much significance to counsel's stipula-
tion is unclear. Counsel merely stipulated a commercial vehicle was
involved; this is not tantamount to a conclusion of law that the com-
mercial vehicle was not a motor vehicle as defined in the Act.28 The
Act's definition of "motor vehicle" includes "a pickup or panel
truck . .,." What the definition does not include is "a pickup or
panel truck which is . . . used primarily in the occupation, profession,
or business of the insured."30
Camacho, like Negron, sustained injury "while not an occupant of
a motor vehicle" (because he was occupying a "truck used primarily in
the occupation, profession, or business of the insured"). And because
Camacho's injury was caused by physical contac3 1 with a truck used
primarily in the occupation, profession, or business of the owner, not of
the insured, it would appear to be caused by physical contact with a
"motor vehicle." Like Negron, Camacho should have recovered under
the benefits section of the Act which provides:
The insurer of the owner of a motor vehicle shall pay personal
injury protection benefits for: 1. Accidental bodily injury sustained
in this state by the owner while occupying a motor vehicle, or while
not an occupant of a motor vehicle if the injury is caused by physi-
25. Id. at 332.
26. Id. at 331.
27. Id.
28. For the definition of "motor vehicle", see note 10 supra.
29. 310 So. 2d at 331.
30. Id.
31. See the discussion of "physical contact" in text accompanying notes 21-23
supra.
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cal contact with a motor vehicle.32
This reasoning may seem strained, but in the concurring opinion in
Heredia v. Allstate Insurance Co.,33 Judge Carroll suggested such an
analysis to the Florida Supreme Court;34 the court apparently adopted
it.3 5
In Heredia, the Third District Court of Appeal held that an in-
jured pedestrian, hit by a panel truck used primarily in the business of
its corporate owner, could not recover PIP benefits from his family's
auto insurer.38 The concurring judge reluctantly followed precedent he
had approved in earlier cases, 7 but admitted the earlier cases might
have been wrong, because the statutory definition of motor vehicle ex-
cluded only vehicles "used primarily in the occupation, profession, or
business of the insured."38 Since the pedestrian was not injured by a
motor vehicle used in his own business (the business of the insured pe-
destrian), he should recover his statutory first-party insurance bene-
fits.39 The concurring judge believed the majority members were read-
ing the statute as if it exempted vehicles "used primarily in the
occupation, profession, or business of the owner,"' an inappropriate
32. FLA. STAT. § 627.736(4)(d) (1971) (emphasis added). This provision was
amended in 1977. See note 58 infra.
33. 346 So. 2d 1230 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
34. Id.. at 1231-32. Judge Carroll called into question the wisdom of the Cama-
cho decision:
[H]aving been a member of the panels of this court which decided Cama-
cho . . . although I now see some justification for appellant's argument
that the language of the statute does not support the result reached. . . , I
concur in this court's judgment of affirmance based on the authority of
Camacho . . . , with the decision in this case being certified as one of
public interest, whereby the Supreme Court of Florida will have jurisdic-
tion to review the decision, on certiorari.
Id. at 1232.
35. 358 So. 2d 1353, 1355 (Fla. 1978).
36. The Act provides PIP benefits for statutorily defined relatives living in the
same household with the insured. FLA. STAT. § 627.736(4)(d) 3 (1979).
37. Camacho v. Allstate Ins. Co., 310 So. 2d 330 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1975)
and Saborit v. Deliford, 312 So. 2d 795 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. ,1975).
38. 346 So. 2d at 1251 (emphasis in original).
39. Id. at 1232.
40. Id. at 1231 (emphasis in original).
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judicial revision where the legislation is clear.41
The Florida Supreme Court agreed with the reasoning of Judge
Carroll's concurring opinion. It read the statute literally, reversed the
district court, and awarded Heredia his PIP benefits.' 2 The court noted
that the legislature expressly exempted vehicles used in the business of
the insured.'3 If the legislature had intended to exempt vehicles used in
the business of the owner it would have said so.44 Thus the pedestrian
was injured by a motor vehicle and could recover under the Act.
The opinion reversing Heredia did not mention the Camacho deci-
sion, even though the majority in the district court had relied upon it.
But impliedly, the Camacho decision was wrong, for it held that the
Act did not apply to commercial vehicles. 4'5 At a minimum, the su-
preme court opinion in Heredia holds that the Act applies to a pedes-
trian hit by a commercial vehicle.
Putting Heredia and Negron together, one might expect the occu-
pant of a commercial vehicle (Negron) hit by a commercial vehicle
(Heredia) to recover. Not so.
In Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co. v. Castagna,'6 Castagna
was injured when his van, which he used primarily in his business, was
struck by a lunch truck. The lunch truck had collided moments before
with a Chevrolet automobile. Castagna sought PIP benefits from his
own insurer, 47 Lumbermens, who denied coverage, claiming the in-
41. Id. at 1232.
42. 358 So. 2d at 1355.
43. Id.
44. The court notes that "[t]he Legislature ... also employed the term 'owner'
throughout the same statute, in a variety of contexts. In the face of this selectivity,
courts generally are not free to replace one term with the other. . . ." Id.
45. Another case in which PIP benefits were awarded to a pedestrian hit by a
commercial vehicle is Century Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Fillmore, 306 So. 2d 548 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1974), which was expressly overruled by Camacho. Camacho, 310 So.
2d at 332. Because the supreme court decision in Heredia agrees with Century on the
same facts, and because Century was expressly overruled by Camacho, impliedly Ca-
macho was incorrectly decided. On the other hand, it may be possible to distinguish
Camacho because, while Century and Heredia involved a pedestrian and a commercial
vehicle, Camacho involved two commercial vehicles.
46. 368 So. 2d 348 (Fla. 1979).
47. Id. at 349.
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sured's injuries were not incurred "while occupying a motor vehicle"'4 8
and were not "caused by physical contact with a motor vehicle." 49
Instead of deciding whether Castagna had been injured by physi-
cal contact with a "motor vehicle," the lunch truck, (a question the
supreme court in Heredia would have answered in the affirmative be-
cause the lunch truck was not owned by the insured), the court dis-
cussed whether the injury was "caused by physical contact" with the
Chevrolet.50 Having focused on the wrong issue, the court concluded
that the physical contact with the Chevrolet was too remote to meet the
traditional proximate cause requirements of tort law, which of course is
true, but irrelevant.5 1 The court stated, without analysis, that "[tihe
Chevrolet is a 'motor vehicle' within the statutory definition. The van
and lunch truck are not." 52
The conclusion that the lunch truck is not a "motor vehicle" di-
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 350.
51. A discussion of proximate cause is not totally out of place in the context of
the No-Fault Act. For example, see Royal Indemnity Co. v. Government Employees
Ins. Co., 307 So. 2d 458 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1975) in which a woman sitting on a
park bench was injured when a moving vehicle struck a parked vehicle and the parked
vehicle struck her. The insurer of the parked vehicle paid her PIP benefits and sought
reimbursement from the insurer of the moving vehicle. The insurer of the moving vehi-
cle argued that the plain language of the statute required that benefits be paid only
when injury is "caused by physical contact with" a motor vehicle (FLA. STAT. §
627.736(4)(d) 4 (1971)), and no contact occurred between the moving vehicle and the
park bench-sitter. The Third District Court of Appeal held that the insurer of the mov-
ing vehicle should pay, reasoning that the No-Fault Act did not replace common law
concepts of causation, "particularly proximate causation." Id. at 460. The court said
the parked car was "in reality an extension of the [moving] car," and therefore the
proximate cause of the injury. Id. See also Padron v. Long Island Ins. Co. 356 So. 2d
1337 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1978), and Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Pridgen, 339 So. 2d
1164 (Fla. 2d Dist, Ct. App. 1976).
But cf. Feltner v. Harford Accident & Indemnity Co., 336 So. 2d 142 (Fla. 2d
Dist. Ct. App. 1976) in which the Second District Court of Appeal held that injury
sustained by a man, who after driving a young woman home was struck across the face
with a piece of pipe by her irate father, who thought the man was a seducer, was not
injury "arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use" of the car. The court did not
find a sufficient "causal connection between the use of the automobile and the attack."
Id. at 143.
52. 368 So. 2d at 349.
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rectly contravened the holding in Heredia.53 In a footnote in Lumber-
mens, the court acknowledged that Heredia construed the word "in-
sured" in the definition of "motor vehicle."54 But this acknowledgment
failed to distinguish Heredia, for in Heredia the court only construed
the word "insured" to reach the conclusion that the statutory term
"motor vehicle" included a commercial truck.55 Castagna's injury, like
Heredia's, was caused by physical contact with a motor vehicle (a com-
mercial truck). The statutory definition of "motor vehicle" was satisfied
because the truck that struck Castagna was not used in the business of
the insured, Castagna, but rather in the business of its owner.
Assuming Heredia had precedential effect, the only issue in Lum-
bermens should have been whether Castagna was the occupant of a
"motor vehicle." Negron established that he was not. Negron permitted
the occupant of a conveyance which was not within the statutory defini-
tion of "motor vehicle" (a post office tractor-trailer) to recover when
hit by a "motor vehicle."'56
In view of Negron and Heredia, the Florida Supreme Court should
have either held for Castagna, or approved the holding in Camacho:
the Act does not apply when two commercial vehicles collide.57 Instead,
the Court discussed proximate cause, leaving the important issue
unclarified. 58
53. Recall that Heredia concluded that the pedestrian hit by a commercial vehi-
cle had been hit by a "motor vehicle" because the vehicle was not used primarily in the
business of the insured, but rather used primarily in the business of the owner.
54. 368 So. 2d at 349 n.3. This footnote is the only acknowledgment the Lumber-
mens court makes in the Heredia decision. It states in part that "[t]he word 'insured'
has been held to refer only to insureds who are injured by physical contact within
commercial vehicles, and not to owners of commercial vehicles . I." d.
55. See discussion of Heredia in text supra.
56. See discussion of Negron in text supra.
57. The appellant contended that the case fell under the no-recovery rule of
Camacho because the collision involved only commercial vehicles. 368 So. 2d at 350.
The opinion ignores this contention.
58. At the time of the decision, the legislature had amended the definition of
"motor vehicle" to expressly include commercial vehicles. See Ch. 78-374 § 2, 1978
Fla. Laws 1042. The court acknowledged the change in a footnote without any discus-
sion of how the change should affect Castagna. 368 So. 2d at 349 n.3. Although the
court expressly stated it was construing FLA. STAT. § 627.736(4)(d) (1975), arguably,
the 1978 amendment was merely a clarification of prior law. See Williams v. Hartford
Accident and Indemnity Co., 382 So. 2d 1216 (Fla. 1980), where the court held that a
6:19821Nova Law Journal
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Uninsured Vehicles
The uninsured vehicle cases can be divided into four categories: 1)
those determining the benefits due to children hurt in insured vehicles,
while living with parents who failed to insure the family car, 2) those
determining the benefits due persons injured while either driving, riding
in, or "occupying" uninsured cars, 3) those determining the benefits
due persons injured in an insured car who owned an uninsured car, and
4) those determining the benefits due persons who constructively
"owned" an uninsured car. Basic to these cases is the statutory require-
ment that one cannot recover PIP benefits from a stranger if one owns
an uninsured vehicle or is statutorily entitled to insurance benefits from
a relative domiciled with him.59
Cases in the first category stand for the proposition that children
injured while riding in others' insured vehicles can recover PIP benefits
in spite of their parents' failure to insure the family car. For example,
in Farley v. Gateway Insurance Co.,60 a child, riding in a car insured
by Gateway, was allowed to recover from Gateway, despite the fact
that he lived with his stepfather, who owned an uninsured car. Gate-
way argued that Farley's stepfather, by failing to insure, had become a
self-insurer under the Act.61 The court rejected Gateway's construction
1973 modification of section 627.727 of the Florida Statutes (dealing with uninsured
motorist coverage) was formal only, and "was intended by the legislature to clarify and
secure from doubt" pre-existing law. 382 So. 2d at 1220. In so doing, the court "dis-
approved" five cases inconsistent with the opinion. Id.
At the time of the Lumbermens decision, the legislature had also amended FLA.
STAT. § 627.736(4)(d)(1) to provide benefits for injury sustained "while occupying a
motor vehicle" or "while not an occupant of a self-propelled vehicle." See ch. 77-468
§ 33, 1977 Fla. Laws 2076. Although Castagna would not have fit into the category
"while not an occupant of a self-propelled vehicle" under the amended law, he would
have fit into the category "while occupying a motor vehicle" under the amended law,
since the definition of motor vehicle had been expanded to include commercial vehicles.
59. FLA. STAT. § 627.736(4)(d)(4) (1979).
60. 302 So. 2d 177 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
61. FLA. STAT. § 627.733(4) (1979) provides:
An owner of a motor vehicle with respect to which security is required...
who fails to have such security in effect at the time of an accident shall
have no immunity from tort liability, but shall be personally liable for the
payment of benefits under § 627.736. With respect to such benefits, such
an owner shall have all of the rights and obligations of an insurer under §
45
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of the statute, reasoning that the "Act was intended to broaden insur-
ance coverage.'2 The construction urged by Gateway would have re-
duced coverage.63 The court also rejected Gateway's argument that the
Act required Farley to look to his stepfather as an insurer,"6 reasoning
that the questioned provision of the Act was intended to prevent an
injured party from collecting insurance benefits twice: once from the
insurer of the car in which he was hurt, and ofice from the insurer of
his family car." The court pointed out that there would be no double
recovery for Farley. The court concluded that the legislature did not
intend
to acquiesce in the consequence of calamity to a relative [of one
who ought to have insured] when such relative is injured in or by a
stranger's automobile and can recover [from] the stranger's insurer
if the stepfather didn't even own an automobile. Farley should not
in effect be penalized just because his stepfather bought an auto-
mobile; and the obvious practicalities in these cases preclude a re-
sponse that he, Farley, can always go against his stepfather if the
latter fails to procure insurance therefor.6"
Finally, the court observed that "insurer" is defined in the statute as
one in the business of selling insurance.6 7 Farley's stepfather was not in
§ 627.730-627.741
(emphasis added).
62. 302 So. 2d at 179 (emphasis in original).
63. Id.
64. Gateway argued FLA. STAT. § 627.736(4)(d)4b (1973):
(d) The insurer of the owner of a motor vehicle shall pay ... for
4.. . . injury sustained ... by any person. . . while occupying the own-
er's motor vehicle. . . provided the injured person is not himself:
a. The owner of a motor vehicle with respect to which security is required
... or
b. Entitled to ... benefits from the insurer of the owner of such a motor
vehicle.
65. 302 So. 2d at 179.
66. Id.
67. Id. FLA. STAT. § 624.03 (1973). In State Farm Mut. v. Pierce, 383 So. 2d
1184 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1980), the court cited Farley when it refused to make the
husband, the owner of an uninsured vehicle, a co-defendant with the insurance com-
pany sued for PIP benefits by his wife. The husband was not an insurer and could not
be made to share in payment of benefits.
1252 6:19821
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that business.
Commercial Union Insurance Co. v. Williams 8 is similar to Far-
ley. Williams was injured while a passenger in an insured motor vehi-
cle, and while residing in the household of a relative (her mother) who
owned an uninsured motor vehicle. The First District, like the Farley
court, allowed Williams to recover PIP benefits from the insurer of the
vehicle in which she was a passenger. Commercial Union's argument
that Williams' mother, by failing to insure her motor vehicle, had be-
come a self-insurer6 was rejected by the court, as it had been in Far-
ley. Instead, the court concluded that Williams had the option of suing
either her mother, or, "if she prefers," Commercial Union.7 0
In contrast, cases in the second category stand for the proposition
that persons injured while either driving, riding in or "occupying" unin-
sured cars cannot recover PIP benefits. For example, in State Farm
Automobile Insurance Co. v. Kraver" Carolyn Kraver was driving an
uninsured Cadillac, registered and titled in her father's name,7 2 when
she collided with an automobile insured by State Farm. Carolyn argued
that she should recover PIP benefits from State Farm under the Farley
decision. The court disagreed, reasoning that the plain language of the
benefits section of the Act controlled..3
68. 309 So. 2d 617 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
69. Id. at 618.
70. Id. at 619. See also Gateway Ins. Co. v. Butler, 293 So. 2d 738 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1974) in which a child injured in a conveyance struck by a vehicle
insured by Gateway was allowed to recover PIP benefits from Gateway, despite the fact
that his father, in whose household he resided, owned an uninsured car.
The same result occurs when the child living in the household of a parent who
owns an uninsured car is struck by an insured vehicle. ,See Witko v. Liberty Mut. Ins.
Co., 348 So. 2d 52 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
71. 364 So. 2d 1259 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
72. The court pointed out that the Cadillac was "purchased" by Carolyn
suggesting ownership might have been a latent issue. Id. at 1260. See FLA. STAT. §
627.736 (4)(d)4.a (Supp. 1976).
73. FLA STAT. § 627.736(4)(d) (1979) provides:
(d) The insurer of the owner of a motor vehicle shall pay personal injury
protection benefits for:
4. Accidental bodily injury sustained in this state by any other
person [than the owner] while occupying the owner's motor
vehicle or, if a resident of this state, while not an occupant of
a motor vehicle or motorcycle, if the injury is caused by phys-
25316:1982 No Fault Insurance in Florida
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Because Ms. Kraver was neither "occupying the [insured] owner's
motor vehicle"7 4 (she was not occupying the car insured by State
Farm) nor was she "not an occupant of a motor vehicle or motor-
cycle" 5 (for she was in her dad's Cadillac), she did not come within
the benefits provided by the statute.
The court found Farley inapplicable;78 sound logic because Farley
was "occupying the [insured] owner's motor vehicle"77 and was not
himself "[the owner of a motor vehicle with respect to which security
is required,"78 although his stepfather was. Kraver was driving a vehi-
cle which should have been insured and was not. Although both Farley
and Kraver were children of parents who failed to insure, Kraver was
old enough to know better-and she was driving. Farley was merely a
passenger, and in an insured car at that.
The decision in South Carolina Insurance Company v. Rodri-
guez7 9 is consistent with Kraver, but the result is inconsistent with the
policy of the Act. Rodriguez, injured when the uninsured motor vehicle
in which he was riding collided with a motor vehicle insured by South
Carolina Insurance Company, attempted to recover PIP benefits from
South Carolina Insurance Company. Rodriguez is distinguishable from
Farley, who sought benefits from the insurer of the vehicle in which he
was a passenger, and thus was clearly within the description of the ben-
efits section of the statute." Rodriguez did not own a vehicle, nor did
he live with one who did. The Rodriguez court, relying on Kraver and
ical contact with such motor vehicle, provided the injured per-
son is not himself:
a. The owner of a motor vehicle with respect to which security
is required under §§ 627.730-627.741, or
b. Entitled to personal injury benefits from the insurer of the
owner of such a motor vehicle. (emphasis added.)
74. Id. at (4)(d)4.
75. Id. This use of double negatives is not bad grammar, but rather a close
tracking of the language of the statute. Recall that the court declined to limit benefits
of the Act to pedestrians. See the discussion of Negron in text supra.
76. 364 So. 2d at 1261.
77. FLA. STAT. § 627.736 (4)(d)4 a (1979).
78. Id.
79. 366 So. 2d 168 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
80. FLA. STAT. § 627.736 (4)(d)4 (Supp. 1978).
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the "clear dictates" of the statute,8" denied Rodriguez benefits. Pre-
sumably,8 2 Rodriguez was injured neither while "occupying the [in-
sured] owner's motor vehicle"'83 nor "while not an occupant of a motor
vehicle," 84 thus he was not entitled to benefits. But there was no evi-
dence that passenger Rodriguez was a relative of the uninsured owner
(contrasted with the plaintiff in Kraver who was driving her father's
Cadillac), nor that he had any control over the failure to insure (con-
trasted with Carolyn Kraver, who actually purchased the Cadillac, al-
though it was registered in her father's name)85 Thus, Rodriguez fails
to effect the intent of the Act as stated in Farley: "to broaden insur-
ance coverage while at the same time reasonably limiting the amount
of damages which could be claimed."'
Similarly, in Protective National Insurance Company of Omaha v.
Padron, 7 a passenger, Padron, was injured while riding in an an un-
insured car. Padron, however, sought to recover from the insurer of the
driver of the car in which he was riding rather than the insurer of the
owner of the other car. The Third District Court of Appeal denied re-
covery,88 reasoning that the driver's policy provided benefits only for
persons occupying the insured car,89 and the No-Fault Act only re-
quires that the owner of a car purchase insurance, not the driver.90 The
injured passenger did not have no-fault insurance of her own, 91 but
whether or not she owned a car was not disclosed. One who does not
own a car is not required to have PIP insurance.92 Indeed, one cannot
obtain no-fault protection without owning a car.93 Assuming the in-
81. 366 So. 2d at 169.
82. The decision is per curiam.
83. FLA. STAT. § 627.736 (4)(d)4. See language of statute at note 73 supra.
84. Id. See note 10 supra.
85. 364 So. 2d at 1260.
86. 302 So. 2d at 179.
87. 310 So. 2d 432 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
88. Cf. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Smith, 328 So. 2d 870 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1976)
in which an injured pedestrian was allowed to recover from the driver's insurer, despite
the owner's failure to insure.
89. 310 So. 2d at 433.
90. Id. at 434.
91. Id. at 433.
92. FLA. STAT. § 627.733 (1979).
93. See McClendon v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 305 So. 2d 237 (Fla. 3d Dist.
255 1No Fault Insurance in Florida1 6:1982
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jured passenger owned no car, it is not reasonable to deny her coverage
under the Act; the exception of those similarly situated warrants legis-
lative and judicial attention. Remedial statutes should be broadly con-
strued so as to achieve their remedial purpose. In enacting the No-
Fault Act, the legislature intended to reduce fault-based litigation and
to facilitate compensation of accident victims. Leaving a blameless auto
passenger to to her common law remedy does not further these goals.
Persons injured while "occupying" an uninsured car have been de-
nied PIP benefits. In Industrial Fire and Casualty Insurance Company
v. Collier94 the court interpreted the word "occupying." Collier was
injured when changing the tire of his uninsured VW. His disabled vehi-
cle was struck by another car, causing the VW to strike him. He ap-
plied for PIP benefits from Industrial, the insurer of his other car, who
denied benefits based on an exclusion in its policy which was authorized
by the Act. 5 The policy exclusion provided that coverage did not apply
while the insured was occupying a motor vehicle which he owned, but
had failed to insure under the policy. The policy defined "occupying" to
mean "in or upon, or entering into, or alighting from a motor vehi-
cle."96 The appellate court found that Collier was "occupying" his VW,
and thus was excluded from coverage.97
Cases in the third category stand for the proposition that persons
injured while driving, or riding in an insured car, who own9" an unin-
Ct. App. 1974). McClendon was injured driving another's uninsured auto. He applied
for PIP benefits from his own insurer under a non-owner policy issued to him. The
insurer was held not liable for PIP benefits because McClendon did not own a car, even
though his policy contained an uninsured motorist endorsement; presumably this cover-
age was available only upon a showing of fault. An insurer is not obligated to provide
no-fault benefits in a policy of insurance if the insured does not own a car. Id. at 237-
38.
94. 334 So. 2d 148 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
95. Id. at 149. FLA. STAT. § 627.736(2) provides: "AUTHORIZED EXCLU-
SIONS-Any insurer may exclude benefits: (a) For injury sustained by the named
insured . . . while occupying another motor vehicle owned by the named insured and
not insured under the policy .... "
96. 334 So. 2d at 149-50.
97. Id. at 150. See also Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Pridgen, 339 So. 2d 1164, 1165
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
98. The owner of a motor vehicle must insure it. FLA. STAT. § 627.733(1)
(1979): "Every owner or registrant of a motor vehicle required to be registered and
licensed in this state shall maintain security as required by subsection (3) in effect
Nova Law Journal 6:1982 [
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sured car, will also be denied the PIP benefits of the Act.
In Whitaker v. Allstate Insurance Co.,99 Pam Whitaker did not
recover from Allstate because she owned an uninsured Porsche. She
lived with her sister and was injured while driving her sister's car, in-
sured by Allstate. The court affirmed Allstate's refusal to pay PIP ben-
efits based on the "unambiguous proviso" of Section 627.736(4)(d)3 of
the Act: "provided the relative. . . is not [herself] the owner of a mo-
tor vehicle with respect to which security is required.100
Tapscott v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.101 in-
volved a woman who was injured while driving her father's car. Her
action against her father's insurer failed because she was the owner of
a vehicle for which security was required under the Act, and her "es-
tranged husband cancelled the insurance on her automobile."11 2 Thus
she was involuntarily excepted from the benefits provision of the Act.1 03
Because the security requirement is triggered by the requirement
that a vehicle be registered in the state,10' Ms. Tapscott argued that
continuously throughout the registration or licensing period." In addition, one must
look to one's own insurer for PIP benefits, even if injured in another's insured auto. See
FLA. STAT. § 627.736(4)(d) and Martinez v.'Old Security Cas. Co., 327 So. 2d 786
(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1976). Main Ins. Co. v. Wiggins, 349 So. 2d 638 (Fla. 1st Dist.
Ct. App. 1977) interpreted the word "owner". The First District held that Wiggins,
who was injured while standing beside a motor vehicle he was leasing, was not an
"owner" because his lease did not include an option to purchase. Id. at 639. Because
Wiggins owned no other car, and because he lived with his daughter, he was allowed to
recover PIP benefits from his daughter's auto insurer. The decision is straightforward
enough-one who leases is not an "owner." But the fact that one who leases with an
option to purchase is an "owner" as specifically defined in FLA. STAT. § 627.732(2)
(1979) might well come as a surprise to an unwary lessee.
99. 363 So. 2d 856 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
100. Id. at 857. See also Protective Nat'l Ins. Co. of Omaha v. Bergouignan, 335
So. 2d 871 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
101. 330 So. 2d 475 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
102. Id. at 476.
103. FLA. STAT. § 627.736(4)(d)3(1979):
(d) The insurer ...shall pay ...for 3. Accidental bodily injury sus-
tained by a relative of the owner residing in the same household, under the
circumstances described in subparagraph 1. or subparagraph 2., provided
the relative at the time of the accident is domiciled in the owner's house-
hold and is not [herself] the owner of a motor vehicle with respect to
which security is required ....
104. See Ochoa and Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. Lopez, 358 So. 2d 1173, 1174 (Fla.
51
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her car was not required to be registered because it had been inoper-
able for four days due to clutch and transmission disorders. 10 5 The
court conceded that prior cases excluded "motor vehicles which are
neither operated over the public streets or highways of Florida nor
maintained for that purpose"10 6 from the required security provisions of
the Act, but found that Ms. Tapscott had not "abandoned her automo-
bile as a means of transportation on public streets and highways."107
The insurance on her car was cancelled because. her husband aban-
doned her, not because she had abandoned her car. The court noted
that "[a]fter recovery from her injuries, appellant repaired and rein-
sured her car,"10 8 evidencing her intent to maintain the car.
An opposite outcome but one consistent with the result in Tapscott
was reached in Malen v. American States Insurance Co.109 Wayne
Malen owned an uninsured Mercedes Benz. He was injured driving Di-
ane Loos' car, insured by American States. American States denied
coverage because Malen was "the owner of a motor vehicle with re-
spect to which security is required. ."1110 On appeal, Malen recovered
because the court determined that his Mercedes was not a vehicle
"maintained for operation on the streets and highways .... "II point-
ing to the fact that it had been left unrepaired at a repair shop for six
months to be sold "as is."11 2 Thus, security was not required for his
Mercedes.1"'
3d Dist. Ct. App. 1978), Lopez v. Fidelity & Cas. Co. of N.Y., 384 So. 2d 680, 681
(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1980) and FLA. STAT. § 320.02(1) (1979).
105. 330 So. 2d at 476.
106. Id. at 477. The court cited Staley v. Florida Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co.,
328 So. 2d 241 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1976) and Kotich v. Criterion Ins. Co., 38 Fla.
Supp. 199 (C.C. Escambia Co. 1973).
107. 330 So. 2d at 477.
108. Id.
109. 376 So. 2d 473 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
110. Id. American was arguing the exclusion from coverage provided by FLA.
STAT. § 627.736(4)(d)4a (1975).
111. 376 So. 2dat474.
112. Id. at 473 citing Ward v. Florida Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 375 So. 2d
898 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1979) and Tapscott.
113. See also Sherman v. Reserve Ins. Co., 350 So. 2d 349 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1977). Cf. Williams v. Leatherby, 338 So. 2d 70, 71 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1976). Williams owned an uninsured car, but was injured driving a friend's car. The
court held the insurer not liable for PIP benefits, in spite of the fact that Williams'
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In Staley v. Florida Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co.,114 Sta-
ley was injured while a passenger in a car insured by Florida Farm.
Staley owned an uninsured auto not involved in the accident. Staley
argued that he was entitled to PIP benefits from Florida Farm because
he, like Farley, was injured while a passenger in an insured vehicle.1 15
The court denied benefits, distinguishing Farley."'6 Unfortunately, in
distinguishing Farley, the court misreported it.117
The logical rationale for the outcome in Staley is the plain lan-
guage of the statute, which expressly excludes benefits where the in-
jured person is himself "the owner of a motor vehicle with respect to
auto had been inoperable and in storage for more than two months before the accident,
and was not repaired until after the accident. The court relied upon FLA. STAT. §
627.733(1) which requires every owner of a motor vehicle required to be registered to
maintain security on the motor vehicle. But the court failed to examine whether the
motor vehicle was "required to be registered," and declined to follow Staley v. Florida
Farm Bur. Ins. Co., discussed in text accompanying notes 114-119 infra. Id. at 72. (In
dictum, the Staley court had said: "Had appellant's motor vehicle been inoperable or
had it been in storage it would not have been a vehicle required to be registered and
licensed in Florida." 328 So. 2d at 243.) Apparently the Williams court was distracted
by the fact that the car had not been insured for a year prior to its inoperability. Id.
This shouldn't make any difference once the car is inoperable. The No-Fault Act sets
penalties for failure to insure, and denial of benefits where they are legally available is
not one of them.
114. 328 So. 2d 241 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
115. Id. at 243.
116. Id.
117. The Staley court said Farley was "conceivably 'entitled to collect personal
injury benefits from' his stepfather." 328 So. 2d at 243. This is error. The Farley court
expressly found that the stepfather was not an "insurer," and that "the obvious practi-
calities" precluded the response that Farley could go against his stepfather. 302 So. 2d
at 179. Further, the Staley court said that the policy of the Act in Farley is "to shift
the burden of Farley's injury not to his stepfather but to a compensated seller of auto-
mobile insurance." 328 So. 2d at 243. The Farley court found "the act was intended to
broaden insurance coverage while at the same time reasonably limiting the amount of
damages in which could be claimed," 302 So. 2d at 179, a policy statement in Staley's
favor, not against him. Furthermore, the Farley court found the "obvious reason" for
Section 627.736(4)(d)4b is "to prevent an injured party from receiving a windfall by
collecting benefits from the insurance carrier for the owner of a vehicle in which he is
riding at the time of the accident and at the same time collecting benefits from the
insurance carrier of another motor vehicle owner . I." d. This interpretation too
would favor Staley's recovery.
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which security is required."""8 The best way to distinguish Farley from
Staley is also to refer to the plain language of the statute: Farley was
neither the owner of a motor vehicle,119 nor entitled to PIP benefits
from the insurer of the owner.'2 0 If one is either, one is excluded from
benefits. Staley fit the first exclusion. Unspoken, but perhaps relevant
in Farley, is the fact that a child has no control over whether his parent
(stepfather) insures or not; Staley should have insured. Spoken, and
certainly very relevant in Farley, is the obvious practicality: a child
doesn't sue his stepfather. 12'
Constructively "Owned" Vehicles
The final category of cases, those determining the availabilty of
PIP benefits to those who constructively "own" an uninsured vehicle, is
118. FLA. STAT. § 627.736(4)(d)4a.
119. Id.
120. FLA. STAT. § 627.736(4)(d)4b.
121. In contrast to the denial of PIP benefits in the above cases, persons have
been allowed to collect medical payments benefits from the insurer of the car in which
they were riding, in spite of failing to insure their own cars.
Ward v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., and Johnston v. United Services Auto.
Ass'n, 364 So. 2d 73 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1978), consolidated for appeal, involved
passengers injured in separate accidents, each in an insured vehicle. Both passengers
owned automobiles which they had failed to insure, in contravention of the Act. The
appellate court found that the injured plaintiffs were entitled to the insurance benefits
they were seeking from the insurer of the owner of the vehicle in which they were
injured---"additional and optional medical payments coverage for which a separate pre-
mium was charged." Id. at 76. They were not seeking nor were they entitled to PIP
benefits. Id. In response to United Services' argument that it would be unfair to allow
Johnston to recover because he had violated the required security provision of the Act,
the court responded that the legislature had provided penalties for violation of the Act,
and it was not the court's role to fashion new ones, and that "between plaintiffs and
defendants, there is nothing unfair in requiring defendants to make payment of benefits
which they have contracted to pay under coverage for which they have been paid a
premium." Id. at 78. The court reminded the defendant that the purpose of provisions
in insurance contracts which restrict coverage when other insurance coverage is availa-
ble is to avoid duplication of coverage, not to escape coverage altogether, as defendant
would do. The court warned that "[i]f an insurer intends to restrict coverage, it should
use language clearly stating its purpose," for "[w]here there are two interpretations
which may fairly be given to language used in a policy, the one that allows the greater
indemnity will govern." Id. at 77.
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perhaps the most disturbing in terms of outcome. These cases construe
the meaning of the phrase "named insured" in a policy of insurance in
order to impute constructive ownership of a vehicle. The holding of
each presents a disturbing result, at odds with consumers' reasonable
expectations regarding insurance coverage. 122
For example, in the consolidated cases of Rojas and Fonseca,123
Mrs. Rojas' reasonable expectations were thwarted. Mrs. Rojas, driving
her husband's uninsured Oldsmobile, and Mrs. Fonseca, her passenger,
were injured in an accident. Mrs. Rojas sought PIP benefits and Mrs.
Fonseca sought liability benefits under a policy issued to Mrs. Rojas by
122. See R. KEETON, INSURANCE LAW § 6.3 (1971):
Insurance contracts continue to be contracts of adhesion, under which
the insured is left little choice beyond electing among standardized provi-
sions offered to him, even when the standard forms are prescribed by pub-
lic officials rather than insurers. . . . Regulation is relatively weak in most
instances, and even the provisions prescribed or approved by legislative or
administrative action ordinarily are in essence adoptions, outright or
slightly modified, of proposals made by insurers' draftsmen.
Moreover, the normal processes for marketing most kinds of insurance do
not ordinarily place the detailed policy terms in the hands of the policy-
holder until the contract has already been made .... Thus, not only
should a policyholder's reasonable expectations be honored in the face of
difficult and technical language, but those expectations should prevail as
well when the language of an unusual provision is clearly understandable
unless the insurer can show that the policyholder's failure to read such
language is unreasonable.
It is important to note, however, that the principle of honoring reason-
able expectations does not deny the insurer the opportunity to make an
explicit qualification effective by calling it to the attention of a policy-
holder at the time of contracting, thereby negating surprise to him.
Id. at 350-52. See also Ward v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 364 So. 2d 73 (Fla. 2d
Dist. Ct. App. 1978): "An insurer will not be allowed, by the use of obscure terms, to
defeat the purpose for which the policy was procured. . . . (Citing, Roberson v. United
Services Auto. Assn., 330 So. 2d 745 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976.) . . . If an insurer intends
to restrict coverage, it should use language clearly stating its purpose." Id. at 77. See
also Abraham, Judge-Made Law and Judge-Made Insurance: Honoring the Reasona-
ble Expectations of the Insured, 67 VA. L. REV. 1151 (1981).
123. Fidelity and Cas. Co. of N.Y. v. Fonseca, and Rojas v. Fidelity and Cas.
Co. of N.Y., 358 So. 2d 569 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1978) cert. denied 365 So. 2d 711
(Fla. 1978).
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Fidelity. The policy covered Mrs. Rojas' Ford, and "a temporary sub-
stitute vehicle." Mrs. Rojas and Fonseca both argued that they were
injured in a temporary substitute vehicle and should therefore recover
from Fidelity, since Mrs. Rojas' Ford was out of service and under re-
pair on the date of the accident.'24 The appellate court found that
neither Mrs. Rojas nor Mrs. Fonseca could recover, 125 because Mr.
Rojas' Olds was not a "temporary substitute vehicle" which the policy
defined as a "non-owned" vehicle.126 It was an "owned," rather than
"non-owned", vehicle because Mr. Rojas, by operation of the fine print,
was a "named insured" under the policy. His name didn't appear on
the policy, but because the policy defined "named insured" to include
the resident spouse of the named insured, ownership of the Olds was
imputed to Mrs. Rojas. 27 Thus coverage under the policy depended
upon the interrelationship of three separate definitions in the pol-
icy--"named insured," "non-owned," and "temporary substitute vehi-
cle." By manipulating all these provisions, lawyers could retrospectively
determine what coverage was available.
Rojas is wrongly decided for two reasons: the clear and unambigu-
ous language of the policy extends coverage, and the rationale underly-
ing the decision fails to justify the denial of coverage.
The court focused on the wrong policy provision ("named in-
sured") to reach its erroneous conclusion. The insuring clause in Mrs.
Rojas' policy obligated Fidelity to pay for damages arising out of the
"ownership, maintenance, or use of the owned automobile or any non-
owned automobile.' 1 28 The court decided that since Mr. Rojas was a
"named insured" (defined in the policy to include a spouse who resided
in the same household), the Olds could not possibly be a "non-owned"
vehicle. But the court overlooked the clear and unambiguous definition
of an "owned" vehicle contained in the policy: a vehicle "for which a
specific premium charge indicates that coverage is afforded." 29 The
language of the policy defined a "non-owned" vehicle as one "not
124. 358 So. 2d at 570.
125. The policy tied the availability of PIP benefits to the availability of liability
insurance under the policy. Id. at 571 n.1.
126. Id. at 571.
127. Id.
128. Id. (emphasis in original).
129. Id.
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owned by or furnished for the regular use of either the named insured
or any relative, other than a temporary substitute automobile." 130 A
"temporary substitute automobile" was one "not owned by the named
insured, while temporarily used with the permission of the owner as a
substitute for the owned automobile. . . when withdrawn from normal
use because of its breakdown, repair, servicing, loss or destruction."1 31
No premium was charged nor coverage afforded for the Olds. The
policy unambiguously defined a "non-owned" vehicle as one "not
owned:" a vehicle as to which no premium was paid. Rojas was indeed
a named insured. But payment of benefits depended on the definition of
"owned" and "non-owned," not upon the definition of "named in-
sured." Neither Mr. nor Mrs. Rojas "owned" the Olds, because the
policy gave a very specific definition to the word "owned," and that
definition was incorporated into the definition of "non-owned. 1 ,3 2
This technical construction is a fitting response to Fidelity's argu-
ment that the policy is "clear and unambiguous. 1 33 To see the fallacy
of the insurer's argument, one need only examine the rationale under-
pinning the court's interpretation of the insurance policy provisions at
issue in this case. The court said that the inclusion of both spouses in
the definition of named insured "was intended to protect the insurer
from assuming risks for which premium payments were not elicited in
situations where such risks were likely to eventuate." 14 But in this
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. The court did not focus on the definition of "non-owned" as "furnished for
the regular use of either the named insured or any other relative."
133. 358 So. 2d at 574.
134. Id. at 575. Historically, the inclusion of both spouses as "named insureds"
in the omnibus clause of an automobile insurance policy was intended to protect the
insured, not the insurer. See R. KEETON, INSURANCE LAW § 4.7 (1971) (Omnibus
Clauses Generally):
Perhaps the major objective underlying the development of omnibus
clauses has been to serve the interests of the insurance purchaser (usually
the named insured) in having the benefits of the coverage extend to certain
other persons as well as himself-persons who are natural objects of his
concern.
A second objective-to serve the interests of potential victims of inci-
dents to which the insurance coverage applies-has been at most a subsidi-
ary influence in the voluntary expansion of coverage through omnibus
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case, a premium was elicited for injury in a temporary substitute vehi-
cle, which is precisely the risk that eventuated. Coverage under these
facts is precisely what the insured would have expected she was paying
for, whether her "loaner" came from her neighbor, her mechanic or, as
in this case, her spouse. The court feared that if the definition of named
insured did not include the spouse, "two or more vehicles could be cov-
ered by payment of a single premium."135
Ironically, in Boyd v. United States Fidelity and Guarantee Co.,138
which the Rojas court relied upon, two premiums were paid to two
different companies, one covering Mr. Boyd's car, and one covering
Mrs. Boyd's."' "The [Boyd] court acknowledged the incongruity of the
fact that the husband would be covered in almost any car in the world
which he drove with the owner's permission except that of his wife." 1
Rojas repeats the irony, yet fails to recognize that this very incongruity
defeats the reasonable expectations of the consumer with regard to the
scope of coverage. 139
clauses, but it has been a primary influence upon legislation requiring or
encouraging the inclusion of omnibus clauses in liability insurance
coverages.
Id. at 221-22.
See also § 2.11(b) (The definition of Insured):
In general, an omnibus clause of an automobile insurance policy ex-
tends the definition of "insured" to persons using the automobile with per-
mission. The earlier forms of omnibus clauses required that the permission
be that of the named insured, express or implied.
The 1955 revision broadened the definition of "insured" to include the
spouse of the insured even without proof of permission and any other per-
son using the vehicle with the spouse's permission.
Id. at 76.
135. 358 So. 2d at 575.
136. 256 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1971) reh. denied (1972).
137. Id. at 2.
138. 358 So. 2d at 572. Cf. Protective Nat'l Ins. Co. of Omaha v. Bergouignan,
335 So. 2d 871 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1976) in which the court held that a passenger
injured in an insured vehicle could not recover PIP benefits because he owned an unin-
sured vehicle. But the court allowed his spouse who was injured in the same car to
recover. Either their policy did not define "named insured" to include a spouse, or the
court chose to ignore such a definition.
139. The court also failed to see the implicit hostility to the married state con-
tained therein. For a case in which the Florida Supreme Court urged the importance of
marriage, see Raisen v. Raisen, 379 So. 2d 352 (Fla. 1979).
1264 Nova Law Journal 6:19821
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The result in Industrial Fire and Casualty Insurance Co. v.
Jones140 is equally disturbing. Calvin Jones was injured while driving
his mother's uninsured car. Jones resided with his mother and step-
father. He sought PIP benefits from Industrial, the insurer of his step-
father's car. Industrial denied payment based on language in its policy.
The policy excluded coverage of any relative of the "named insured"
while occupying a motor vehicle "of which the named insured is the
owner and which is not an insured motor vehicle under this insur-
ance.' ' 141 The court said Calvin's stepfather "owned" Calvin's mother's
uninsured car, not in fact, but by operation of the definition of "named
insured" in the policy. 42 The court reached this conclusion despite the
fact that the policy defined "named insured" more broadly than the
Act defined "named insured. 1' 43 The court found its interpretation nec-
essary to prevent "the ridiculous result of allowing the insurance of one
automobile and the coverage on several unnamed automobiles. 1 44 The
140. 363 So. 2d 1168 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
141. Id. at 1169.
142. Id. at 1170. Cf. Lopez v. Fidelity & Cas. Co. of N.Y., 384 So. 2d 680, 681
(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1980). Fidelity argued that coverage should be denied under
the provision of the Act which authorizes the insurer to exclude benefits for injury
sustained by a relative of the named insured, residing in the same household, while
occupying another motor vehicle owned by the named insured but not insured under
the policy. The court found the exclusion inapplicable because Rodriguez did not
"own" the vehicle occupied by Lopez. Because Lopez was not Rodriguez's spouse (he
was his son), he was not caught in the ensnaring definition of "owner" which caught
the plaintiffs in Jones and Fonseca.
143. Id. The policy defined "named insured" to include the policy holder or the
spouse of the policyholder. Id. Section 627.732 (1977) defined "named insured" as "a
person, usually the owner of a vehicle, identified in a policy by name as the insured
under the policy." Id. Cf. Cavalier Ins. Corp. v. Myles, 347 So. 2d 1060 (Fla. 1st Dist.
Ct. App. 1977): It is axiomatic that the provisions of statutes relating to insurance
become a part of any policy issued in the state, and that if the terms of a policy are
susceptible of differing interpretations, the interpretation which sustains the claim for
indemnity or which allows the greater indemnity will be adopted. Id. at 1062 citing
Dorfman v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 342 So. 2d 91 (Fla. 3rd Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
Cf Andriakos v. Cavanaugh, 350 So. 2d 561, 563 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1977):
"[I]nsurance policy . . .will be enforced as if it were in compliance with the Act
regardless of its actual terms."
144. 363 So. 2d at 1170. Here the court cited Fidelity & Cas. Co. of N.Y. v.
Fonseca, 358 So. 2d 569 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1978) for authority. Ironically, Fon-
seca had paid for insurance on a "temporary substitute vehicle," but when injured in a
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court also observed that "as a practical matter an insurance company
may include as a named insured a policyholder's 'spouse' [without ac-
tually naming the spouse on the policy] for the simple reason that a
policyholder (especially in this day and age) is not apt to have the same
spouse at any given point in time.' '1 45
The court appears to confuse matters of administrative conve-
nience with matters of policy. 4 The Jones court relied upon its former
decision in Rojas, in which it opined that the inclusion of both spouses
within the definition of "named insured" protects the insurer "from as-
suming risks for which premium payments were not elicited in situa-
tions where such risks were likely to eventuate."' 47 But the court over-
looked the fact that in Rojas the insured paid a premium for coverage
in a temporary substitute vehicle and did not receive the expected cov-
erage.148 While protection of the profits of the insurer is a worthy con-
cern, in Jones that protection comes at the expense of an injured child,
who had no control over whether or not his parents properly insured.
As the Farley court recognized, "obvious practicalities" prevent a suit
against the parent.' 49 The result in these cases encourages insurance
companies to define terms in ways that the consumer would not expect,
and in ways which offend the purposes of the Act. The policy exclusion
at issue here presents a booby-trap for the unwary consumer.
Conclusion
Florida courts have extended the coverage of the No-Fault Act to
those injured in vehicles which were not statutorily defined "motor ve-
hicles." This desirable result furthered the purposes of the Act. But the
supreme court erred in Lumbermens. It should have extended coverage
to one injured in an accident involving two commercial vehicles. In
view of the subsequent amendment of the Act to expressly include com-
car she was driving as a substitute for her own auto, which was being repaired, she
recovered nothing in exchange for the premium she had paid.
145. 363 So. 2d at 1170 n.1.
146. It also undermines the marital harmony for which the supreme court ex-
pressed great concern in Raisen v. Raisen, 379 So. 2d 352 (Fla. 1979).
147. 358 So. 2d at 575.
148. See discussion of Rojas in text, supra.
149. 302 So. 2d at 179.
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mercial vehicles, this injustice should not recur.
The courts have extended the coverage of the Act to children in-
jured in or by insured vehicles despite the fact that their parents owned
an uninsured car. This result is consistent with the purposes of the Act.
The courts have denied the coverage of the Act to injured persons who
actually own an uninsured car. The Act requires owners to purchase
personal injury protection insurance, and it is reasonable to expect and
require those who own cars to comply. But it is not reasonable to ex-
clude from the Act's benefits those persons who do not own an auto,
and thus have no opportunity to insure. If such a person is injured in an
uninsured car, recovery of no-fault benefits from the insured driver, or
from the insured owner of another car involved in the accident, should
be permitted. This result would further the purposes of the Act without
undermining the required insurance provision of the Act. The courts'
failure to extend coverage on these facts is out of keeping with the
purposes of the Act.
Finally, the imputation of constructive ownership of uninsured
vehicles to spouses, thus denying the benefits of the Act to them, is a
surprising and unfair result. This development is the most inimical to
the purposes of the Act. It will eventually undermine the Act, for it
invites drafting of insurance policies which avoid the Act's required
benefits.
16:1982 267 1No Fault Insurance in Florida
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Alternatives to Public School:
Florida's Compulsory Education Dilemma
A child is a person who is going to carry on what you have
started. . . . He will assume control of your cities, states and na-
tions. He is going to move in and take over your churches, schools,
universities and corporations. All your books are going to be judg-
ed, praised or condemned by him. The fate of humanity is in his
hands.1
Introduction
The value of a quality education in our society is unquestioned.
However, controversy exists concerning state efforts to insure education
for its citizens. These efforts are reflected in compulsory education
lawS2 which are sometimes challenged by citizens claiming compliance
through an unorthodox method of schooling.$
To set the stage for an analysis of Florida's contemporary
problems with compulsory school attendance laws, it is appropriate at
the outset to briefly discuss some landmarks which have been signifi-
cant in the origin and development of compulsory education in the
United States. The focus of this note will then shift to State of Florida
v. M.M.,4 a recent case involving education at home in the context of
1. Abraham Lincoln. This quote was taken from H.S. Bhola, A Policy Analysis
of Adult Literacy Versus Universal Primary Education, 55 VIEWPoINT TEACH AND
LEARN 22, 24 (Fall 1979).
2. See generally Note, Home Instruction: An Alternative to Institutional Educa-
tion, 18 J. FAM. LAW 353 (1980). All fifty states plus the District of Columbia have
compulsory attendance laws.
3. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Pierce v. Society of Sis-
ters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Scoma v. Board of Educ., 391 F. Supp. 452 (N.D. Ill.
1974); People v. Turner, 121 Cal. App. 2d 861, 263 P.2d 685 (1953); F. & F. v. Duval
County, 273 So. 2d 15 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1973); People v. Levisen, 404 Ill. 574,
90 N.E.2d 213 (1950); State v. Shaver, 294 N.W.2d 883 (N.D. 1980).
4. State of Fla. v. M.M., 407 So. 2d 987 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
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Florida's compulsory school attendance laws. The examination of M.M.
will be highlighted by the court's struggle to define the word "school"
and followed by an analysis of the potential ramifications of the court's
decision. Although the court displayed wisdom in reaching its decision,
there remains a legislative void in Florida which is susceptible to future
challenge; some recommendations are suggested which can help to fill
that gap and clarify Florida's ambiguous compulsory education laws.
Historical Perspective of Compulsory Education
In 1925 the United States Supreme Court in Pierce v. Society of
the Sisters5 recognized the need to balance state power to insure the
education of its populace with parental rights to direct their children's
upbringing. Pierce involved a challenge to an Oregon enactment which
required "every parent, guardian or other person.having control. . . of
a child between eight and sixteen years to send him to a public
school."8 The Court considered the enactment "repugnant to the con-
stitution" because the legitimate business and property interests of pri-
vate schools were "threatened with destruction through the unwar-
ranted compulsion which [the state exercised] over present and
prospective patrons of their schools." Pierce is frequently cited for its
dictum acknowledging the parental option to elect private school for
their children. This option is a derivative of the parental right to be
free from unreasonable governmental interference with respect to their
children's upbringing. 8 Although the parents' right to provide private
education prevailed, along with the private schools' business and prop-
erty interests, the Court cautioned
[n]o question [was] raised concerning the power of the state rea-
sonably to regulate all schools, to inspect, supervise and examine
them, their teachers and pupils; to require that all children of
5. 268 U.S. 510.
6. Id.,at 530 (emphasis added).
7. Id. at 532, 535.
8. Id. at 534-35 citing Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) which stated
that legislation prohibiting the teaching of foreign languages to students prior to pass-
ing the eighth grade was an unreasonable interference with the right of parents to
control the education of their children.
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proper age attend some school, that teachers shall be of good moral
character and patriotic disposition, that certain studies plainly es-
sential to good citizenship must be taught, and that nothing be
taught which is manifestly inimical to the public welfare.9
Thus, Pierce may be equally significant for its implicit recognition of
the state's power to compel and regulate education of its citizens so
long as the power is reasonably exercised.
The Supreme Court reaffirmed its position regarding state power
to reasonably regulate education in Wisconsin v. Yoder,' ° but the Court
also recognized that notwithstanding the high priority on education, the
state's interest "is by no means absolute to the exclusion or subordina-
tion of all other interests."'11 In Yoder, Amish parents claimed that the
compulsory education law in Wisconsin was inapplicable to them be-
cause it conflicted with their religious beliefs which are protected by
the free exercise clause of the first amendment."2 The Wisconsin law,
which required public or private school attendance between the ages of
seven and sixteen, was contrary to the parents' religious practices
prohibiting formal education beyond the eighth grade.' 3 This prohibi-
tion is rooted in the Amish doctrine which emphasizes that "salvation
requires life in a church community separate and apart from the world
and worldly influence.' 4 Apparently, the Amish community feared
that formal education beyond the eighth grade "not only expose[d]
themselves to. . . censure of the church community. . . but. . . also
endanger[ed] their own salvation . . ." due to the intensity of peer
pressures coercing conformity to non-Amish values.' 5 The Court,
clearly influenced by the longstanding practice of the Amish religion
9. Id. at 534.
10. 406 U.S. at 213. The court was emphatic in their position by stating: "There
is no doubt as to the power of a state, having a high responsibility for education of its
citizens, to impose reasonable regulations for the control and duration of basic educa-
tion." Id. (emphasis added).
11. Id. at 215.
12. Id. at 208-09. The court quoted from the first amendment in footnote four of
the opinion: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof...." Id. at 209 n.4.
13. Id. at 211.
14. Id. at 210.
15. Id. at 209-11.
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coupled with the history of self-reliance demonstrated by its followers,
agreed that enforcement of the Wisconsin compulsory education law
would threaten the existence of the Amish religion. 6 It is important to
realize, however, that the Yoder holding is narrow and the Amish par-
ents may have been unsuccessful if their departure from the compul-
sory education laws had been more substantial" or if their beliefs had
not been grounded in a religious foundation. s
Presently, compulsory education laws generally require children to
attend school between the ages of six to sixteen.19 Although this age
requirement varies only slightly from state to state, there is great dis-
parity between state statutes regarding the means of achieving compul-
sory attendance.20 This lack of statutory uniformity, combined with
conflicting judicial decisions, brings into focus the competing interests
that often collide in compulsory attendance controversies. These inter-
ests are those of the state in mandating and regulating the education of
its citizens, the parents in directing the upbringing of their children,
and the child in being guaranteed educational opportunities.2 1, It is evi-
dent that these interests must be carefully weighed if a compulsory ed-
16. Id. at 219, 224-25. While there was no evidence concerning the attrition rate
in the Amish religion, the Court seemed confident that Amish defectors were not likely
to become burdens on society. Id. at 224-25.
17. Id. at 238 (concurring opinion). Justice White explained why Yoder should
have limited application: "This would be a very different case for me if respondent's
claim were that their religion forbade their children from attending any school at any
time and from complying in any way with the educational standards set by the state."
Id. The Court also seemed impressed with the quality of vocational training provided
for the children in lieu of the brief additional period of formal education. Id. at 224.
18. Id. at 216. Chief Justice Burger who delivered the opinion of the court re-
stricted Yoder to claims based on religious beliefs. He hypothesized:
If the Amish asserted their claims because of their subjective evaluation
and rejection of the contemporary secular values accepted by the majority,
much as Thoreau rejected the social values of his times and isolated him-
self at Walden. Pond, their claims would not rest on a religious basis.
Thoreau's choice was philosophical and personal rather than religious and
such belief does not rise to the demands of the religion clauses.
Id. Compar; F. & F., 273 So. 2d 15, discussed in the Ramifications section of this note.
19. Moberly, Compulsory Attendance-A Second Look, THE HIGH SCHOOL J.,
Feb. 1980, at 197; Note, supra note 2, at 357.
20. Id. at 379-81; See generally Annot., 65 A.L.R. 3d 1222 (1975).
21. 406 U.S. at 213-15. See also 268 U.S. at 534-35.
272
Nova Law Journal 6:1982
65
et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue
Published by NSUWorks, 1982
Florida's Compulsory Education Dilemma6:1982
ucation dispute is to reach a just resolution.
The state's interests in an educated citizenry was stressed early in
our country's history by Thomas Jefferson who believed that education
is a cornerstone of democracy 22 and it is evident that the state is inter-
ested in preparing citizens to become "self-sufficent participants in soci-
ety." 23 Parental interest in the nurture and education of their children
is incontrovertible and to override the parent, a state interest of suffi-
cient magnitude must exist.24 When the parental interest is religiously
based, the state's concern must be compelling before the courts will
allow intervention, as clearly demonstrated by the Yoder decision.25
The interest of the child is obviously the heart of the controversy and
should never be overlooked in the balancing process. Justice Douglas in
his dissenting opinion in Yoder, wrote: "Children themselves have con-
stitutionally protectible interests," 26 and he believed that the Yoder
majority ignored the interests of the child in reaching its decision.
Douglas eloquently stated: "The education of the child is a matter on
which the child will often have decided views. . . he may want to be a
pianist or an astronaut or an oceanographer . . if his education is
truncated, his entire life may be stunted and deformed.12 7
Today the controversies continue. In recent years parental dissatis-
faction with public schools has manifested in an increased number of
22. 406 U.S. at 221, 225. See also Moberly, supra note 18 which quoted a force-
ful statement made by Thomas Jefferson in 1816: "If a nation expects to be ignorant
and free in a state of civilization, it expects what never was and never will be ... "
Id. at 196.
23. 406 U.S. at 221.
24. Id. at 214, 232. See also 391 F. Supp. at 460-61. In Scoma, the parents
asserted fundamental constitutional rights to educate their children as they saw fit and
the court held that those interests do not "rise above a personal or philosophical choice
and cannot claim to be within the bounds of constitutional protection. Id. But see Ohio
v. Whisner, 47 Ohio St. 2d 181 at , 351 N.E.2d 750 at 771 (1976). Ohio's minimum
standards for private schools were so pervasive they nearly cloned the private schools in
the public school image which consequently deprived the parents of their traditional
interests in guiding their children's upbringing. Id. at , 351 N.E.2d at 768.
25. 406 U.S. at 214; 294 N.W.2d at 895; See also 47 Ohio St. 2d at ._, 351
N.E.2d at 771; But cf. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) which explained
that the power of the parent, even when related to a religious claim may be subject to
limitations when it endangers the welfare of the child.
26. 406 U.S. at 242-44.
27. Id. at 244-46.
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parents attempting to educate their children at home. There is evidence
of this movement in Broward County, Florida, as demonstrated by the
establishment of the United Citizens of Broward, a parent group
bonded together by their interest in home schooling. "[A]lthough ac-
curate figures are difficult to come by. . .John Holt . . publisher of
Growing without Schooling, a newsletter for home schoolers, estimates
that upwards of 10,000 families" have established home schools
nationwide. s
Dissatisfaction with the public school system frequently stems
from school boundary disputes and busing requirements. Certainly
many parents are concerned for their children's welfare due to exces-
sively long bus rides to school at unbelievably inconvenient hours,29 but
it is significant to note the fact that many other parents are insidiously
motivated by racial prejudice. Skepticism regarding the quality of edu-
cation provided in the public schools also seems to be increasing in re-
cent years, along with concerns about school violence and what some
believe to be a "mean spirited, competitive, status oriented"30 atmo-
sphere. As a former teacher, guidance counselor and coach in the Flor-
ida public school systems ' I question whether these concerns are justi-
fied or exaggerated. Even if they are well founded, it can be argued
that the school atmosphere is merely a reflection of the society in which
children must learn to function.32 Certainly parents are entitled to be
critical of the education afforded their children. However, regardless of
parental motivations for withdrawing children from the public schools,
parents should not be exempt from fulfilling their responsibility to com-
ply in an acceptable manner with the state's compulsory education
requirements.
Home instruction is recognized in many states as an alternative
28. R. A. Bumstead, Educating Your Child at Home: The Perchemlides Case,
PHI DELTA KAPPAN, Oct. 1979, at 98. Holt has predicted that "[w]ithin a decade half
a million U.S. families will be educating their children at home." V. Rustand, Home
Teaching and Herbert, 58 EDUCATIONAL HORIZONs 75, 75 (Winter 1979).
29. Miami News, Dec. 15, 1981 § B (Lifestyle), at 1-2, col. 2.
30. R.A. Bumstead, supra note 27.
31. Dade County: 1972-1975, Collier County: 1976-1977, Broward County:
1977- 1980.
32. R.A. Bumstead, supra note 27.
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means of compliance with compulsory education laws.3 3 In those states
permitting education at home, it is not unusual for one or more of the
following to be required: (a) certain courses to be included,3 4 (b) certi-
fied or qualified instructors,3 5 (c) instruction equivalent to that availa-
ble in public schools 6 or (d) instruction for a specified length of time."
Florida is among those states which statutorily provide for the home
education alternative as a means of compliance with compulsory school
attendance so long as the child is tutored by a certified instructor.3 8
Recently, however, a case of first impression arose in the Fourth Dis-
trict Court of Appeal of Florida which provided occasion to review a
circuit court determination that parents who are not certified teachers
may be permitted to educate their children at home. 9
State of Florida v. M.M.
When the 1981-82 Broward County School boundaries were re-
established, Mr. and Mrs. Pohl objected to the continued busing of
their two children to Ely High School in Pompano, Florida.40 After the
Pohls were denied a transfer for their children by the Hardship Com-
mittee of the School Board, they decided to withdraw them from public
school.41 The Pohls removed Scott and Michelle from Ely High School
in February 1981 and commenced instruction in their own home which
they designated as the Pohl Private School.42 The two children were the
only pupils and neither of the parents were certified teachers nor was
an older sister who also instructed the children on occasion. 43 The Stu-
33. See Note, supra note 1, at 379-81.
34. In Re Shinn, 195 Cal. App. 2d 683, 16 Cal. Rptr. 165 (1961). Accord, e.g.,
State v. Lowry, 191 Kan. 701, 383 P.2d 962 (1963).
35. E.g., State v. Faith Baptist Church, 207 Neb. 802, 301 N.W.2d 571 (1981).
See Kentucky State Bd. v. Rudasill, 589 S.W.2d 877 (Ky. 1979).
36. State of N.J. v. Massa, 95 N.J. Super. 382, 231 A.2d 252 (Morris County
Ct. 1967); State v. Hershberger 103 Ohio App. 188, 144 N.E.2d 693 (1955).
37. FLA. STAT. § § 228.041 (13) and (16) (Supp. 1980).
38. FLA. STAT. § 232.02 (4) (1979).
39. 407 So. 2d at 989-90.
40. In the Interests of Michelle Martin and Scott Evans, Nos. 81-2550 and 81-
2552. (Fla. 17th Cir. Ct., ordered June 30, 1981). Hereinafter cited as Court Order.
41. Id.
42. Id., 407 So. 2d at 989.
43. 407 So. 2d at 990.
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dent Welfare and Attendance Department of the School Board initi-
ated an action for dependency44 in the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit al-
leging that the children had been truant from Ely High School in
violation of the Florida Compulsory Education Law which mandates
regular school attendance between the ages of six and sixteen.4 5 Com-
pliance with Florida's compulsory education law can be accomplished
in four alternative ways according to Florida Statute Section 232.02.46
Regular school attendance is the actual attendance of the pupil
during the school day as defined by law and regulations of the
State Board. Regular attendance within the intent of 232.01 may
be achieved by attendance at:
(1) A public school supported by public funds;
(2) A parochial or denominational school;
(3) A private school supported in whole or in part by tuition
charges or by endowments or gifts;
(4) At home with a private tutor who meets all requirements pre-
scribed by law and regulations of the State Board of Private
Tutors.
Although the fourth alternative allows home instruction under the
guidance of a private tutor,47 the Pohls did not claim compliance under
that provision because a teaching certificate is a pre-requisite for pri-
vate tutors.48 Asserting, instead, that their home was a private school,
the Pohls claimed compliance with the third provision which does not
explicitly mandate certification of instructors. 49 The state argued that
the Pohl teaching arrangement was similar to the private tutoring rela-
tionship contemplated in Section 232.01 (4) and, consequently, the in-
structors were required to be certified.50 Circuit Court Judge Vitale
44. Id. and FLA. STAT. § 39.01(9)(d) (Supp. 1980).
45. FLA. STAT. § 232.01 (Supp. 1980).
46. FLA. STAT. § 232.02 (1979).
47. FLA. STAT. § 232.02(4) (1979).
48. Fla. State Bd. of Educ. Admin. Rule 6A-1.951 reads in part: "Private
Tutors. Any person who tutors a child of compulsory attendance age, when such tutor-
ing is in lieu of school attendance for the child, shall meet the following requirements:
(1) He shall hold a valid Florida certificate to teach the subject or grades in which
instruction is given."
49. Petitioners Brief at 1-2; Court Order at 1.
50. Petitioners Brief at 2.
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held that the arrangement constituted a private school and therefore
the teacher certification requirement did not apply because "[t]here are
currently no rules or statutes regulating non-public schools in the areas
of certification or education of teachers, curriculum, class loads, stu-
dent assessment and many other areas. ... 51 To comply with the pri-
vate school provision, the Pohls were required merely to: (a) maintain
enrollment and attendance records,5 2 (b) obtain certificates of immuni-
zation for their children, 53 (c) instruct the children for the requisite
number of hours per day and days per year5 and (d) file an annual
data base survey with the Department of Education. 5
The court determined that the Pohls were not strictly in compli-
ance with the Florida Statute because Scott and Michelle were in-
structed only four hours per day rather than the five hours mandated
by law.56 Notwithstanding this deficiency, it was ordered that the chil-
dren could attend the Pohl Private School and the matter was sched-
uled to be reviewed at a later date to allow the Pohls an opportunity to
enlarge their instructional hours.57
The state petitioned the Fourth District Court of Appeal and the
oral argument focused on a frustrating effort to define "school." 58 If
the Pohl home instruction scheme had constituted a school, then it
would have been difficult to deny compliance with the private school
provision in the Florida statute.59 If the program had been merely a
tutoring arrangement, then the private school provision could not have
sheltered the Pohls from the teacher certification requirements applica-
ble to private tutors under the home instruction provision. 0
Florida's statute provides virtually no aid in defining the word
"school." The state relied on the definition of "school" provided in
51. Court Order at 2. (emphasis added). Judge Vitale noted that "Florida Stat-
ute Chapter 247 which set minimum standards for private schools was repealed in
1969." Id. Interestingly, compliance with those standards was never mandatory.
52. FLA. STAT. § 232.021 (1979); Court Order at 2.
53. FLA. STAT. § 232.032 (Supp. 1980). Court Order at 2.
54. FLA. STAT. § § 228.041 (13) and (16) (Supp. 1980). Court Order at 2.
55. FLA. STAT. § 229.808 (1979). Court Order at 3.
56. Court Order at 2.
57. Id. at 4.
58. State of Fla. v. M.M.-oral argument tapes.
59. FLA. STAT. § 232.02( )f(1979).
60. FLA. STAT. § 232.02(4) (1979).
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Florida Statute Section #228.041 (5): "A school is an organization of
pupils for instructional purposes on an elementary, secondary or other
public school level approved under regulations of the State Board." 1
The problem with this definition, according to the Pohls, is that since it
is found in Chapter 228 of the Florida Statutes entitled State Plan for
Public Education it applies only to public education.62 The Pohls,
therefore, asserted that the proper definition of school is derived from
Florida Statute 229.808 (2) which "defines a non-public school as one
which could be run by an individual"63 and "declares itself to be an
educational center."'" The difficulty with this definition is that its ap-
plication is expressly limited to organization of the data base survey, a
report facilitating maintenance of state records of all private schools in
Florida.6 5 This struggle to define the word "school" commanded the
appellate court's attention and ultimately influenced the court to re-
verse "the final order under review in all respects save the adjudication
that the minor appellees are dependent children within the jurisdiction
of the family division of the circuit court." 66
Can A Home Be A School?
Several jurisdictions have struggled to define a "school" for pur-
poses of determining compliance with compulsory education laws.67
Their experience provides a valuable context for analyzing the Fourth
District Court of Appeal's rationale in M.M.
Generally, two contrasting positions have emerged reflecting dif-
ferent viewpoints concerning the functions that schools should fulfill."
The first position defines a school as an organization or institution in
61. Petitioners Brief at 3. The petitioners view was consistent with a 1972 Attor-
ney General opinion which recommended use of this definition to determine whether
attendance at a private school can satisfy the regular attendance requirement. 072-90
Op. Att'y Gen 154, 156 (1972).
62. State of Fla. v. M.M.-oral argument tapes.
63. Respondent's Brief at 3.
64. State of Fla. v. M.M.-oral argument tapes.
65. Id., Fla. Stat. § 229.808(2) (1979).
66. 407 So. 2d at 991.
67. See generally Annot., 65 A.L.R.3d 1222 (1975).
68. Id. at 1232-34; Accord Note, supra note 2, at 364-65.
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the business of education. 69 Cases advocating this position often recog-
nize the importance of group learning activities and school socialization
functions.70 The second position considers an arrangement to be a
school if learning is imparted, regardless of the number of students
involved. 71 This view focuses solely on academic functions and denies
69. See State v. Hoyt, 84 N.H. 38, 146 A. 170 (1929) where it was held that
parents cannot "make use of units of education so small, or facilities of such doubtful
quality, that supervision thereof would impose an unreasonable burden upon the state
.... " Id. at 41, 146 A. at 171. Accord City of Akron v. Lane, 65 Ohio App. 2d 90,
416 N.E.2d 642 (1979). State v. Counort, 69 Wash. 361, 124 P. 910 (1912) is often
cited to support the proposition that home instruction by parents is not a private school.
See, e.g., Petitioner's Brief at 4. Judge Morris wrote a perplexing opinion in the Cou-
nort case. On one hand he stated that instruction by a parent to a child regardless of
the parents competency to teach is not attendance at a private school. 69 Wash. at .
124 P. at 911. To constitute a private school "means the same character of school as
the public school, a regular, organized and existing institution, making a business of
instructing children . . . ." Id. at -, 124 P. at 911-12. On the other hand it seemed
contradictory when he stated, "[u]ndoubtedly a private school may be maintained in a
private home in which the children of the instructor may be pupils. This . . . is not to
be determined by the place where the school is maintained, nor the individuality or
number of the pupils who attend it. It is to be determined by the purpose, intent, and
character of the endeavor." Id. at ., 124 P. at 912. The decision, denying private
school status to the Counort arrangement seemed to turn on the state's evidence "that
his two little girls could be seen playing about the house at all times during the ordi-
nary school hours." Id.
70. 195 Cal. App. 2d at -, 16 Cal. Rptr. at 171; Knox v. O'Brien, 7 N.J. Super.
608, 72 A.2d 389 (Cape May County Ct. 1950). Knox was subsequently overruled by
Massa which interpreted equivalent instruction merely to be academic equivalency and
denied consideration of socialization factors. 95 N.J. Super. at _, 231 A.2d at 257.
71. 404 I11. 574, 90 N.E.2d 213. The court, in Levisen agreed with the parents
and held that "[a] school . . . is a place where instruction is imparted to the young
. . . [and the] number of persons taught does not determine whether the place is a
school." Id. at -, 90 N.E.2d at 215. The court reasoned that the end result is determi-
native rather than the manner in which the education is delivered. Id. See generally
Comment, Private Tutoring, Compulsory Education and the Illinois Supreme Court,
18 U. Cm. L. REv. 105 (1950). See also State v. Peterman, 32 Ind. App. 665, 70 N.E.
550 (1904). In Peterman, the parent who hired a teacher to instruct his child at the
teacher's home was in compliance with the law because "[t]his would be the school of
the child. . . and would be as much a private school as if. . . conducted as such." Id.
at .., 70 N.E. at 551. Compare 191 Kan. 701, 383 P.2d 962. The Lowry court held
that the home instruction did not constitute a private school but also implied that the
result may have been the opposite if the legislature's course of study requirements had
been complied with by the parents. Id. at , 383 P.2d at 965. See State v. Superior Ct.,
279 I1
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the importance of socialization at school. 2 While both theories re-
present accepted descriptions of schools, distinctive ramifications are
associated with each perspective. In terms of M.M., if the first theory
had been adopted by the appellate court, the Pohls would have had
difficulty demonstrating their instructional arrangement was an organi-
zation in the business of education.7 8 If the second theory had been
embraced, then the court may have considered the Pohls' arrangement
a private school because it imparted learning despite the apparent lack
of socialization. 4
In People v. Turnere5 a California appellate court construed a
statute which, like Florida's, provided a home instruction exemption to
state compulsory education laws. The Turner court held that when
children were tutored at home, parents were not entitled to use the
private school provision.7 6 Reading the statute's sections in pari
materia the court concluded "the legislature intended to distinguish be-
tween private schools upon the one hand and home instruction by a
private tutor . . . on the other. 77
The Fourth District Court of Appeal in M.M. adopted the Turner
reasoning, concluding "[that there is no statutory authority regulating
the establishment of private schools in Florida does not mean that Flor-
ida parents, unqualified to be private tutors, can proclaim their homes
to be private schools and withdraw their offspring from public
schools."'7 8 The M.M. court applied the following canon of statutory
construction to section 232.02 in support of its conclusion:
55 Wash. 2d 177, 346 P.2d 999 (1959). The Washington Supreme Court established
"three essential elements of a school ... (1) the teacher, (2) the pupil or pupils, and
(3) the place or institution." Id. at ._, 346 P.2d at 1002. Washington law required all
teachers to be certified and teacher certification appeared to be the only ingredient
preventing the home instruction from being a school. Id.
72. 95 N.J. Super. at -, 231 A.2d at 257.
73. 69 Wash. at -, 124 P. at 911-12.
74. 404 Ill. at -, 90 N.E.2d at 215.
75. 121 Cal. App. 2d 861, 263 P.2d 685 (1953).
76. Id. at _, 263 P.2d at 688.
77. Id. Judge Patrosso stated, "[i]f a private school ... necessarily comprehends
a parent or private tutor instructing at home, there was no necessity to make specific
provision exempting the latter." Id.
78. 407 So. 2d at 990.
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In the interpretation of a statute, it will be presumed that the
legislature intended every part thereof for a purpose, and that it
had some purpose in introducing the particular language used in an
enactment. The maxim "ut res magis valeat quam pereat" requires
not merely that the statute should be given effect as a whole, but
that effect should be given to each of its provisions. Significance
and effect should be accorded every part of the statute, if this can
be done without destroying or perverting the sense or effect of the
law or the general policy that dictated its enactment. In general,
therefore, that construction is favored which gives effect to every
clause and every part of the statute, thus producing a consistent
and harmonious whole. A construction that would leave without
effect any part of the language used should be rejected if possible.79
To allow the private school designation to be attached to the Pohl home
tutoring arrangement would have ignored this rule of statutory con-
struction and obviously rendered Florida's home instruction provision
mere surplusage.80
Ramifications
It is possible that the Pohls' home instruction would have fur-
nished the children an adequate education; it is even conceivable that
the children's education would be superior to that afforded by public
schools. However, it is important to consider that the purpose of the
compulsory education statute is to insure all children receive a satisfac-
tory education. If parents are permitted to claim compliance with the
private school provision while instructing children at home, then many
children may be deprived of educational opportunities due to the
idiosyncrasies of their parents.81 For example, in F. & F. v. Duval
79. Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
80. State of Fla. v. M.M.--oral argument tapes. To paraphrase one of the judges
from the M.M. oral argument, if we were to adopt the position that home tutoring
constitutes a private school then why wouldn't a private tutor simply declare the ar-
rangement to be a school. (The judge was candidly suggesting that this would nullify
the requirement in Florida that private tutors obtain teaching certificates.) Accord Pe-
titioner's Brief at 5.
81. See 406 U.S. 205 (dissenting opinion); 391 F. Supp. 452; 404 Ill. 574, 90
N.E.2d 213 (dissenting opinion). In Levisen, Justice Simpson was concerned the law
may "be thwarted by the whim and caprice of the many who... will take advantage
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County 2 parents instructing their children at home asserted that it was
against their religious beliefs to send the children to school; they
claimed compliance with the parochial school provision of Florida's
statute.83 The father, a self-ordained minister of the so-called "Cove-
nant Church of Jesus Christ," believed that it was sinful to associate
with Blacks and Orientals because they were the product of Eve's copu-
lation with Satan.84 The court found the parents not in compliance with
the parochial school provision because the religion had not been recog-
nized; this was supported by the fact that no church services were held
for other people.8 5 This distinction is significant when comparing
F. & F. to Yoder. Even though both cases ostensibly involve religious
practice, only in Yoder was the claim legitimately grounded in the free
exercise clause of the First Amendment. In cases not legitimately based
on the free exercise clause, however, there is no guarantee that an ex-
emption from state law will be granted.88 There is an "ancient
Rabbinic principle first laid down by the Babylonian Jewish Scholar
Samuel, and known as dina de-malkhuta dina, . .. the law of the
country is binding and in certain cases is to be preferred. 8s7 This prin-
ciple describes the course taken by United States courts, which recog-
nize one's right to hold any belief; but when those beliefs lead to prac-
tices interfering with the rights or welfare of others, the courts support
the state's authority to intervene. 88
The F. & F. court found it unnecessary to consider whether the
instructional arrangement could be a private school because the parents
only claimed compliance with Florida's school attendance law as a
home tutoring arrangement and a parochial school.89 This is important
because a decision sanctioning the Pohl Private School in M.M. would
have established a dangerous precedent enabling bizarre situations, as
of the situation. . . ." Id. at -, 90 N.E.2d at 216.
82. 273 So. 2d 15.
83. Id. at 17-18.
84. Id. at 18.
85. Id.
86. State v. Garber, 197 Kan. 567, 419 P.2d 896 (1966).
87. State v. Faith Baptist Church, 207 Neb. 802 at -, 301 N.W.2d 571 at 581
(1981) (concurring opinion).
88. 197 Kan. 567 at -, 419 P.2d 896 at 901; 294 N.W.2d at 888.
89. 273 So. 2d at 17-18.
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illustrated by F. & F., to achieve compliance with Florida's private
school provision. Moreover, judicial endorsement of such a policy would
have undoubtedly resulted in a deluge of public school withdrawals.
Many parents, like the Pohls, who are disgruntled with school busing
could have used this precedent to thwart school board efforts to effectu-
ate racial integration. Similarly, whenever school policy disputes arise,
withdrawals would be encouraged without concomitant assurances that
parent-furnished educational alternatives are adequate. In M.M. the
court adopted a common sense approach recognizing that the Pohl Pri-
vate School does not fit within the generally accepted meaning of
"school."
It is this author's view that the M.M. court, by adhering to the
teacher certification requirements of the home instruction provision in
Florida's statute, wisely avoided opening the proverbial floodgates. Un-
fortunately, the decision did not fill the void in Florida's compulsory
education statute by precisely prescribing the characteristics necessary
for an instructional arrangement to be considered a school for purposes
of the private school provision. This clearly would have usurped the
legislature's power; thus the court elected not to intrude into the legis-
lature's domain. The decision seems narrowly restricted to the facts of
the case and it is unclear what result will follow when parents assert
private school status by commencing instruction in a clubhouse, garage
or storefront with an expanded number of pupils. The question is likely
to be presented in the near future since "[s]chool officials [in Broward
County] [estimate] that parents of about 30 to 40 students have been
following the Pohls' example of keeping their children home or in
makeshift private schools to protest busing." 90
What are the minimum characteristics necessary for an educa-
tional facility to be considered a private school? Consider the present
arrangement of a Broward County storefront school, housed in Bay X
of the North Lauderdale Square Shopping Center. It is called The
North Lauderdale Academy and it may very well become the next bat-
tleground in the compulsory education arena.9 1 This arrangement was
90. Miami Herald, Dec. 17, 1981 § A at 1, col. 1. The "director of student wel-
fare and attendance, said truant officers have found about 60 children this year who are
being taught at home by parents." Fort Lauderdale News, Dec. 17, 1981 § B at 1, col.
5.
91. Miami News, Dec. 15, 1981 § B (Lifestyle), at 1-2, col. 2.
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born from the same busing controversy as the Pohl Private School and
after an unsuccessful first attempt, the storefront school has been oper-
ating for several weeks.92 The curriculum is provided by the University
of Nebraska's High School Independent Study Program. 93 Although
student enrollment has fluctuated, there are presently fifteen pupils at-
tending the Academy with expectations of additional students in the
future.94 The program's supervisors are not certified teachers in the
State of Florida although two of them have experience in education
and one holds an out-of-state expired teaching certificate.95 Under the
University of Nebraska's independent study program, however,
"[s]upervisors are not teachers of courses offered through the Indepen-
dent Study High School, and to serve effectively, need not have the
background to help students with the subject matter in the courses.""
The local supervisors are merely monitors or administrators and pri-
mary instruction is provided by correspondence with teachers at the
University of Nebraska.97
Don Samuels, a member of the Broward County School Board,
has argued that the North Lauderdale Academy "[i]n the long run,
.. . will hurt the kids."98 Development of social skills may be ham-
pered if these children are deprived of the opportunity to interact and
mature with their peer group.9 9 Due partially to the school's infancy
and also to the nature of the endeavor, the facilities and equipment are
below par. Yet, while social interaction and adequate facilities are de-
sirable, they are presently of little consequence in determining compli-
92. Id. at 2B; Personal Interview with North Lauderdale Academy supervisor,
Penny Kaufman.
93. University of Nebraska-Lincoln Division of Continuing Studies. Independent
Study High School Bulletin Series 82, No. 10 (1981-82).
94. Miami News, Dec. 15, 1981 § B (Lifestyle), at 1-2, col. 2.
95. Personal interview with North Lauderdale Academy supervisor Penny
Kaufman.
96. University of Nebraska-Lincoln Division of Continuing Studies, supra note
93, at 6.
97. Id. at 6-7.
98. Miami News, Dec. 15, 1981 § B (Lifestyle), at 1-2, col. 2.
99. Id. Jim Augustyn, the interim Principal at the University of Nebraska's In-
dependent High School Program admits "they'll have to pick up their socialization
skills on the outside somewhere, and there won't be the spontaneous give and take
between teacher and pupil that you'd see in a normal school." Id.
1284 Nova Law Journal 6:19821
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ance with Florida's statute.100 Other questions are presented by the
establishment of the North Lauderdale Academy. First, does this
arrangement fall within the private school provision which does not
mandate teaching credentials, or under the home education provision
subject to teacher certification requirements? Second, are state certifi-
cation requirements complied with when children are enrolled in corre-
spondence courses similar to the University of Nebraska Independent
Study Program? These questions have not yet been litigated in Florida
and it is urgent for the legislature to address the issues during the pre-
sent session.
Recommendations
M.M. has pointed out alarming shortcomings in Florida's compul-
sory education statute. There are virtually no minimum standards as-
suring citizens of Florida that the quality of education at private
schools will be acceptable.101 Furthermore, founders of new private
schools appear uncertain of what minimum standards should be
achieved to comply with Florida's private school provisions.102 It is true
that many private schools maintain high standards, but at the same
time it is possible that some private schools are substandard and detri-
mental to student welfare. Understandably, regulations imposing all
public school standards upon the private schools are unreasonable be-
cause the distinctiveness of private schools would become blurred.10 3 It
is also recognized that any possibility of mass state indoctrination of
our youth through the schools should be avoided. However, as stated
earlier, the right of the state to reasonably regulate education is un-
questioned104 and adoption of minimum standards would upgrade or
100. The Florida Statutes make no mention of social interaction or facilities with
reference to private educational programs.
101. Court Order at 3.
102. Interview with North Lauderdale Academy supervisor Penny Kaufman.
103. 47 Ohio St. 2d at -, 351 N.E.2d at 768. Accord 589 S.W.2d 877. "[T]o say
one may not be compelled to send a child to a public school but the state may deter-
mine the basic texts to be used in the private . .-. schools is but to require that the
same hay be fed in the field as is fed in the barn." Id. at 884.
104. 406 U.S. at 213; Accord Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). "A
state always has a legitimate concern for maintaining standards in all schools it allows
to operate." Id. at 613. But cf. 589 S.W.2d at 883 n.9. "State controlled homogeneous
285116:1982
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eliminate the substandard private schools without burdening those
schools already maintaining acceptable standards.
Both the circuit court and the Pohls claimed the legislature in-
tended not to regulate or control non-public schools. 0 5 The legislature,
however, did not intend to prohibit all regulations as illustrated by state
requirements concerning the number of mandatory school days and
hours for compliance with compulsory attendance laws.106 This is also
substantiated by the standards established for non-public colleges and
all independent post-secondary vocational, technical, trade and business
schools. 10 7 These standards exist to "protect" the student from decep-
tive, fraudulent or substandard education.10 8 They are not "intended to
regulate the stated purpose of a nonpublic college [or post-secondary
school] or to restrict any religious instruction or training in a nonpublic
college [or post-secondary school]."109 It is difficult to understand why
students in private elementary or secondary schools are not in need of
the same protections provided students in private colleges or post-secon-
dary schools.
It is time to establish minimum standards for all schools in Flor-
ida, and teacher certification should be one of the first requirements
adopted. To this former teacher it is incredible that presently there is
no certification requirement for those teaching in private schools. Al-
though it has been argued that certification will not guarantee the com-
petency of teachers, it will certainly provide one way to increase the
likelihood that teachers are qualified to instruct our children."x0
To become a certified teacher in Florida, one must have earned a
four-year college degree which includes an emphasis on professional
preparation in teaching."" In addition, the Department of Education
schools have provided a fertile field for the growth of totalitarian governments." Id.
105. Court Order at 3. State v. M.M.-oral argument tapes.
106. FLA. STAT. § § 228.041 (13) and (16) (Supp. 1980).
107. FLA. STAT. § 246.011 (Supp. 1980); FLA. STAT. § 246.201 (1979).
108. FLA. STAT. § 246.011(3) (Supp. 1980).
109. FLA. STAT. § 246.011(4) (Supp. 1980).
110. 294 N.W.2d at 894.
111. Fla. State Bd. of Educ. Admin. Rule 6A-4.04 reads in part:
(2) Regular Certificate. The regular certificate shall be valid for 5 years
and may be issued to an applicant who has met the following
requirements:
(b) Holds an earned acceptable four-year bachelor's or higher
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requires new teacher-applicants to demonstrate specific competencies
by means of a written examination. 1 2 The teacher must be competent
to write in understandable style, interpret professional material, under-
stand basic mathematics and comprehend patterns of child develop-
ment. 113 These qualifications are essential if Florida is to achieve a sat-
isfactory standard of education. Finally, the state should also adopt
minimum curriculum requirements insuring students in all schools that
they will be instructed in those fundamental areas needed for function-
ing in society. 14
degree or a foreign degree that required twelve (12) years of
pre-university education combined with four (4) years of
higher education ...
(c) Has an acceptable major in a single certification subject
• ..or has met the specialization and professional preparation
requirements for that subject ...
112. Fla. State Bd. of Educ. Admin. Rule 6A-4.021 reads in part:
Florida Teachers Certification written examination.
(2) Examination required.
(a) Each applicant who applies for a full-time Florida teaching certificate
and who does not currently hold a valid regular certificate in the State of
Florida shall be required to present a passing score on each sub-test of the
Florida Teaching Certificate Examination ...
(3) Description; competencies.
(c) The following competencies are to be demonstrated by means of the
written examination;
1. The ability to write in a logical and understandable style
with appropriate grammar and sentence structure.
2. The ability to read, comprehend, and interpret professional
and other written material.
3. The ability to comprehend and work with fundamental
mathematical concepts.
4. The ability to comprehend patterns or physical, social and
academic development in students, and to counsel students
concerning their needs in those areas.
113. Id.
114. State of Fla. v. M.M.-oral argument tapes. The necessity for minimum cur-
riculum requirements was apparent from part of the dialogue which occurred at the
M.M. oral argument.
Judge: "Supposing the Pohls are illiterate, does that make any difference?
Attorney: "No Sir, not according to the law as we find it now."
Judge: "If all they do for 5 hours a day is teach tennis, does that make any
difference?"
2871Florida's Compulsory Education Dilemma16:1982
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Conclusion
M.M. has revealed serious defects in Florida's compulsory educa-
tion laws. If the Florida legislature "dropped the ball,' 115 it is time to
recover the fumble. Minimum standards for all Florida schools must be
established to guarantee that no child is deprived the opportunity to
obtain an adequate education.
Gary E. Sherman*
Attorney: "According to the minimum requirements which have been set
up by the State Board of Education . . ., anyone attending a non-public
school complies with compulsory attendance laws ...by attending for
180 school days. They do not establish the curriculum or that the teachers
have to be certified."
Judge: "What does your position do with the supposed legislative intention
that we shall have compulsory education in this state? Devastates it, does
it not?"
Attorney: "Compulsory attendance may be achieved in one of four ways.
Number 3 is private school."
Judge: "You need not have a teacher and you need not educate!"
Attorney: "No Sir, it is the legislature that has dropped the ball if.any-
body, not this court or not the lower court. The lower court can only rule
by what the law is as we find it."
115. State of Fla. v. M.M.-(oral argument tape).
* I would like to express my appreciation to Special Assistant Attorney General
Paul Zachs and attorney Ellis Rubin for their cooperation during my research. I would
also like to express a special thank-you to Edna Sherman for her effort in typing this
note.
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Does the Constitution Guarantee Court-Appointed
Counsel When the Plea is "Don't take my Baby
Away"? Lassiter v. Department of Social Services
An impoverished mother has no constitutional right to a lawyer's
help in resisting a state's attempt to take her child away
permanently. .... 1
The preceding quote illustrates the press' view of the Supreme
Court's decision in Lassiter v. Department of Social Services.'
In its five-four decision the majority held that court-appointed
counsel is not a matter of right in state proceedings to permanently
remove a child from his parent's custody. This decision is Justice Potter
Stewart's legacy to the nation.
The Supreme Court has recognized a constitutional obligation to
provide counsel in criminal cases but it has not yet extended that obli-
gation to include non-juvenile civil proceedings.3 The constitutional
source of the obligation is found in the fourteenth amendment which
provides "no state shall. . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or prop-
erty, without due process of law. . . .- In criminal cases one's life or
liberty is in danger of deprivation. In civil cases one's money or prop-
erty is usually endangered. Between the extremes of loss of life or lib-
erty and loss of money or property, lies the loss of one's parental rights.
The issue in Lassiter, which focused on this intermediate gray area,
was whether due process is violated when the state attempts to judi-
cially terminate parental rights without appointing counsel for the
parent.
It is necessary to review the Court's factual account given in
1. Miami Herald, June 2, 1981, at 4a, col. 1.
2. - U.S. ___, 101 S. Ct. 2153 (1981).
3. Note, Court Appointment of Attorneys in Civil Cases; The Constitutionality
of Uncompensated Legal Assistance, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 366, 382 (1981).
4. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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Lassiter and the historical development of the right to counsel as well
as other due process considerations in civil contexts in order to under-
stand not only the significance of Lassiter but also the opposing conclu-
sions reached by the majority and dissenting justices. It appears, from
the constitutional standards applied by the Lassiter Court that the ma-
jority considered loss of a child more nearly akin to loss of property
than to loss of liberty.5 Therefore, the differing standards used by the
justices in deciding the nature of the process due, will also be
examined.
I. The Court's Narration of the Facts
The facts of Lassiter are important because Ms. Lassiter was an
atypical petitioner in this civil case. In addition, Justice Stewart, for
the majority, and Justice Blackmun, for the minority, differed signifi-
cantly in their interpretation of the relevant events.
In 1975, the District Court of Durham County, North Carolina,
adjudicated petitioner's infant son a neglected child." That court based
its decision on evidence that Abby Gail Lassiter had not given her son
proper medical care. As a result, the infant was transferred to the cus-
tody of the Durham County Department of Social Services. Later, in
1976, Ms. Lassiter was convicted of second degree murder,7 and sen-
tenced to serve twenty-five to forty years in prison.8 Two years later, in
1978, the Department of Social Services petitioned the district court to
terminate Ms. Lassiter's parental rights,9 basing its petition on a de-
partment evaluation that she "ha[d] not had contact with the child
since December of 1975. " 10 In the majority's opinion, this statement
seemed to raise the inference that Ms. Lassiter chose not to see her son
because of her disinterest in him. In contrast, the dissent pointed out
5. See pp. 299-305 infra, for discussion of due process standards applied in
Lassiter.
6. 101 S. Ct. at 2156.
7. This conviction stemmed from stab wounds Ms. Lassiter inflicted upon an in-
dividual whom her mother was beating with a broom when Ms. Lassiter entered her
mother's apartment. Id. at 2156 n.1.
8. Id. at 2156.
9. Id. at 2156-57.
10. Id. at 2157 (emphasis supplied).
6:19821290 Nova Law Journal
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that Ms. Lassiter did not voluntarily neglect to contact her son, but
was unable to do so because she was in prison.""1
According to Justice Stewart, who wrote the opinion for the ma-
jority, Ms. Lassiter was notified that the Department of Social Services
had a hearing date to seek to terminate her parental rights.1 2 Although
Ms. Lassiter's mother had retained counsel to assist in efforts to invali-
date her murder conviction, Ms. Lassiter never mentioned the termina-
tion proceeding to him; she only mentioned it to "'someone'" at the
prison.18 The majority implied this omission signified Lassiter was in-
different to her rights regarding her son. The dissent, however, related
this incident in a different light. Justice Blackmun stated that when
Lassiter was advised of the pending termination proceeding "[she] im-
mediately expressed strong opposition to that plan and indicated a de-
sire to place the child with his grandmother. 1 4 Justice Blackmun also
noted Lassiter was not informed she had a right to be represented by
counsel at the termination hearing.
Ms. Lassiter was brought from prison to the hearing on Aug. 31,
1978.15 The Department of Social Services'1 6 sole witness was a social
worker who detailed the medical neglect of the infant and stated the
child should not be placed with his grandmother, who was caring for
Ms. Lassiter's four other children. Following this testimony the court
advised Ms. Lassiter to cross-examine the witness. Justice Stewart de-
scribed this event:
Ms. Lassiter conducted a cross-examination of the social worker,
who firmly reiterated her earlier testimony. The judge explained
several times, with varying degrees of clarity, that Ms. Lassiter
should only ask questions at this stage; many of her questions were
disallowed because they were not really questions, but arguments.17
11. Id. at 2173.
12. Id. at 2157.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 2173.
15. Id. at 2157.
16. It is interesting to note that in the majority opinion Lassiter's adversary is
called "Department" while in the dissent it is called the "State." See, e.g., id. at 2157,
2168.
17. 101 S. Ct. at 2157 (emphasis added).
2911Parental Rights & Appointed Counsel1 6:1982
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In contrast Justice Blackmun pointed out that the testimony of the
Department's sole witness consisted of inadmissible hearsay evidence,
to which Ms. Lassiter made no objection. Justice Blackmun aptly noted
that while "[t]he court gave petitioner an opportunity to cross-examine
the social worker, . . . she apparently did not understand that cross-
examination required questioning rather than declarative
statements." 18
Ms. Lassiter testified she had properly cared for her son and ex-
pressed her desire that he live with his grandmother, brothers and sis-
ters. 19 On appeal from the termination of parental rights, Lassiter's
only argument was that the trial court erred in failing to appoint coun-
sel for her.2
The differing versions of the facts may perhaps be explained by
the effect petitioner's character had upon the Court: She was not
merely an ineffective parent, but a convicted murderess. The majority
implied termination of parental rights was the only proper outcome in
this particular case, and it is arguable that the Court's preoccupation
with this result prompted a misapplication of logic and law. Through-
out the majority opinion petitioner's character seemingly hangs like a
shadow over the logic of the Court. A more "worthy" petitioner might
have fared better.21
Given the facts in this case the Court's grant of certiorari was
itself questionable. Justice Burger, concurring in the majority opinion,
stated: "Given the record in this case, which involves the parental
rights of a mother under lengthy sentence for murder who showed little
interest in her son, the writ might well have been a 'candidate' for dis-
missal as improvidently granted.'2 2 Neither Justice Burger nor the
18. Id. at 2173 (footnotes and citations omitted) (emphasis added). At this point
the dissent includes testimony from the termination hearing which demonstrates that
Ms. Lassiter had no notion as to the nature of cross-examination. The judge was impa-
tient and discourteous to her, and all opportunity to present a meaningful defense was
lost. Id. at 2173 n.22.
19. Id. at 2157-58.
20. Id. at 2158.
21. Perhaps a more "worthy" petitioner would not be a convicted murderess,
have had a number of children out of wedlock, or be imprisoned for several decades
and unable to personally care for her child. In Lassiter, all these factors combined to
make the petitioner particularly unappealing.
22. 101 S. Ct. at 2163 (emphasis added).
85
et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue
Published by NSUWorks, 1982
Parental Rights & Appointed Counsel6:1982
other justices explain why certiorari was granted.
II. Historical Development of Right to Counsel23
The Supreme Court had never before heard a case involving the
right to counsel in the context of parental rights termination. 4 Since
the Court had not extended the right to court-appointed counsel to non-
juvenile civil cases,25 it was necessary for the Lassiter Court to consider
both the right to counsel in criminal cases and the due process given in
civil cases.
The extension of fourteenth amendment due process guarantees to
include the right to state appointed counsel is a recent development. In
1932 the Court, in Powell v. Alabama28 determined due process re-
quired courts to assign counsel for indigent defendants in capital cases.
However, the Powell Court declined to determine whether that right
extended to other criminal prosecutions.2
Addressing the appointment of counsel in Lassiter the Court's
analysis began with Betts v. Brady' 8 In Betts, the Court refused to
extend the automatic right to counsel for indigents charged with non-
capital criminal offenses, deciding that state courts had the power to
appoint counsel, or not, as they deemed proper.29 Betts held sway for
over twenty years, until the case-by-case approach was overruled in the
landmark decision Gideon v. Wainwright."°
In Gideon the Court expanded the automatic right to counsel to
include all non-capital felony cases. This shift from Betts demonstrated
the Court's concern for fundamental fairness: "[R]eason and reflection
require us to recognize that in our adversary system of criminal justice,
23. The historical development of the right to counsel is also treated in Note,
Constitutional Law - Due Process - Indigent Parents' Right to Counsel in Child Neg-
lect Cases, 46 TENN. L. REV. 649 (1979).
24. The Supreme Court denied certiorari in a case similar to Lassiter in Kauf-
man v. Carter, 8 Cal. App. 3d 783, 87 Cal. Rptr. 678, cert. denied, 402 U.S. 964
(1971). See discussion at p. 295 infra.
25. See note 3 supra.
26. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
27. Id. at 71.
28. 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
29. Id. at 473.
30. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
2931
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any person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be
assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him. This seems to us
to be an obvious truth." '3
In the twenty years since Gideon, the Court decided several cases
specifically bearing on Lassiter. The Court found the right to appointed
counsel existed in juvenile proceedings where a child faced institution-
alization in a juvenile detention facility.32 In addition the Court found
the right to counsel exists in any prosecution threatening any length of
imprisonment.33 Of the five justices reaching the merits in Vitek v.
Jones,34 four concluded counsel must be appointed for a prisoner in a
proceeding to transfer him from prison to a mental hospital. 5
Further expansion of the right to counsel was later inhibited by
Morrisey v. Brewer and Gagnon v. Scarpelli.36 In Morrisey, the Court
held an informal pre-revocation hearing must precede parole revoca-
tion, but declined to decide whether the parolee was entitled to assis-
tance of counsel, whether retained or appointed.37 In Gagnon, the
Court admitted that counsel might be necessary to assure due process
in parole revocation proceedings, but decided a case-by-case approach
was adequate to determine whether counsel should be appointed.38 The
31. Id. at 344.
32. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). Although a juvenile proceeding is not a crim-
inal trial, the Court reasoned that the danger of incarceration in a juvenile detention
institution was comparable to imprisonment. The penalty of incarceration, rather than
the nature of the proceeding, made the presence of counsel requisite. Id. at 12-31.
33. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972). The Court held "that absent
knowing and intelligent waiver, no person may be imprisoned for any offense, whether
classified as petty, misdemeanor or felony, unless he was represented by counsel at his
trial." Id. at 37. In any proceeding - no matter how minor - where incarceration
might result, the right to counsel was definitively assured.
34. 445 U.S. 480 at 497 (1980).
35. Id. The fifth justice concluded that some independent assistance should be
provided to an inmate in such a proceeding, but that assistance need not necessarily be
a licensed attorney.
36. 408 U.S. 471 (1972); 411 U.S. 778 (1973).
37. 408 U.S. at 489.
38. 411 U.S. at 790. The Court reasoned that revocation of parole or probation
was not part of a criminal trial and therefore the full due process protections of crimi-
nal trials did not apply. Id. at 781. It is interesting to note that in In re Gault, the
nature of the punishment was the determining factor in requiring the appointment of
counsel, even though the juvenile proceeding was not considered a criminal one. In
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Lassiter Court relied on these cases to justify its affirmation of the
case-by-case approach in deciding whether counsel need be appointed.
In the civil arena, the Supreme Court had not, before Lassiter,
reached the merits of the right to counsel issue in termination of paren-
tal rights proceedings. The opportunity presented itself in 1971, when
Kaufman v. Carter,3 9 a case remarkably similar to Lassiter, came
before the Court. The Court denied certiorari,4 0 refusing to decide
whether an indigent mother was entitled to court-appointed counsel in
a state initiated civil suit seeking to declare her an unfit mother and
obtain custody of five of her seven children. Justice Black, dissenting
from the denial of certiorari, argued the Court should have heard the
case and counsel should have been appointed:
The necessity of state-appointed counsel is particularly acute in
cases like one of those before us, Kaufman v. Carter, where the
state initiates a civil proceeding against an individual to deprive her
of custody of her children. Here the state is employing the judicial
mechanism it has created to enforce society's will upon an individ-
ual and take away her children. The case by its very nature resem-
bles a criminal prosecution. The defendant is charged with con-
duct-the failure to care properly for her children-which may be
criminal and which in any event is viewed as reprehensible and
morally wrong by a majority of society. And the cost of being un-
successful is dearly high-loss of the companionship of one's
children.41
Davis v. Page,42 a fifth circuit case, also involved the right to
court-appointed counsel in a parental rights proceeding. In Davis, the
Gagnon, on the other hand, the fact that the revocation of parole or probation was not
part of a criminal proceeding seems to be the determining factor in not requiring ap-
pointment of counsel, even though the result, as in In re Gault, might be incarceration.
39. Meltzer v. C. Buck LeCraw & Co., 402 U.S. 954 (1971), discussing denial
of certiorari in Kaufman, 402 U.S. 964 (1971).
40. Id. at 964. Although Justice Black's dissent to denial of certiorari in Kauf-
man seems directly related to the issues in Lassiter, the Court makes no mention of his
opinion in Lassiter.
41. Id. at 959 (emphasis added).
42. 618 F.2d 374 (5th Cir. 1980), modified, 640 F.2d 599 (5th Cir. 1981) (en
banc), petition for cert. filed, sub nom. Chastain v. Davis, 50 U.S.L.W. 3109 (U.S.
May 7, 1981) (No. 80-1888).
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hearing concerned removal of the child from the parent's custody s
while in Lassiter the hearing concerned the final termination of all pa-
rental rights. 44 Unlike Ms. Lassiter, the parent in Davis had no crimi-
nal record. The fifth circuit determined the parent was indeed entitled
to a court appointed attorney to assure compliance with due process. 45
Lassiter may have a negative effect on the decision in Davis, since
Davis will probably be vacated and remanded for reconsideration in
light of Lassiter.6 It is interesting to speculate whether the Supreme
Court would have overruled the fifth circuit decision in Davis, had
Davis come before the Court prior to Lassiter.
Since decisions specifically involving the right to appointed counsel
have been mainly limited to criminal cases, the Lassiter Court was
compelled to analyze due process requirements in civil cases generally,
rather than the right to counsel specifically. The right to counsel is one
aspect of due process. In deciding what process was due in Lassiter, the
Court relied on its decision in Mathews v. Eldridge.7
Since 1976 when Eldridge was decided, it has been the tool with
which the Court decides due process issues.48 Eldridge articulated a
three-pronged test to be applied in due process determinations: "First,
the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second,
the risk of erroneous deprivation of such interests, through the proce-
dure used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute
procedural safeguards; and finally the Government's interest, . ..
The guideposts of Eldridge were generated by the Court's earlier
decisions in civil due process cases.50 In Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy
43. Id. at 375.
44. 101 S. Ct. at 2156, 2157.
45. 640 F.2d at 604.
46. See note 42 supra. If Davis should be remanded, the case-by-case approach
mandated by Lassiter would be applied. However, the lower court could still decide
that in this particular case the parent is entitled to a court appointed attorney.
47. 101 S. Ct. at 2159 citing 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
48. See Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105 (1977); Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div.
v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1 (1978); Little v. Streater, - U.S. -, 101 S. Ct. 2202 (1981). In
these cases the Eldridge factors were applied to evaluate the procedural due process
necessary when a drivers license was to be revoked, utilities were to be shut-off, and
paternity to be adjudicated.
49. 424 U.S. at 335 (emphasis added).
50. See Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961) (right to a hearing
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the Court considered the litigant's private interests-loss of government
employment.5 1 In Goldberg v. Kelly,52 the Court considered the impor-
tance of the private interest in determining the timing of a hearing for
termination of welfare benefits,53 and found the private interest impor-
tant enough to require a pre- rather than post-termination hearing be
afforded.5 4 Goldberg evaluated and weighed the government's interest
in protecting the poor and avoiding increased fiscal burdens.55
In both Richardson v. Perales" and Kelly the Court considered
the risk of erroneous deprivation as part of the due process issue. In
Perales physicians' reports were deemed sufficient evidence for finding
nondisability in a claim for Social Security disability benefits.57 The
procedure carried with it a low risk of erroneous deprivation, and it can
be inferred from the Court's reasoning that the low risk was a factor in
the decision."" In Kelly however, the evidence relied on in terminating
welfare benefits was severely subject to "honest error or irritable mis-
judgment. . . -59 Since the risk of erroneous deprivation was great,
the Court required a pre-termination hearing in this case. 0
In Eldridge the Court adroitly interwove and balanced these con-
siderations to formulate the factors necessary for fulfillment of due pro-
cess requisites. As the culmination of a long line of due process deci-
for firing); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (timing of hearing for termination
of welfare benefits); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971) (nature of hearing required
for suspension of drivers license); Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389 (1971) (type of
procedure required for claim of Social Security disability benefits); Fuentes v. Shevin,
407 U.S. 67 (1972) (timing of hearing in seizure of property in replevin); Stanley v.
Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (right to a hearing for unwed father's custody of child);
Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974) (timing of hearing for firing); Fusari v. Stein-
berg, 419 U.S. 379 (1975) (nature of procedure for eligibility for unemployment
compensation).
51. 367 U.S. at 895-96. In addition, the Court made reference to the govern-
ment's interest in security. Id. at 899.
52. 397 U.S. 254.
53. Id. at 264.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 264-65.
56. 402 U.S. 389.
57. Id. at 404.
58. Id. at 405.
59. 397 U.S. at 266 citing Kelly v. Wyman, 294 F. Supp. 893 at 904-05.
60. Id. at 261.
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sions, Eldridge provides a clear and useful tool for all due process
determinations. Nevertheless, the application of Eldridge in Lassiter
vas not without conflict.
Due process considerations in civil cases have usually involved the
right to a hearing, the timing of the hearing, or the nature of the hear-
ing or procedure in question.61 In Lassiter, there was no question of
entitlement to a hearing, nor was the timing of the hearing at issue.
Rather, the nature of the hearing was the subject of evaluation, and the
Court used the Eldridge guideposts to determine whether the hearing
in Lassiter passed due process muster. The facts in Lassiter were an
important ingredient under the Eldridge due process formula. The
stakes were not mere property interests, but the benefits and rights of
family life. The Court recognized the magnitude of the parent's interest
in the custody of his child. 2
Although the constitution does not specifically state that familial
interests are constitutionally protected, a long line of cases have found
such constitutional protection for rights existing within the realm of
marriage, sexual matters, and child-rearing.6" In its treatment of due
process issues in familial rights cases the Court has held a right to a
hearing exists in a case involving a child custody decree obtained in an
ex parte divorce action, 4 as well as in a case involving child custody
rights of unwed fathers. 5 In Stanley v. Illinois,66 an Illinois statute
was construed to mean an unwed father could be denied, without a
hearing, custody of his children upon the death of the mother.6 7 The
unwed father was presumed unfit. The Supreme Court held that a
hearing was required before a father could be deprived of his chil-
61. See note 50 supra.
62. 101 S. Ct. at 2160.
63. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (involuntary sterilization); Gris-
wold v. Connecticut, 383 U.S. 479 (1965) (contraception); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973) (abortion); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (right to marry).
64. May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528 (1952).
65. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
66. Id.
67. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § § 702-1, 702-4, 701-14. The pertinent language of
the statute defines a parent as "the father and mother of a legitimate child, or the
survivor of them, or the natural mother of an illegitimate child." § 701-14. The defini-
tion of parent did not include the natural father of an illegitimate child.
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dren.68 The Court in Lassiter considered these cases to underscore the
magnitude of parental interest in child custody.69
Nevertheless, using the due process considerations enumerated in
Eldridge,7" and the historical fact that the right to appointed counsel
exists mainly in criminal cases, the majority concluded that Ms.
Lassiter did not have a right to appointed counsel.
III. The Majority Rationale
The majority's conclusion must be viewed in light of the facts it
found persuasive: Ms. Lassiter repeatedly stabbed another human be-
ing, inflicting death; she was convicted for this murder; she was serving
a twenty-five to forty year prison sentence; she was, therefore, an unfit
mother. The majority implied that Ms. Lassiter could not, and should
not have won custody of her son under the circumstances. To some
critics the majority's treatment of the general issue of whether a parent
was entitled to court-appointed counsel appears subordinate to its inter-
est in a particular result for the particular petitioner.
Cases involving due process issues require a two tier inquiry. First,
is the specific interest involved one entitled to fourteenth amendment
due process protection? Second, if entitlement is demonstrated, what
degree of due process protection is appropriate?71
There is no doubt that a parent's interest in raising his child is
entitled to some due process protection. In Stanley, the Court specifi-
cally stated "[t]he integrity of the family unit has found protection in
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. ' 72 This point is
so well settled that Lassiter only addressed the second question and
decided the degree of procedural protection due.
Based on its historical analysis of the right to counsel, the majority
found a presumption rooted in the criminal context, that "an indigent
litigant has a right to appointed counsel only when, if he loses, he may
be deprived of his physical liberty."73 The majority presumed no right
68. 405 U.S. at 658.
69. 101 S. Ct. at 2160.
70. See discussion at p. 296 supra.
71. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 507 (1978).
72. 405 U.S. 645 at 651 (citations omitted).
73. 101 S. Ct. at 2159.
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to counsel existed because no loss of physical liberty was at stake in
Lassiter. This presumption was balanced against the three Eldridge el-
ements7 4 to decide what process was due. The composite analytic pic-
ture was thus comprised of private interests, government interests, and
risk of erroneous decisions on the one hand, and the presumption that
appointed counsel is not constitutionally guaranteed where incarcera-
tion is not threatened, on the other.75
Applying the Eldridge test, the Lassiter majority acknowledged a
parent's interest in the custody of his child is great"6 and then rapidly
proceeded to evaluation of the state's interest. According to the major-
ity the state's interest is not only the child's welfare, 7 but also the
desire to make judicial decisions in the most economical manner.78 The
majority wanted to avoid imposing upon the states the expense of
court-appointed counsel, 9 as well as the added costs of the lengthened
and more complex proceeding likely to result from the assignment of
counsel."0
While superficially enticing, the soundness of this reasoning seems
debatable. In a case-by-case approach the lower court will have to
determine whether counsel need be appointed in a particular case.
Cleaver v. Wilcox"1 suggested three factors to be considered when de-
ciding whether to appoint counsel to fulfill due process requirements in
74. The Court in Lassiter stated that Eldridge propounded three elements to be
evaluated in deciding the requirements of due process and that the Court must balance
these three elements. The majority gave no reason as to why it deemed the Eldridge
elements proper for application to Lassiter, other than that the Eldridge elements con-
cern due process. Id.
75. Id.
76. 101 S. Ct. at 2160.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. According to the majority in Lassiter, thirty-three states and the District
of Columbia have statutes which already provide for the appointment of counsel in
termination of parental rights and child dependency cases. Id. at 2163. It appears the
majority declined to impose upon the states that which the majority of states have seen
fit to impose upon themselves.
80. Id. at 2160.
81. 499 F.2d 940 (9th Cir. 1974). This was a class action seeking the right to
appointment of counsel in child dependency proceedings. An amendment to the Cali-
fornia Statutes - CAL. STATS. WELF. & INST. CODE § 600 (Deering) see also § 318.5,
now provides for counsel as a matter of right in this type of proceeding.
Nova Law Journal 6:1982
93
et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue
Published by NSUWorks, 1982
Parental Rights & Appointed Counsel
a child dependency proceeding: (1) length of probable parent-child sep-
aration; (2) presence or absence of parental consent or disputed facts;
(3) the parent's ability to handle relevant documents and examination
of witnesses at the proceeding. 2 The preceeding factors will necessarily
vary and warrant individualized evaluation in each case, although each
state may create its own guidelines. To use this method, the judge
needs to investigate each case, familiarize himself with the abilities of
the parents, and determine their capacity to proceed pro se. Is it more
economical to allot a judge's time to these inquiries, than to require
automatic appointment of counsel upon determination of indigency? If
judicial economy is a valid state interest it appears the Wilcox case-by-
case approach defeats rather than serves this interest. The majority ad-
mitted, however, the state's pecuniary interests in Lassiter were insuffi-
cient to overcome the parental interests represented in the case.83
The third Eldridge factor concerns the possibility that erroneous
decisions will result from the procedures currently used. This factor re-
quires the court to consider whether the proposed procedure will signifi-
cantly affect the outcome in a particular case. In Lassiter, the Court
framed the inquiry as whether "a parent will be erroneously deprived
of his or her child because the parent is not represented by counsel."84
In answering the question the majority acknowledged in some cases
parents might risk erroneous deprivation since, without counsel, they
could not adequately represent their interests.85 However, this would
not necessarily occur in every situation.8 6
The majority stated that the weight of the Eldridge factors might
rebut the presumption against appointed counsel in some cases but not
in others.8 7 For example, in a particular case where state's interests are
strong, private interests weak, and risk of erroneous decision slight, the
presumption against appointed counsel would not be rebutted. How-
ever, where the state's interests are slight, private interests great, and
risk of error high, the presumption might be rebutted.8 8 Since the
82. Id. at 945.
83. 101 S. Ct. at 2160.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 2161.
86. Id. at 2162.
87. Id.
88. Id.
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weight of the Eldridge factors differ in each case, the majority adopted
the case-by-case approach established in Gagnon as the proper method
for deciding when counsel should be appointed.8 9
The application of this balancing test will be troublesome for lower
courts. The majority did not explain the circumstances under which
state interests could outweigh parental interest. Nor does the majority
explain why courts should not defer to any risk of error where potential
loss is great and the parent unrepresented.
Applying the case-by-case approach to Lassiter the majority con-
cluded Ms. Lassiter had no right to counsel. In the majority's view the
risk of error was slight because "the case presented no specially troub-
lesome points of law, either procedural or substantive,"9' 0 and "that
counsel for Ms. Lassiter could not have made a determinative differ-
ence."'" Since the majority believed the presence of counsel could not
have changed the outcome in Lassiter, it did not evaluate the need for
counsel in termination proceedings generally.
IV. The Dissent's Counterpoint
Writing for the dissent, Justice Blackmun recognized his breth-
ren's failure to look beyond petitioner's character in the Lassiter deci-
sion. "[T]he issue before the Court is not petitioner's character; it is
whether she was given a meaningful opportunity to be heard ... .
Justice Blackmun did not question the propriety of the application
of Eldridge but applied them himself, to reach the opposite conclusion:
due process required the appointment of counsel for an indigent parent
threatened with judicial termination of parental rights.
Evaluating the Eldridge test, Justice Blackmun, like the majority,
acknowledged the importance of the first factor-parental interest. He
emphasized, however, the magnitude of this interest to a greater extent
than the majority.9" Evaluating the second Eldridge factor-state in-
terests-Justice Blackmun easily dismissed the state's financial interest
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 2175.
93. Id. at 2166.
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as a limited one, 4 while admititng the state's interest in the welfare of
the child is a legitimate one.9 5 The Justice pointed out, however, that
the child's protection is not occasioned by unnecessarily removing him
from his biological parents.96 Therefore, it seems the state's interest
would best be served by affording procedural protections in termination
proceedings so as to assure against unnecessary or erroneous parent-
child separations. It seems obvious appointment of counsel would be
the very sort of procedural protection aiding the state in its goal of
preventing unnecessary separations. Both the dissent and the majority
agreed, however, that the state's interest in Lassiter was not the dispos-
itive factor that tipped the scales against court-appointed counsel.9 7
The final Eldridge factor-possibility of erroneous depriva-
tion-was the factor that caused most divergence between majority and
dissenting views. The majority believed in some cases risk of erroneous
deprivation would not be "insupportably high." '98 The dissent, on the
contrary, stated that risk of error in this type of proceeding assumed
"extraordinary proportion."991 According to Justice Blackmun, the risk
of error was great because the legal issues were not simple.100 "The
parent cannot possibly succeed without being able to identify material
issues, develop defenses, gather and present sufficient supporting non-
hearsay evidence, and conduct cross-examination of adverse wit-
nesses." 10 1 It would be a rare parent who could perform those adver-
sarial functions successfully. Justice Blackmun called the majority's ac-
knowledgment that these factors "'may . . . overwhelm an
uncounselled parent' a profound understatement. 1 0 2
Based on its evaluation of the Eldridge factors, the dissent found
illogical the majority's conclusion that counsel need not be appointed in
every case.10 3 But while the opinions' divergence in the factor analysis
94. Id. at 2170.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 2170.
98. Id. at 2162.
99. Id. at 2170.
100. Id. at 2169.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 2171.
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was not insignificant, the critical difference between majority and dis-
senting approaches focused on the manner in which Eldridge was ap-
plied. Justice Blackmun asserted that the case-by-case approach in this
context reflected erroneous application of EldridgeT10 because it neces-
sitated judicial evaluation of litigants. Rather than evaluating different
litigants within a given context, the correct inquiry concerns due pro-
cess needs arising within different legal contexts.10 5 Justice Blackmun
supported this reasoning: "But procedural due process rules are shaped
by the risk of error inherent in the truth-finding process as applied to
the generality of cases, not to rare exceptions." 0 6
The majority's decision in Lassiter is most vulnerable on this
point. In Eldridge, the three-step test was applied to the proceeding
involved in termination of disability benefits, rather than to the litigant,
in order to determine constitutional sufficiency of the nature and timing
of the procedure.1 07 It is clear from the Eldridge decision that the
Court intended the test to be used in evaluating procedures rather than
litigants; the decision turned not on the facts surrounding Mr. El-
dridge's loss of benefits but on the termination proceedings in gen-
eral.108 Moreover, in the Court's succeeding applications of Eldridge it
has consistently applied the test to legal contexts rather than to liti-
gants.109 It is amazing if not ironic that in Little v. Streater,110 decided
the same day as Lassiter, the Court applied Eldridge in a manner con-
104. Id. at 2171.
105. Id.
106. Id. citing Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 344.
107. 424 U.S. at 336.
108. Id.
109. See Hortonville Joint School Dist. No. 1 v. Hortonville Educ. Ass'n, 426
U.S. 482 at 494 (1976) (procedures for firing teachers); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S.
651 at 675 (1977) (procedure for inflicting corporal punishment in public schools);
Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality & Reform, 431 U.S. 816 at 849
(1977) (procedures for removal of foster children from foster homes); Board of Cura-
tors of the University of Missouri v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78 at 86 n.3 (1978) (proce-
dures for dismissal of students for academic deficiencies); Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S.
247 at 259 (1978) (procedures for suspension of public school students); Memphis
Light, Gas & Water Division v. Craft, 431 U.S. 1 at 17-18 (1978) (procedures for
terminating utility services); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 at 425 (1979) (civil
proceeding to commit an individual to a state mental hospital).
110. 101 S. Ct. 2202 (1981).
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sistent with previous decisions. It used the three-pronged test to evalu-
ate private interests, state interests, and risk of erroneous deprivation in
paternity proceedings in general."' The Court in Little did not consider
Mr. Little's particular situation. Nevertheless, in Lassiter the Court
,specifically stated that each parent-litigant will be evaluated individu-
ally."12 This novel application of Eldridge is completely contrary its
spirit and seems irreconcilable with the Court's traditional use of that
test.
Justice Blackmun also disagreed with the majority's presumption
that counsel should be appointed only when loss of physical liberty is
threatened. 13 The trend of prior Court decisions indicates there should
be no such presumption, though most of those decisions dealt with
criminal cases. Dissenting from denial of certiorari in Kaufman, Jus-
tice Black stated "the necessity of state-appointed counsel is particu-
larly acute in [child dependency proceedings].""' He found no pre-
sumption that court-appointed counsel was limited to cases involving
deprivation of physical liberty.
The Lassiter dissent also pointed out that loss of liberty was not
the only threat warranting court-appointed counsel. Justice Blackmun
cited Vitek, in which a plurality required appointment of counsel even
though transfer from prison to a mental hospital did not involve addi-
tional confinement."15 Vitek focused on the consideration that "[the
stigmatizing consequences of a transfer to a mental hospital for in-
voluntary psychiatric treatment, coupled with the subjection of the
prisoner to mandatory behavior modification as a treatment for mental
illness, constitute the kind of deprivations of liberty that [require] pro-
cedural protections."' "'0 The Vitek Court specifically stated the stigma
which attaches to mental hospital confinement raised the need for pro-
cedural protections." 7 It is arguable that just as great a stigma at-
taches to parents whose children are taken away by the state. The in-
voluntary loss of parental rights is perhaps even more severe than
Ill. Id. at 2208.
112. 101 S. Ct. at 2162.
113. Id. at 2166.
114. 402 U.S. at 959.
115. 101 S. Ct. at 2167.
116. 445 U.S. at 494.
117. Id.
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involuntary subjection to treatment for mental illness. Hospitalization
and treatment may be viewed as a helpful service, rather than a pun-
ishment, but loss of parental rights affords no such redemptive aspect
for the petitioner. Nevertheless, the majority presumed away the par-
ent's right to an appointed attorney while the prisoner's right was
preserved.
The dissent rebutted the majority's use of Gagnon in supporting its
conclusion that a presumption exists against appointment of counsel.,,
The Court in Gagnon held appointed counsel was not required, even
though revocation of parole or probation results in loss of physical lib-
erty. The dissent did not read Gagnon and Vitek as holding loss of
physical liberty the only factor to consider when determining whether
counsel should be appointed.11 9 Therefore, according to the dissent, the
majority erroneously decided such a presumption exists.1 0
Justice Blackmun offered another criterion for deciding whether
counsel should be appointed: the nature of the proceeding itself.12'
Compared with Gagnon, a termination of parental rights hearing is a
formal proceeding. In Gagnon technical rules of procedure and evi-
dence did not apply because of the informal nature of the parole revo-
cation hearing,122 whereas in Lassiter the North Carolina statute pro-
vided for formal and adversarial procedures to extinguish parental
rights. 2 3 Justice Blackmun pointed this out: "Indeed, the State here
has prescribed virtually all the attributes of a formal trial as befits the
severity of the loss at stake in the termination decision-every attri-
bute, that is, except counsel for the defendant parent. 1 24 A similar
view was held in Kaufman by Justice Black, who compared dependency
proceedings to criminal prosecutions. 125
118. 101 S. Ct. at 2166.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 2167.
122. 411 U.S. at 787. N.C. GEN. STAT. § § 7a-289.23; 7a-289.25; 7a-289.27(l);
la-1 Rule 1 (Supp. 1979); 101 S. Ct. at 2167.
123. 1d. The government initiates the proceeding by filing a petition and serving
a summons on the parent; a judge presides over the hearing and conducts the proceed-
ing pursuant to the formal rules of evidence and procedure.
124. Id. at 2168.
125. 402 U.S. at 959.
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Another troublesome element of the Lassiter majority's reasoning
was its application of Eldridge at all.126 Justice Blackmun did not take
exception to the application of the Eldridge standards to Lassiter.
However, in his own three-paragraph dissent, Justice Stevens1 27 recog-
nized that by employing the Eldridge balancing test, the majority
chose "an appropriate method of determining what process is due in
property cases. ' 128 This, of course, is not necessarily an appropriate
test where parental rights hang in the balance. Surely it seems logical
that when the Court addressed what due process was requisite when a
party stood to lose his Social Security disability payments 129-- a case
involving monetary losses-it did not calculate or intend that these
same criteria be applied when loss of parental rights was contemplated.
The majority could have relied on other precedents demonstrating
the loss of parental rights cannot be compared with loss of property;
the former is a much greater loss. Justice Blackmun acknowledged
these precedents, citing a series of cases that show loss of parental
rights has been considered a more grievous deprivation than the loss of
property.1 30 For example, in May v. Anderson 3 1 the Court acknowl-
edged that "[flights far more precious. . . than property rights will be
cut-off if [a parent] is to be bound by the Wisconsin award of custody
[to the other parent.]"132 The high degree of protection given parental
rights was also expressed in Stanley v. Illinois, 33 when the Court
stated: "It is plain that the interest of a parent in the companionship,
care, custody, and management of his or her children 'come[s] to this
126. 101 S. Ct. at 2159.
127. 101 S. Ct. at 2176.
128. Id. (emphasis added).
129. 424 U.S. at 349.
130. Id. at 2165. See May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 533, Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972); Kovacs v.
Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 95 (1949); Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S.
816, 845 (1977); Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977); Prince v. Massa-
chusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35
(1925).
131. 345 U.S. 528. The Supreme Court held that a child custody decree of an-
other state need not be given full faith and credit when that decree was obtained in an
ex parte divorce action. Id. at 534.
132. Id. at 533.
133. 405 U.S. 645.
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Court with a momentum of respect lacking when appeal is made to
liberties which derive merely from shifting economic arrange-
ments.' "1u
It seems the standard for what degree of process is due should be
higher when the loss is parental rights rather than property rights. In
Goldberg v. Kelly,"3 5 the Court tied the applicable standard to the loss
suffered: "The extent to which procedural process must be afforded the
recipient is influenced by the extent to which he may 'be condemned to
suffer grievous loss,' . . . and depends upon whether the recipient's in-
terest in avoiding that loss outweighs the governmental interest in sum-
mary adjudication."'136 Using this test the majority necessarily would
have concluded that loss of parental rights is one of the most grievous
losses a human being can suffer: the highest standard of due process
should have been applied in Lassiter.
Neither the majority nor dissent compared deprivation in
Argersinger v. Hamlin"7 to deprivation in Lassiter, yet the comparison
is illuminating. In Argersinger, the defendant faced a $1,000 fine and/
or six months in jail. He was actually sentenced to ninety days in
jail."8 The mere possibility of that deprivation of liberty mandated ap-
pointment of counsel. If the Court had compared the loss in Lassiter to
the loss in Argersinger using the "grievous loss" test, surely the perma-
nent and absolute loss of parental rights would seem more severe than
a short term in prison. On this basis, the due process mandated in
Argersinger should have been extended to cases involving loss of paren-
tal rights.
The Lassiter Court could have stated simply and logically what
universal rules of human experience teach: the loss of a child is among
the most severe of all losses and requires the highest standard of proce-
dural protection. As the circuit court noted in Davis v. Page: "To offer
counsel when a single day in jail may be at stake, but to deny counsel
to an indigent when the destruction of his or her family is threatened,
134. Id. at 651 (citations omitted).
135. 397 U.S. 254 (1970). The Court determined in Goldberg that a pre-termi-
nation hearing must be provided prior to termination of financial aid under federally
assisted Aid to Families with Dependent Children program.
136. Id. at 2162-63. [citations omitted].
137. 407 U.S. at 26.
138. Id.
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does not accord with our concept of due process."1 39 Further justifica-
tion would hardly seem necessary, yet both the majority and dissent
chose instead to weigh due process requisites in light of the Eldridge
factors. Only Justice Stevens found no reason for weighing factors. He
stated, instead, that due process should be applied here as in a criminal
case.1 40 According to Justice Stevens "[t]he issue is one of fundamental
fairness, not of weighing the pecuniary costs against the societal bene-
fits. '141 To this writer, Stevens' proposition seems self-evident.
Having come to the opposite conclusion with regard to due process
right to counsel in termination proceedings in general, the dissent ex-
amined the implications of the majority's decision in view of Lassiter's
facts. Justice Blackmun made it clear that Ms. Lassiter could not han-
dle cross-examination. She did not present a defense; nor was she aided
or advised by the judge as to what she could do.142 In fact, as apparent
from the hearing transcript, the judge was quite rude to her.1 43
The majority concluded that presence of counsel could not have
made any difference in the outcome because the issues were not troub-
lesome and because Ms. Lassiter had no arguments to present.14 This
is conjecture. Counsel for Ms. Lassiter might have objected to the
hearsay testimony offered by the department's only witness. This evi-
dence comprised the major part of the state's case and was geared to
convincing the court that Ms. Lassiter's mother was unable to care ad-
equately for an additional child.1 45 Ms. Lassiter's mother denied this
allegation146 and counsel might have stressed both the denial and Ms.
Lassiter's interest in having her son returned to his brothers, sisters and
grandmother. It is possible that expert witnesses provided by defense
counsel might have testified that child rearing among family members
was eminently preferable to rearing in foster homes. Ms. Lassiter had
no real opportunity to present her case. Nevertheless the majority casu-
139. 640 F.2d at 604.
140. 101 S. Ct. at 2176.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 2174.
143. Id. at 2174 nn.24 and 25.
144. Id. at 2162-63.
145. Id. at 2173. The social workers hearsay came from unidentified community
members.
146. Id. at 2173.
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ally observed that the outcome would not have been different if counsel
had assisted.
Further, it is apparent the majority neglected the sage reasoning
of Armstrong v. Manzo, 47 where the Court stated due process required
litigants have an opportunity to be heard "at a meaningful time and in
a meaningful manner."14 It is inconceivable that the majority actually
perceived Ms. Lassiter's opportunity as meaningful.
The circuit court in Davis eloquently described the infirmities in-
herent in denying appointment of counsel in a case like Lassiter:
The State is represented by the State Attorney; it has access to
public records concerning the family and to the service of social
workers, psychiatrists, and psychologists. Those representing the
state have experience in legal proceedings and the ability to ex-
amine witnesses, present evidence, and argue skillfully that the
child should be adjudicated dependent. Unrepresented parents, in
contrast, will normally not cross-examine witnesses, submit evi-
dence, call witnesses, or present a defense. They do not understand
the rules of procedure or substantive law. They do not object to
improper questions or move to strike improper testimony ...
[T]hey may not even understand the legal significance and effect of
the proceedings.
Unless the indigent parent has the tools necessary to oppose
the state's expert presentation, a finding of dependency could be
based partially upon inadmissible hearsay, improper opinion evi-
dence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue of dependency, a determi-
nation of dependency might be founded upon testimony that a
skilled attorney would expose as biased or untrue. The parent may
have a defense sufficient to prevent an adjudication of dependency,
which he or she is unable adequately to present.149
The circumstances which Judge Tuttle described in Davis were
precisely what occurred in Lassiter. The basic truth of the fifth circuit's
words in Davis were self-evident and seemingly unassailable, yet the
147. 380 U.S. 545. The Court held in this case that failure to give notice to a
divorced parent that an adoption was pending deprived him of his parental rights with-
out due process.
148. Id. at 552.
149. 618 F.2d at 380-81.
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majority in Lassiter chose to ignore the import of this argument.
Finally, Justice Blackmun referred to Little v. Streater,1 50 finding
it ironic that the same day the Court decided a parent had no right to
appointed counsel in Lassiter, it also found an indigent man had a right
to state-paid blood-grouping tests taken in order to refute a charge of
paternity."' 1 In Little too the Court applied the Eldridge test but came
to a result opposite to Lassiter. The Court reasoned that absent the
blood-grouping tests the petitioner might erroneously be adjudged a
father:
Assessment of the Mathews v. Eldridge factors indicates that ap-
pellant did not receive the process he was constitutionally due.
Without aid in obtaining blood test evidence in a paternity case, an
indigent defendant, who faces the State as an adversary when the
child is a recipient of public assistance and who must overcome the
evidentiary burden Connecticut imposes, 'lacks a meaningful op-
portunity to be heard.' "152
Was Ms. Lassiter in less danger of an erroneous outcome than Mr.
Little? Blood group tests are often inconclusive with regard to pater-
nity.153 Whether or not the tests were performed Mr. Little might have
remained in the same position. In Lassiter it is clear damaging hearsay
evidence was admitted which may have prejudiced the outcome. The
majority nonetheless ignored the import of the erroneous decision ele-
ment and allowed greater procedural due process protection for Little
than for Lassiter. If the holdings of Little and Lassiter are suggestive
of the Court's hierarchy of values it may be argued the Lassiter major-
ity believed a higher standard of due process should be afforded when
parenthood is imputed than when it is terminated.
Conclusion
It is indeed unfortunate that an important issue-whether due pro-
cess requires the appointment of counsel for indigents in termination of
150. Id. at 2175 citing Little v. Streater, 101 S. Ct. 2202 (1981).
151. Id.
152. Little v. Streater, 101 S. Ct. at 2210 (citations omitted).
153. Id. at 2206.
1 6:1982
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parental rights proceedings-was represented by a convicted murder-
ess. It is fascinating to speculate whether the majority would have de-
cided an obvious constitutional right to court-appointed counsel existed
in termination proceedings had this question been presented by a non-
felonious, hard-working, and exemplary petitoner. The Court should
have recognized that any petitioner, no matter how unappealing, has
the right to representation in this situation, in order to protect the right
to a meaningful hearing. When parents' rights to their children are
threatened the highest standards of procedural protection should be af-
forded without question, because the loss of a child is one of the most
tragic of all.
To those of us reaching adulthood in the post-Gideon generation, a
criminal trial without representation seems the most flagrant violation
of constitutional rights. The right to court-appointed counsel seems ba-
sic and its non-existence unimaginable; its hard-fought history is practi-
cally forgotten. The need for counsel in cases involving termination of
parental rights seems no less compelling than the need for counsel in
criminal cases. The Court's five-four decision in Lassiter makes it clear
that this compelling need, for the present, will remain unfulfilled.
Roselin Shoshanna Ehrlich*
* Professor Michael Masinter, Nova University Law School, graciously provided
the fifth circuit appellate briefs for Davis v. Page, as well as his invaluable guidance.
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The Use Of Contempt Of Court To Enforce Florida
Divorce Decrees
Florida's courts often use contempt sanctions as a highly effective
means of enforcing final divorce decrees." Accordingly, when a party
fails to comply with a provision of the divorce order, the recalcitrant
party may be threatened with imprisonment. This threat ensures rapid
compliance with the duty the final decree imposes.2 The recent action
of a Dade County circuit judge exemplifies the effectiveness of such a
threat. Judge Rainwater cited 480 men in contempt of court over a
four day period.' Of the 480 men cited, 440 immediately paid the owed
family support ordered by their respective divorce decrees.4
The Florida Constitution, however, limits the courts' extraordinary
power to coerce: "No person shall be imprisoned for a debt, except in
cases of fraud."' 5 Therefore, it is imperative a court determine, prior to
exercising its power, whether a debt is the underlying cause for the
imposition of contempt and subsequent imprisonment. Courts have had
particular difficulty making this determination regarding property set-
tlements incorporated into final divorce decrees." Florida courts, in par-
ticular, have reached conflicting conclusions when determining whether
these settlements are enforceable through contempt of court.
If a court considers property settlements as merely imposing a
1. Miami Herald, Sept. 19, 1981, at 8B, col. 1.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 11.
6. Compare Collins v. Collins, 179 So. 2d 231 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1965) and
Firestone v. Ferguson, 372 So. 2d 490 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1979) holding the respec-
tive parties in contempt for failure to comply with a provision of a property settlement
agreement incorporated into final divorce decrees with Howell v. Howell, 207 So. 2d
507 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1968) and Carlin v. Carlin, 310 So. 2d 403 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 1975) holding contempt is not an available remedy to enforce property settle-
ment agreements incorporated into final divorce decrees.
7 See note 6 supra.
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debt, it should not punish the debtor by using its contempt power to
enforce the decree. This note will attempt to set forth certain guidelines
a Florida court might use in determining when a property settlement
incorporated in a final divorce decree constitutes a debt. In such cases
the decree is unenforceable through contempt because of Florida's con-
stitutional guarantee.
Contempt
In order for any judicial system to function smoothly, its courts
must have the ability to enforce their decrees. One such means of en-
forcement is the power of contempt. Florida defines contempt as "[a]
refusal to obey any legal order, mandate or decree, made or given by
any judge either in term time or in vacation relative to any business of
said court, after due notice thereof...."s
When the court seeks to punish a party for violating a judicial
decree, it initiates criminal contempt proceedings. 9 When a private
party initiates proceedings for the purpose of coercing another party
into action or non-action, the proceedings are for civil contempt.10 At
times, the distinction between civil and criminal contempt is nebulous.
The Florida Supreme Court discussed the differences and the. difficulty
of making the distinctions between the two in Pugliese v. Pugliese.11
Tina and Rocco Pugliese were divorced in 1975. The final divorce
decree ordered Rocco to vacate the marital dwelling. Subsquent to en-
try of final judgment, Rocco's attorney filed motions for a new trial,
stay of execution of judgment and notice of hearing. The attorney ad-
vised Rocco the judgment requiring surrender of the premises was
stayed pending final determination of the motions. Thus, Rocco refused
to vacate the marital dwelling.
Upon Rocco's refusal to vacate, Tina Pugliese filed a motion for
contempt and a notice of hearing. The judge held Rocco in contempt of
8. FLA. STAT. § 38.23 (1979); see also FLA. STAT. § 38.22 (1979) which states
that "[e]very court may punish contempts against it whether such contempts be direct,
indirect, or constructive, and in any such proceedings the court shall proceed to hear
and determine all questions of law and fact."
9. In re S.L.T., 180 So. 2d 374 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1965).
10. Id.
11. 347 So. 2d 422 (Fla. 1977).
314 Nova Law Journal 6:1982 ]
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court for willfully refusing to vacate the premises as required by the
divorce decree. Rocco was sentenced to thirteen days in county jail, but
the order did not provide Rocco with an opportunity to purge his con-
tempt by fulfilling the decree requirements which would terminate the
sentence. Florida's Second District Court of Appeal affirmed the deci-
sion without opinion.1 2
To properly review the decision, the Florida Supreme Court had to
determine whether the order was for civil or criminal contempt.13 In
doing so the court stated that "if the purpose of the proceedings is to
coerce action or non-action by a party, the order of contempt is civil. '14
In civil contempt, the party seeking to coerce the action or non-action
initiates the proceedings. The judge then would hold the non-complying
party in contempt for the "private benefit of the offended party."'15
Criminal contempt, on the other hand, punishes rather than co-
erces. It is maintained solely and simply to "vindicate the authority of
the court or to punish otherwise for conduct offensive to the public in
violation of an order of the court."'" Criminal contempt can be either
direct or indirect.
A direct criminal contempt is one committed in the "presence of
the court.' 1 7 Oftentimes this type of conduct occurs during the course
of. a trial. For example, in Olds v. State, a judge held the public de-
fender in direct contempt of court.' The holding stemmed from the
judge's displeasure with the public defender's continued efforts to im-
peach an important state's witness. The witness had been previously
represented by the public defender's office and the judge felt the con-
tinued effort to impeach the witness violated the attorney-client privi-
lege. This violation prompted the judge to hold the attorney in direct
criminal contempt.
Although the decision to hold someone in contempt is generally
left to the trial court's discretion, Florida's Fourth District Court of
12. Id. at 424.
13. Id.
14. Id. (emphasis added).
15. Id.
16. Id. (emphasis added).
17. Demetree v. State, 89 So. 2d 498 (Fla. 1956).
18. 302 So. 2d 787 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
3151
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Appeal reversed the Olds contempt order.1 9 The court concluded the
trial judge erred in believing the information sought by the public de-
fender was privileged: the subject matter of the attempted cross exami-
nation included statements by the state's witness made in the presence
of third parties and involved matters of public record. Based on these
facts, the appellate court found the information was not privileged and
the trial court's order for direct criminal contempt could not stand.20
In contrast to direct criminal contempt, an indirect criminal con-
tempt is one committed "outside the presence of the court.' 21 For ex-
ample, in Demetree v. State,2 a judge held the defendant in contempt
of court for violating an order enjoining him from operating a house of
prostitution. The judge sentenced the defendant to six months in the
Dade County Jail.
The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the Demetree order for indi-
rect criminal contempt.23 It stated that typically, an indirect criminal
contempt proceeding is brought on behalf of the public.24 Here, the
injunction was obtained by the county solicitor in the name of the State
of Florida. The alleged contemptuous conduct was not committed
against the county solicitor as an individual, but was committed against
the public at large. The trial court had sustained its burden of showing,
beyond a reasonable doubt, the defendant was guilty of contemptuous
conduct by continuing the operation of his brothel. Therefore, the order
for indirect criminal contempt was valid.2 5
Preliminarily, the court must decide who was offended by the con-
temptuous conduct since this determines whether direct or indirect
criminal contempt was committed or whether civil contempt was com-
mitted. In Pugliese, the Florida Supreme Court found Rocco's conduct
in failing to obey the court order to vacate could be subject either to
indirect criminal contempt proceedings or civil contempt proceedings.26
The supreme court rejected Tina's argument that by admitting in open
19. Id.
20. Id. at 790.
21. 89 So. 2d at 501.
22. Id. at 500.
23. Id. at 501.
24. Id. at 503.
25. Id. at 502.
26. 347 So. 2d at 424.
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court, at the contempt hearing, he had defied the terms of the divorce
order Rocco committed a direct criminal contempt. A judge must al-
ways hear testimony in his presence at a hearing for indirect criminal
contempt. Declaring that this testimony constituted conduct equivalent
to direct criminal contempt would obliterate the distinctions between
direct and indirect criminal contempt.2 7 Thus, Rocco's conduct could
not constitute a direct criminal contempt and the more stringent stan-
dards for an indirect criminal contempt proceeding applied.,
To determine whether the proceeding was for criminal or civil con-
tempt, the supreme court in Pugliese looked to the language of the
order itself. Orders for civil contempt classically include a purging pro-
vision whereby the contemnor can terminate the senteice upon compli-
ance with the court ordered action.29 Since the Pugliese order lacked
this purging provision it was an atypical civil contempt order.30
Turning to whether the order could be classified as one for indirect
criminal contempt, the supreme court in Pugliese looked to the proce-
dure followed by the lower court prior to adjudging Rocco in contempt.
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.840 spells out the procedural re-
quirements31 to initiate an indirect criminal contempt proceeding. Since
27. Id. at 426.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 424.
30. Id.
31. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.840. Indirect Criminal Contempt:
(a) Indirect (Constructive) Criminal Contempt. A criminal contempt
except as provided in the preceding subsection concerning direct con-
tempts, shall be prosecuted in the following manner:
(1) Order to Show Cause. The judge, of his own motion or upon af-
fadavit of any person
(2) Motions; Answer. The defendant, personally or by counsel, may
move to dismiss the order to show cause, move for a statement of particu-
lars or answer such order by way of explanation or defense. All motions
and the answer shall be in writing unless specified otherwise by the judge.
A defendant's omission to file motions or answer shall not be deemed as an
admission of guilt of the contempt charged.
(3) Order of Arrest; Bail. The judge may issue an order of arrest of
the defendant if the judge has reason to believe the defendant will not
appear in response to the order to show cause. The defendant shall be ad-
mitted to bail in the manner provided by law in criminal cases.
(4) Arraignment; Hearing. The defendant may be arraigned at the
3171Contempt & Florida Divorce Decrees16:1982
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these requirements were not met, Rocco was not given notice of the
consequences that might follow the hearing. 2 Thus, because the trial
court's order failed to adhere to procedural requirements for criminal
contempt nor contained a purging clause, as required for civil con-
tempt, the order for contempt could not stand whether classified as ei-
ther criminal or civil. The supreme court reversed the Second District
time of the hearing, or prior thereto upon his request. A hearing to deter-
mine the guilt or innocence of the defendant shall follow a plea of not
guilty. The judge may conduct a hearing without assistance of counsel or
may be assisted by the prosecuting attorney or by an attorney appointed
for that purpose. The defendant is entitled to be represented by counsel,
have compulsory process for the attendance of witnesses, and may testify
in his own defense.
All issues of law and fact shall be heard and determined by the judge.
(5) Disqualification of Judge. If the contempt charged involves disre-
spect to or criticism of a judge he shall disqualify himself from presiding
at the hearing. Another judge shall be designated by the chief justice of
the Supreme Court.
(6) Verdict; Judgment. At the conclusion of the hearing the judge
shall sign and enter or record a judgment of guilty or not guilty. There
should be included in a judgment of guilty a recital of the facts constitut-
ing the contempt of which the defendant has been found and adjudicated
guilty.
(7) The Sentence; Indirect Contempt. Prior to the pronouncement of
sentence, the judge shall inform the defendant of the accusation and judg-
ment against him and inquire as to whether he has any cause to show why
sentence should not be pronounced. The defendant shall be afforded the
opportunity to present evidence of mitigating circumstances. The sentence
shall be pronounced in open court and in the presence of the defendant.
FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.830. Direct Criminal Contempt:
A criminal contempt may be punished summarily if the court saw or heard
the conduct constituting the contempt committed in the actual presence of
the court. The judgment of guilt of contempt shall include a recital of
those facts upon which the adjudication of guilt is based. Prior to the adju-
dication of guilt the judge shall inform the defendant of the accusation
against him and inquire as to whether he has any cause to show why he
should not be adjudged guilty of contempt by the Court and sentenced
therefore. The defendant shall be given the opportunity to present evidence
of excusing or mitigating circumstances. The judgment shall be signed by
the judge and entered of record. Sentence shall be pronounced in open
court.
32. 347 So. 2d at 426.
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Court of Appeal and remanded the case for proceedings consistent with
its opinion. 33
The Pugliese case illustrates that non-compliance with the provi-
sions of a divorce decree may be subject to either civil or criminal con-
tempt proceedings. Generally, non-compliance is characterized as a
civil contempt because the purpose of the proceeding is to "preserve
and enforce rights of private litigants to compel obedience to orders
and decrees of the court made for the benefit of such parties." '34 Usu-
ally the party who has not received family support payments (either
permanent alimony or child support) initiates civil contempt proceed-
ings to coerce the other party into making the delinquent payments.
3 5
The sentence imposed as a result of a finding of civil contempt contin-
ues until the recalcitrant party fulfills his or her obligation.
When the purpose of the contempt proceeding is coercive, the trial
judge is required to make an affirmative finding:
(1) The petitioner presently has the ability to comply with the or-
33. Id. at 427.
34. Deter v. Deter, 353 So. 2d 614, 617 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
35. 180 So. 2d at 379.
Civil contempt proceedings should be instituted by the aggrieved
party or those who succeed to their rights or someone who has an interest
in the right to be protected. Due process of law requires that the party
accused be advised of the charge and accorded opportunity to defend him-
self. In these proceedings there is no presumption of innocence and the
burden of proof is upon the party bringing the charge to prove the facts
charged by a preponderance of the evidence. Where a court order and its
violation are established or admitted the burden is on the accused to show
facts which would excuse his default. If the defense or excuse is that of
inability to comply, the accused has the burden of proving by a preponder-
ance of the evidence such inability. This is based upon the fact that the
making of the order involved an implicit finding of ability to comply. Thus
there must be an affirmative finding appearing on the commitment order
that it is within the power of the accused to obey the order and, conversely,
imprisonment is not available if the accused is unable to comply. It is for
this reason often stated that the accused carries the keys of his prison in
his pocket. In Florida it has been held that imprisonment for civil con-
tempt must be for a fixed term and must include a specifically stated pro-
vision for purging. The fixed term requirement was imposed without stat-
ing whether the contempt was civil or criminal. As a general rule a fixed
term is not required in punishment for civil contempt.
1 6:1982
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der and willfully refuses to do so, or (2) that the petitioner previ-
ously had the ability to comply but divested himself of that ability
through his fault or neglect designed to frustrate the intent and
purpose of the order.36
The Florida Supreme Court spelled out this requirement in Faircloth v.
Faircloth, where it remanded the case because the lower court had not
made the required determination prior to exercising its contempt
power.37 Apparently, the reason behind making this determination is to
assure that the contemnor has the ability to comply with the order.
Otherwise, the purpose of the proceeding would have to be something
other than coercion. The trial court in Faircloth had held the former
husband in contempt because his child support payments were in ar-
rears and because he failed to comply with other provisions of the di-
vorce decree. He was sentenced to the county detention center for five
months and twenty-nine days or until he paid the money owed. 38
Duties Enforceable Through Contempt
Florida considers court ordered imposition of family support pay-
ments a legally imposed duty rather than a debt.39 The language used
in the Florida statutes, allowing the court to impose family support ob-
ligations, reflects this conclusion: "The court may at any time order
either or both parents a duty of support to the child. . .. -40 The con-
stitutional prohibition against imprisonment for a debt is circumvented
by this analysis.41
Although the Florida statute allowing the court to impose alimony
does not expressly mention the word "duty," 42 it is referred to in a
36. Faircloth v. Faircloth, 339 So. 2d 650 (Fla. 1976).
37. Id. at 651.
38. Id.
39. Bronk v. State, 43 Fla. 461, 465, 31 So. 2d 248, 252 (1901).
40. FLA. STAT. § 61.13(1) (1979) (emphasis added).
41. 43 Fla. at 465, 31 So. 2d at 252.
42. FLA. STAT. § 61.08 (1979).
(1) In a proceeding for dissolution of marriage, the court may grant
alimony to either party, which alimony may be rehabilitative or permanent
in nature. In any award of alimony, the court may order periodic payments
or payments in lump sum or both. The court may consider the adultery of
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related statute. Florida Statute § 61.12 sets forth the procedure neces-
sary to garnish or attach amounts due for alimony and child support.
Subsection (2) of the statute states, the court through issuance of a
"writ may provide that the salary of any person having a duty of sup-
port pursuant to said order be garnished on a periodic and continuing
basis for as long as the court may determine. . .. ,,43The Florida Su-
preme Court has interpreted the obligation of family support (perma-
nent alimony or child support) as a legally imposed duty. The supreme
court reflected this view in McRae v. McRae: "The law imposes on
[the] civilized [person] the duty to provide food, shelter and raiment
for his [or her] own."44
Because courts consider imposition of family support imposition of
a legal duty, they will enforce family support orders through contempt
of court when policy considerations justify such action. As early as
1901, the Florida Supreme Court decided in Bronk v. State45 that con-
tempt of court can be exercised to enforce the obligation of family sup-
port. The Bronk decision was based on the court's belief that:
a spouse and the circumstances thereof in determining whether alimony
shall be awarded to such spouse and the amount of alimony, if any, to be
awarded.
(2) In determining a proper award of alimony or maintenance, the
court shall consider all relevant economic factors, including but not limited
to:
(a) The standard of living established during the marriage.
(b) The duration of the marriage.
(c) The age and the physical and emotional condition of both parties.
(d) The financial resources of each party.
(e) Where applicable, the time necessary for either party to acquire
sufficient education or training to enable him or her to find appropriate
employment.
(f) The contribution of each party to the marriage, including, but not
limited to, services rendered in homemaking, child care, education and ca-
reer building of the other party.
The court may consider any other factor necessary to do equity and justice
between the parties.
43. FLA. STAT. § 61.12(2) (1979).
44. 52 So. 2d 908, 909 (Fla. 1951) citing Pollack v. Pollack, 159 Fla. 224, 225,
31 So. 2d 253, 254 (1947).
45. 43 Fla. 461, 31 So. 248 (1901).
321 1
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Alimony or maintenance from the husband to the wife is not a
debt, within the meaning of the constitutional inhibition against
imprisonment for a debt. It is regarded more in light of a personal
duty due not only from the husband to the wife, but from him to
society, that courts of equity have the power to enforce by deten-
tion of the person of the husband in cases where he can discharge it
but will not.46
A policy consideration implicit in this argument is to make the husband
pay support so that the wife and family do not become a burden on
society.
Florida's Third District Court of Appeal reiterated this view in
Chapman v. Lamm: "Contempt for failure to pay court ordered ali-
mony or child support is based upon the fact that such obligations arise
out of the duty owed and that, in accordance with public necessity,
dependents must be supported."47
It is interesting to note, however, in Chapman the appellate court
reversed the trial court's decision holding the former husband in con-
tempt of court because part of the obligation of support had been con-
verted into a debt to a third party.48 Joe Chapman had been committed
to the Dade County Jail for ninety days or until he paid the clerk of
the court $8,170 in overdue child support payments. Part of this
amount, $2,987.50, had been converted into a debt owed to the State of
Florida, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services. On appeal,
Chapman argued the order was reversible because it purported to im-
prison him for a debt owed to a third party, the State of Florida.4 9
Florida's Third District Court of Appeal agreed and said the obligation
"no longer carried the public necessity for enforcement by imprison-
ment. ''50 That part of the money owed to the State of Florida would
not be used to support the children, and consequently public policy did
not support the court's exercise of its contempt power.
Courts will not imprison parties for failure to render payment of
46. Id. at 463, 31 So. at 252.
47. 388 So. 2d 1048 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1980), rev'd, 7 Fla. L. Weekly 124
(March 12, 1982). See infra note 116.
48. Id. at 1049.
49. Id.
50. Id.
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family support unless policy reasons, such as continued maintenance
and nourishment of the family, justify such action.51 In other words,
public necessity must justify court exercise of contempt power. Flor-
ida's First District Court of Appeal reflected this view when it stated in
Smith v. Morgan that once public necessity no longer exists, "the pur-
pose and justification for the extraordinary power of contempt
expires. '52
In Morgan, the lower court found the former husband in contempt
of court for failure to make child support payments in arrears. 53 The
facts demonstrated upon dissolution of marriage in 1963, the husband
was ordered to pay child support. In 1979, the circuit court entered an
order abating the child support obligation because the 17 year old son
was residing with the former husband and consequently was deriving
support directly from the former husband. On the same day the court
entered the abatement order the former husband was held in contempt.
The judge sentenced him to five months and twenty-nine days in jail.5
On appeal, the husband argued that the circuit court was without juris-
diction to punish, through contempt, the failure to pay child support
arrearages once the obligation of support had been abated.55 Florida's
First District Court of Appeal agreed and found the order for abate-
ment "eliminated the public necessity for the extraordinary remedy of
contempt since the father is now supporting the child directly." 56
In Morgan, because the trial court was without jurisdiction to
punish the appellant by contempt, the wife's remedy for recovery of
child support arrearages was limited to a judgment by "ordinary civil
proceedings. 57 The circuit court was without jurisdiction to use its
power of contempt to enforce payment of child support in arrears once
the child had reached the age of majority.58 No sufficient policy reasons
justify court exercise of contempt power to enforce child support pay-
51. Smith v. Morgan, 379 So. 2d 1052 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
52. Id. at 1053.
53. Id. at 1052.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 1053.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Wilkes v. Revels, 245 So. 2d 896 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1970).
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ment when the child is no longer a minor.59
On the other hand, a policy consideration supporting the court's
exercise of contempt power is that orders for family support are modifi-
able.60 Family support orders for alimony and child support generally
59. Id.
60. FLA. STAT. § 61.14 (1979).
Modification of alimony judgments, agreements, etc.-
(1) When the parties have entered into, or hereafter enter into, an
agreement for payments for, or instead of, support, maintenance, or ali-
mony, whether in connection with a proceeding for dissolution or separate
maintenance or with any voluntary property settlement, or when a party is
required by court order to make any payments, and the circumstances or
the financial ability of either party has changed or the child or children
who are beneficiaries of an agreement or court order as described herein
have reached the age of 18 years since the execution of such agreement or
the rendition of the order, either party may apply to the Circuit Court of
the circuit in which the parties, or either of them, resided at the date of
the execution of the agreement or reside at the date of the application, or
in which the agreement was executed or in which the order was rendered,
for a judgment decreasing or increasing the amount of support, mainte-
nance, or alimony, and the court has jurisdiction to make orders as equity
requires, with due regard to the changed circumstances or the financial
ability of the parties or the child or children, decreasing, increasing, or
confirming the amount of separate support, maintenance, or alimony pro-
vided for in the agreement or order.
(2) When an order is modified pursuant to subsection (1), the party
having an obligation to pay shall pay only the amount of support, mainte-
nance, or alimony directed in the new order, and the agreement or earlier
order is modified accordingly. No person shall commence, or cause to be
commenced, as party or attorney or agent or otherwise, in behalf of either
party in any court, an action or proceeding otherwise than as herein pro-
vided, nor shall any court have jurisdiction to entertain any action or pro-
ceeding otherwise than as herein provided to enforce the recovery of sepa-
rate support, maintenance, or alimony otherwise than pursuant to the
order.
(3) This section is declaratory of existing public policy and of laws of
this state which are hereby confirmed in accordance with the provisions
hereof. It is the duty of the Circuit Court to construe liberally the provi-
sions hereof to effect the purposes hereof.
(4) If a party applies for a reduction of alimony or child support and
the circumstances justify the reduction, the court may make the reduction
of alimony or child support regardless of whether or not the party applying
for it has fully paid the accrued obligations to the other party at the time
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continue over extended periods of time; often the circumstances sur-
rounding support payment change substantially. For instance, a former
spouse may remarry or the needs of a child might increase or decrease.
Thus, it is necessary that orders for family support be flexible to fit
changed circumstances. Upon sufficiently changed circumstances, ei-
ther party to the divorce may request the judge to modify a family
support order to reflect the changes that have occurred.61 Since these
orders are modifiable, thereby giving the recalcitrant party no excuse
for continued disobedience of the order, courts are more willing to exer-
cise their extraordinary contempt powers to enforce orders. The former
spouse could have had the order modified if he felt the order was exces-
sive and sufficiently changed circumstances justified modification of the
order."2
In addition to necessary family support payments, court ordered
payment of attorney's fees for services rendered during the divorce is
not considered a debt.63 The reason for placing legal fees in the same
category as family support obligations is unclear. Arguably, the policy
behind treating court ordered legal fees as a duty is to ensure that both
parties will retain competent legal counsel throughout divorce proceed-
ings.6 Because courts are willing to treat court ordered legal fees as
imposing a duty, they are able to use contempt powers to enforce such
orders avoiding constitutional stricture against debtor imprisonment."
Debts Not Enforceable Through Contempt
Property settlements incorporated into final divorce decrees have
given courts particular difficulty in deciding whether they should be
enforced through contempt proceedings or by ordinary civil proceedings
available to creditors against debtors. Two Florida district courts of ap-
peal have decided that property settlements incorporated into final di-
of the application or at the time of the order of modification.
61. Id. § 1.
62. Howard v. Howard, 207 So. 2d 90 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1960).
63. Orr v. Orr, 141 Fla. 112, 192 So. 2d 466 (1939).
64. See Price v. Price, 382 So. 2d 433, 437 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
65. Harrison v. Harrison, 178 So. 2d 889 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1965); Law-
rence v. Lawrence, 384 So. 2d 279 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
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vorce decrees may be enforced through contempt of court.66
Florida's Third District Court of Appeal upheld use of contempt to
enforce a property settlement incorporated into a final divorce decree in
Firestone v. Ferguson.67 The Firestones were divorced in 1974. The
final divorce judgment included a property settlement with a provision
that Myrna Firestone, the former wife, sell a farm in Kentucky and
split the proceeds equally with her former husband, Russell. The agree-
ment also provided Russell pay Myrna $5,000 per month in alimony.68
During a court hearing, Myrna indicated she would be willing to
sell the property for $5,000 per acre. 9 Thereafter, a Kentucky corpora-
tion offered her $4,700 per acre for the farm. Myrna refused to sign
the sale papers and the offer expired. Russell moved to compel Myrna
to comply with the settlement agreement. Judge Ferguson, a Dade
County circuit court judge, held Myrna in contempt of court. He gave
her ten days within which to execute the offer and agreement for sale.
When she refused, the judge relieved Russell from paying further
alimony.70
The appellate court affirmed the lower court's decision, but indi-
cated the possibility of a different result had the property settlement
called merely for the payment of money. This possibility was premised
on the general rule that "the contempt process may not be utilized to
enforce payments required under a property settlement agreement."71
However, the court found the general rule inapplicable to the facts of
Firestone because the contempt proceedings were initiated to compel
Myrna to execute a contract for the sale of property, not to make pay-
ments of money.72
Similarly, Florida's Second District Court of Appeal in Collins v.
Collins held the trial court did not err by holding Marion Collins in
contempt of court for failing to make mortgage payments pursuant to a
66. 179 So. 2d 231 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1965); 372 So. 2d 490 (Fla. 3d Dist.
Ct. App. 1979).
67. 372 So. 2d 490.
68. Id. at 491.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 492.
72. Id.
1326 Nova Law Journal 6:19821
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property settlement.73 Marion and Nannie Lou Collins were divorced in
1963 and their final divorce decree incorporated a stipulation to the
property settlement whereby Marion would make mortgage payments
on certain properties. In 1964 the trial court adjudged Marion in con-
tempt of court for falure to make the required payments. He was sen-
tenced to sixty days in jail.7' The Collins decision seems to violate the
general rule espoused in the Firestone's dicta which prohibits use of
contempt proceedings to enforce a property settlement calling for pay-
ment of money.
Other cases strictly adhere to the general rule found in Firestone,
which Collins seemingly did not follow.7 5 These cases hold that con-
tempt of court is unavailable to enforce property settlements which
merely impose a debt upon one of the former spouses.
For instance, in Howell v. Howell, Florida's Second District Court
of Appeal followed the general rule.76 A property settlement agreement
had been incorporated into the final divorce decree of William and
Thelma Howell in 1959. 77 In pertinent part, the agreement provided:
The husband in full and complete settlement and discharge of all
obligations to the wife for alimony, support and maintenance,
dower or claim of the wife against the husband or against his es-
tate, agree[d] to pay to the wife the sum of $100.00 per week....
The husband agree[d] that there would be no abatement in the
weekly payments hereinabove provided for any reason whatsoever
except the remarriage of the wife. .. Y8
In addition, the parties stipulated "[t]he settlement agreement ...
contained [a] full and complete payment and satisfaction of all ali-
mony, maintenance, support, court costs . . . [and] neither party
[would] ask for, nor be entitled to any other settlement. .. ."
Three years after the decree's execution, William unsuccessfully
73. 179 So. 2d 231.
74. Id.
75. Howell v. Howell, 207 So. 2d 507 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1968); Carlin v.
Carlin, 310 So. 2d 403 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
76. 207 So. 2d 507.
77. Id. at 509.
78. Id.
79. Id.
327 1
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petitioned the court to reduce the "alimony" payments.8 0 The judge
held the agreement was a property settlement because the agreement
was for the transfer of property rights and not for continued mainte-
nance of the wife. The sum of money called alimony was actually the
consideration paid to the wife for the transfer of her property rights.81
Because the agreement was actually a property settlement it was not
modifiable.82 Property settlement agreements are contracts to distribute
property upon dissolution of marriage and when fairly and voluntarily
entered into, the courts will not disturb them.8 The former husband
appealed and Florida's Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed.
In November of 1964, Thelma petitioned the court to hold Wil-
liam in contempt.8 4 For some sixty-nine weeks, William had only paid
$50.00 per week instead of the $100.00 per week he was required to
pay under the final divorce decree. 5 William argued that when the
Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed the lower court's dismissal of
his petition for modification, it fixed the legal status of the original
agreement as a property settlement rather than purely an agreement to
pay alimony.86 Consequently, the payments to Thelma under the agree-
ment constituted an ordinary contractual obligation enforceable only as
between creditor and debtor.8 7 William urged contempt proceedings
were improper since this was not a default of alimony payments but
rather a failure to fulfill the contractual obligations of the property set-
tlements. The appellate court noted that whether the contempt pro-
ceeding could be used to enforce these payments depended on whether
the payments fulfilled an alimony or property settlement agreement."
The court admitted that often it was difficult to determine whether the
agreement constituted alimony or a property settlement.
The court in Howell found alimony to mean "nourishment" or
80. Id. at 510.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Sedell v. Sedell, 100 So. 2d 639 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1958); Bergman v.
Bergman, 145 Fla. 10, 199 So. 2d 920 (1940).
84. 207 So. 2d at 510.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
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"sustenance."89 That is, alimony continues to sustain a former spouse
in a lifestyle to which he or she had become accustomed prior to the
divorce, within the means of the other spouse. If, on the other hand, the
periodic payments were made in consideration for relinquishment of
property rights, they should be classified as payments pursuant to the
executed property settlement.90 The court aptly summarized this
method of classification: "It is the substance and not the form which is
controlling." The use of the term "alimony" in the property settlement
agreement is not conclusive.91
On final analysis, the court agreed with William's argument that
when the Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed the dismissal of his
previous petition for modification, it fixed the "law of the case" as to
the legal classification of the payments.92 Thus, the appellate court was
bound to characterize these payments as those pursuant to a property
settlement, unenforceable through contempt. 93 Thelma was limited to
the usual remedies available to a creditor against her debtor.9 To allow
otherwise, said the court, would result in imprisonment for a debt.
In Carlin v. Carlin,95 the Fourth District Court of Appeal broad-
ened the general rule articulated in the Firestone dicta. The facts
showed the husband voluntarily entered into a property settlement
agreement which was incorporated into the final divorce decree. The
former wife failed to comply with a provision of the agreement and was
therefore adjudged in contempt of the final judgment for dissolution of
marriage.98 The appellate court reversed the contempt order on the
grounds that when the property settlement agreement is fairly and vol-
untarily entered into, its "violation. . . is not enforceable by contempt
but only by the usual remedies available to a creditor against his
debtor." 97 This broadens the general rule in that it prohibits the use of
contempt to enforce any property settlement agreement and not just
89. Id. at 511 citing Underwood v. Underwood, 64 So. 2d 281 (Fla. 1953).
90. 207 So. 2d at 512.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. 310 So. 2d 403.
96. Id.
97. Id.
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one requiring the payment of money.
Florida's Fourth District Court of Appeal later retreated some-
what from the rule in Carlin, in Burke v. Burke,98 where it held pay-
ments required under terms of a property settlement agreement could
not be enforced by contempt proceedings.99 Prior to dissolution of their
marriage, Joseph and Doris Burke entered into a property settlement
agreement which was incorporated in the final divorce decree. The set-
tlement agreement stipulated that Joseph was to pay Doris $1,956.26.
In addition he was to execute and deliver to Doris the joint income tax
return for 1974 together with a check in the amount of one-half the
taxes due. Finally, Joseph was also to execute and deliver to Doris all
documents necessary to release to her all his interests in a note and
mortgage and transfer all of his interests in certain securities. Joseph
failed to comply with any of these provisions which prompted Doris to
file a motion to enforce the agreement through civil contempt. 00
The trial court held the former husband in contempt of court. The
appellate court affirmed in part and reversed in part.10 1 Regarding the
money Joseph owed to Doris, the Fourth District Court of Appeal held
it was clearly a payment required under the terms of a property settle-
ment, unenforceable through contempt proceedings. 10 2 The court,
therefore, reversed that part of the trial court's order holding Joseph in
contempt for failure to execute and deliver the joint tax return and a
check for taxes due for the same reason.103
The court was faced with a different situation regarding the re-
maining portion of the lower court's order requiring Joseph to execute
and deliver certain documents. T10 These acts did not involve holding the
former husband in contempt of court for failure to make an agreed
payment pursuant to a property settlement agreement, but rather or-
dered he comply with the obligations assumed in the agreement.10 5 The
effect of incorporating the agreement into the final divorce decree cou-
98. 336 So. 2d 1237 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
99. Id. at 1238.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 1239.
102. Id. at 1238.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
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pled with the trial court's order for compliance was a "mandatory or-
der to specific 'performance of that act,"'016 which the court found dis-
tinguishable from the payment of money.
The court in Burke indicated that because the trial court was in
effect ordering Joseph to specifically perform the act, Florida Rule of
Civil Procedure 1.570 applied.107 Florida's procedural requirements
provided, in part: "If any other judgment, injunction or mandatory or-
der for the specific performance of any act or contract is not complied
with, the court may hold the disobedient party for contempt ... "108
The trial court ordered Joseph to specifically perform certain acts
which did not involve payment of money. The former husband's failure
to comply was willful and deliberate, and not caused by inability to
perform. Under these circumstances, the court held the trial court had
the authority to enforce its order by holding the former husband in
contempt.109
Upon final analysis, it seems the rule regarding the enforcement of
property settlement agreements incorporated into final divorce decrees
swings from extreme to extreme. On one hand, as in Collins, contempt
of court is available to coerce a former spouse to make required mort-
gage payments. On the other hand, as in Carlin, contempt of court is
never an available remedy to enforce property settlement agreements
incorporated into final divorce decrees. The more moderate approach
was exhibited by Benson v. Benson, where Florida's Fourth District
Court of Appeal stated: "Failure to make payments pursuant to a pure
property settlement is not the subject of contempt proceedings, .
Conclusion
Florida courts have, on occasion, reached conflicting conclusions
when addressing the issue of whether contempt is available as a remedy
to enforce property settlement agreements incorporated into final di-
vorce decrees. It seems clear that contempt is an available remedy to
enforce family support obligations. Where, then, does confusion arise
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. 369 So. 2d 99, 100 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
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with regard to property settlement agreements?
One source giving rise to confusion is Florida's constitutional pro-
hibition against imprisonment of debtors.""1 Judicial construction of
this provision does not prohibit court use of contempt as a means of
enforcing family support obligations because these obligations are not
classified as debts, but rather are viewed as legally imposed special du-
ties. Therefore, when the court threatens a party with imprisonment for
failure to comply with a family support provision, it is coercing that
party's compliance with a legally imposed duty. The court is not threat-
ening the party with imprisonment as a means of enforcing a debt, and
consequently does not violate Florida's constitutional guarantee in this
respect.
The situation is different when a property settlement agreement is
involved. Property settlement agreements create no special duties upon
the parties. They are merely contracts distributing property between
husband and wife upon dissolution of marriage.' 12 When freely and vol-
untarily entered by the parties, these contracts are not disturbed and
courts treat them like any other.' 13 Unlike family support orders, these
settlement agreements are not modifiable.
Unpaid money obligations arising from settlement agreements are
considered debts. Because courts must be careful not to violate the pro-
hibition against imprisoning debtors, they follow the general rule that
contempt of court is not an available remedy to enforce these pay-
ments.- 4 Therefore, the party seeking relief is limited to those proceed-
ings any creditor would have against his debtor." 5
Another source of confusion is, unlike cases presented by breached
family support obligations, there really are no sufficient policy reasons
justifying contempt for property settlement violations. Property settle-
ment agreements are not intended to assure continued "sustenance" or
"nourishment" to the family, and a party's failure to comply with a
settlement provision does not necessarily mean a family will go without
support. Why, then, should a court exercise its extraordinary power of
contempt merely to enforce a contract to distribute property?
111. FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 11.
112. Benson, 369 So. 2d 99.
113. Underwood v. Underwood, 64 So. 2d 281 (Fla. 1953).
114. 207 So. 2d 507.
115. 310 So. 2d 403.
1332 Nova Law Journal 6:1982 1
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Certain guidelines might be useful to a court in determining
whether a divorce order is enforceable through contempt. First the
court should determine the source of the obligation for which enforce-
ment is sought. If the court determines the source of obligation arises
from a duty of family support then contempt may be an available rem-
edy. The court must then determine whether policy considerations jus-
tify the exercise of its extraordinary power of contempt.11 6
If, on the other hand, the obligation arises from an agreement to
distribute property, the court should be careful in exercising its power
of contempt, lest a debtor be imprisoned. If courts treat these agree-
ments like any other contract, the non-breaching party is afforded only
those remedies sounding in contract. Perhaps, however, in cases of seri-
ous violation of a property settlement agreement, a court might impose
punative damages to deter future violations of serious magnitude.
The Burke decision laid down a particularly appealing approach
where the court said it was enforcing the contract through its power of
contempt because it had ordered the party to specifically perform the
contract.11  The courts should be allowed to order a party to specifi-
cally perform a property settlement where the contract demands such
action and there is no adequate remedy at law. Because specific per-
formance, an equitable remedy, usually does not involve the payment of
money, the court could circumvent the Florida proscription against im-
116. After this note was committed to print, the Florida Supreme Court reversed
the Third District Court of Appeal in Chapman v. Lamm, 7 Fla. L. Weekly 124
(March 12, 1982). The supreme court recognized the general rule when a debt based
upon an assignment of the right to receive child support payments is owed to a private
third party (a bank for example), contempt of court is not an available means of en-
forcing that debt. See State ex rel. Cahn v. Mason, 148 Fla. 264, 2 So. 2d 255 (1941).
However, when the state demonstrates sufficient public policy reasons, contempt of
court is an available means of enforcing the child support payments owed to the state.
Section 409.2561 of the Florida Statutes (1979) demonstrated the legislature's intent,
based on the "unique relationship" between the state and the family, to allow the state
to use contempt of court as a means of securing repayment of public monies. The
supreme court held that the acceptance of public assistance for the support of a depen-
dent child vests in the department the authority to proceed with all remedies available
to the child's custodian. 7 Fla. L. Weekly at 126. Still the contempt order in Chapman
was held to be improper because the former husband was not properly notified of the
dissolution of marriage proceedings and the record did not support the determination
that the husband had the ability, to pay the child support. Id. at 124.
117. 336 So. 2d 1237.
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prisoning for a debt. This type of approach would seemingly avoid
much of the confusion surrounding the courts' use of contempt to en-
force property settlements incorporated into final divorce decrees.
Jeffrey F. Thomas
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Constitutionality of Florida's Statute Limiting Tort
Recovery Against a Municipality: Cauley v. City of
Jacksonville
In Cauley v. City of Jacksonville' the Supreme Court of Florida
recently faced a constitutional challenge to monetary limitations placed
on tort recovery against a municipality. In its July, 1981, decision the
court held Florida Statute Section 768.28(5), which imposed those
limitations, constitutionally valid.
In order to appreciate the impact of the Cauley decision, it must
be reviewed in historical perspective. This comment sets forth that per-
spective by considering the origin of "sovereign immunity" and furnish-
ing an overview of the case-made tests used to determine when immu-
nity attached to insulate municipalities from liability. Lastly, the
statute's provisions and Commercial Carrier Corp. v. Indian River
County3 will be examined, providing a context in which Cauley can be
evaluated.
Sovereign Immunity
Sovereign immunity was based on the premise that the king could
do no wrong.4 Since the king was the supreme power, there could be
neither jurisdiction over him nor redress against him. Rather than ac-
knowledging a wrong without a remedy, the king was viewed as infalli-
ble and the doctrine of immunity was created.5 This legal fiction was
1. 403 So. 2d 379 (Fla. 1981).
2. FLA. STAT. § 768.28(5) (1977) (this provision of the statute remains un-
changed however the limits of recovery have been altered by ch. 81-317, 1981 Fla.
Laws 1488).
3. 371 So. 2d 1010 (Fla. 1979).
4. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 236 (reprinted
1966).
5. Id.
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later applied in the American states' based on "the idea that whatever
the state does must be lawful. . . . " Thus, absent its consent, a state
could not be sued in tort.8
Municipalities, as subdivisions of the state, have also been afforded
tort immunity for certain functions.9 Identifying those functions was
often a difficult task. Over time different tests have been employed to
help make the determination. However, courts have experienced consid-
erable difficulty and confusion when applying these tests.10
Case Development of Municipal Immunity
When the first test for municipal immunity was created, the major
issue was the distinction between governmental and proprietary func-
tions of a municipality. If the function was purely "governmental," im-
munity attached; a function that was "proprietary," "municipal" or
"corporate" was not protected.11 The question then became, how to
identify into which category a function fell.
In 1931, in Chardkoff Junk Co. v. City of Tampa12 the city was
held liable for negligent operation of its incinerator. The Supreme
Court of Florida discussed the distinction between governmental and
proprietary functions. The court adopted the view that "[g]overnmental
functions are those conferred on or imposed upon the municipality as
the local agency of limited and prescribed jurisdiction, to be employed
in administering the affairs of the state, and promoting the public wel-
fare generally."1 " The court used the term "municipal functions" in-
6. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 975 (4th ed. 1971).
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 977.
10. Budetti & Knight, The Latest Event in the Confused History of Municipal
Tort Liability, 6 FLA. ST. L. REV. 927 (1978); Seligman & Beals, The Sovereignty of
Florida Municipalities: In-Again, Out-Again, When-Again, 50 FLA. B.J. 338 (1976).
11. See Wood v. City of Palatka, 63 So. 2d 636 (1953); City of Tampa v. Eas-
ton, 145 Fla. 188, 198 So. 753 (1940); Chardkoff Junk Co. v. City of Tampa, 102 Fla.
501, 135 So. 457 (1931); Bryan v. City of West Palm Beach, 75 Fla. 19, 77 So. 627
(1918).
12. 102 Fla. 501, 135 So. 457 (1931).
13. Id. at 505, 135 So. at 459.
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stead of "proprietary functions" or "corporate functions;" these terms
were interchangeable. 14 It defined municipal functions as those "which
specifically and particularly promote the comfort, convenience, safety
and happiness of the citizens of the municipality. . . .Under this class
of functions are included, in most jurisdictions, the proper care of
streets and alleys . . . and [other] improvements generally. 1 5
It appears the Florida Supreme Court has held consistently that
street maintenance was a city duty, and has viewed it as a proprietary
function.1 6 Therefore, the city traditionally lacked tort immunity in this
area. However, the line between governmental and municipal functions
was not always so easily drawn. In City of Tampa v. Easton,17 the
court recognized that "[w]hat are governmental functions and what are
corporate authority on duties of a municipality are not comprehensively
defined in the law but are to be determined in each case upon a judicial
interpretation and application of appropriate provisions or principles of
law to the facts legally shown or omitted [sic] ... ."8 The results
which have followed were often inconsistent andoconfusing.1
In 1957, after lower courts had wrestled with the "governmental-
14. See, e.g., cases cited in note 11 supra.
15. 102 Fla. at 506, 135 So. at 459 (emphasis added).
16. City of Miami Beach v. Quinn, 149 Fla. 326, 5 So. 2d 593 (1942); City of
Tampa v. Easton, 145 Fla. 188, 198 So. 753 (1940); Chardkoff Junk Co. v. City of
Tampa, 102 Fla. 501, 135 So. 457 (1931); Bryan v. City of West Palm Beach, 75 Fla.
19, 77 So. 627 (1918); Keggin v. County of Hillsborough, 71 Fla. 356, 71 So. 372
(1916).
17. 145 Fla. 188, 198 So. 753 (1940).
18. Id. at 192, 198 So. at 755.
19. See generally authorities cited in note 10 supra and Avery v. City of West
Palm Beach, 152 Fla. 717, 12 So. 2d 881 (1943). The city usually was held liable for
failure to properly maintain the streets or give warning of a dangerous condition in the
road. In City of Tampa v. Easton, the city was liable for injuries resulting from a
collision between an automobile and a city owned truck. The court found the city re-
sponsible for keeping the streets safe for traffic as well as keeping the surface of the
street in a safe condition. Since the city gave the truck driver consent to operate his
vehicle, the city was liable for the negligent injuries caused by the driver; however, in
Avery v. City of West Palm Beach, the Supreme Court of Florida affirmed a trial
court's holding that maintenance of traffic signals was a governmental function and,
therefore, immunity attached to the city. The court was unwilling to expand municipal
liability for failure to keep the streets safe to include failure to maintain traffic signals.
See also Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach, 96 So. 2d 130, 132-33 (Fla. 1957).
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proprietary" distinction, the Florida Supreme Court cast aside that the-
ory and held municipalities could be liable for their employee's torts
under the doctrine of respondeat superior.20 Hargrove v. Town of
Cocoa Beach21 represents the court's attempt to clarify the confusion
resulting from the earlier decisions. In Hargrove a municipal corpora-
tion was sued on the basis of a wrongful death claim. The plaintiff
alleged the city was negligent because her husband, left unattended in
a locked jail cell, died of smoke inhalation. The court ultimately found
the city liable and recognized that up to this point the status of immu-
nity was confusing to Florida courts because of "an effort to prune and
pare the rule of immunity rather than to uproot it bodily and lay it
aside . . This pruning approach ha[d] produced numerous strange
and incongruous results."' 22 Reasoning that the "modern city [is] in
substantial measure a large business institution . . . [t]o continue to
endow this type of organization with sovereign divinity appears to us to
predicate the law of the Twentieth Century upon an Eighteenth Cen-
tury anachronism. "23 ,
The court in Hargrove expanded the municipality's liability by
holding it liable for the torts of its policemen under the doctrine of
respondeat superior. "[W]hen an individual suffers a direct, personal
injury proximately caused by the negligence of a municipal employee
while acting within the scope of his employment, the injured individual
is entitled to redress for the wrong done."'24 The court expressly receded
from its prior decisions immunizing municipalities from liability for
torts committed by police officers acting within the scope of their em-
ployment.23 However, immunity was expressly preserved for the munic-
ipality when acting in a legislative, judicial, quasi-legislative or quasi-
judicial capacity.26
Hargrove was restricted by Modlin v. City of Miami Beach,27 the
next Florida Supreme Court decision to greatly impact on the munici-
20. Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach, 96 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1957).
21. Id.
22. Id. at 132, 133.
23. Id. at 133.
24. Id. (footnote omitted).
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. 201 So. 2d 70 (Fla. 1967).
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pal immunity issue. In Modlin, plaintiff's decedent was crushed to
death when portions of a store mezzanine fell on her. Plaintiff brought
a wrongful death action, alleging a city building code inspector negli-
gently inspected the building during its construction. The court viewed
the inspection as enforcement of the building code and, therefore,
found it an "executive" function.
Since Hargrove had specifically reserved immunity only for judi-
cial, legislative, quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative functions, the one
remaining area of potential liability was for executive functions. 28 Ad-
hering to the dictates of Hargrove, the Modlin court reasoned "that if
the respondent city [was] to escape liability, it [would] have [had] to
[do so] other than by the path of municipal immunity." 29
The Modlin court was creative in acknowledging an alternative
route for evading liability. Hargrove had held only that a city was lia-
ble for the torts of its employees under the doctrine of respondeat supe-
rior, but did not furnish a dispositive guide to determining conditions
under which possible tort liability became absolute. While recognizing
that actionable negligence must present some breach of a duty owed,
the Modlin court also found "a doctrine of respectable lineage and
compelling logic that holds that this duty must be something more than
the duty that a public officer owes to the public generally."30 Armed
with that principle, the court proceeded to restrict municipal liability
for city employee negligence exclusively to those instances where a spe-
cial duty was owed to the particular plaintiff. Since the building in-
spector's duty to Mrs. Modlin was no greater than that owed the gen-
eral public, the court held the city was not liable.
In the wake of Modlin, it became apparent that municipal immu-
28. Id. The court proceeded to define the distinction between legislative, execu-
tive and judicial functions. It stated that, "legislative action prescribes a general rule
for future operation, whereas judicial and executive action is typically concerned with
applying the general rule to specific situations or persons." Id. A further distinction
was made between executive and judicial or quasi-judicial functions. The court stated,
"that a power authorized to be exercised on the personal judgment of the acting au-
thority is purely executive, but that where notice and hearing are required and action is
based upon the showing made at the hearing the action is judicial or quasi-judicial."
Id. at 74.
29. Id.
30. Id. (emphasis added).
16:1982
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nity was problematic to those trying to isolate and identify it. 1 Eight
years after Modlin, Florida's Fourth District Court of Appeal at-
tempted to clarify the issue of municipal immunity in Gordon v. City of
West Palm Beach."2 The court in Gordon summarized the status of
municipal tort liability:
1) as to those municipal activities which fall in the category of pro-
prietary functions a municipality has the same tort liability as a
private corporation;
2) as to those activities which fall in the category of governmental
functions ". . . a municipality is liable in tort, under the doctrine
of respondent [sic] superior, only when such tort is committed
against one with whom the agent or employee is in privity, or with
whom he is dealing or is otherwise in contact in a direct transac-
tion or confrontation." City of Tampa v. Davis ....
3) as to those activities which fall in the category of judicial, quasi-
judicial, legislative, and quasi-legislative functions, a muncipality
remains immune. Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach, supra; Mod-
lin v. City of Miami Beach, supra.33
Gordon involved a wrongful death action brought by a father
whose son was killed when his motorcycle hit an automobile at an in-
tersection. The complaint alleged negligence by the city in the "design,
construction and maintenance of the streets and for .. . failure to
warn of a known hazardous condition.' Since the plaintiff claimed
negligent maintenance of the streets, which historically had exposed a
city to liability, 5 this claim was actionable. However, the allegation of
city negligence for failure to install and maintain traffic controls failed
to present a viable cause of action because the court viewed these as
31. Gordon v. City of West Palm Beach, 321 So. 2d 78, 79 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1975), cert. dismissed, 349 So. 2d 160 (Fla. 1977). The court in Gordon stated:
"We are frank to admit that the current status of municipal tort liability is not at all
clear since the advent of Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach; Modlin v. City of Miami
Beach, and subsequent cases attempting to interpret the breadth and scope of those two
cases." Id. (citations omitted).
32. Id.
33. Id. at 80 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
34. Id.
35. Id.
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Statutory Waiver of Immunity and Judicial Determination of
its Scope
The same year the Gordon case was decided, Florida Statute Sec-
tion 768.28, waiving tort immunity for the state and all its subdivisions,
became effective.37 The statute affects the state and its agencies or sub-
divisions, expressly including municipalities.3 8 Although the statute is a
waiver of immunity, the legislature placed limitations on monetary
recovery.
(5) The state and its agencies and subdivisions shall be liable for
tort claims in the same manner and to the same extent as a private
36. Id. See also discussion in note 19 supra.
37. Ch. 73-313, § 1, 1973 Fla. Laws 711 which provided § 768.28 would be
effective January 1, 1975; Ch. 74-235, § 3, 1974 Fla. Laws 664 amended the effective
date of § 768.28 as applied only to the executive departments to be July 1, 1974.
Gordon v. City of Miami Beach was decided October 10, 1975. FLA. STAT. § 768.28(1)
(Supp. 1980) waives sovereign immunity for tort liability for the state, its agencies or
subdivisions;
(1) In accordance with s. 13, Art. X, State Constitution, the state, for
itself and for its agencies or subdivisions, hereby waives sovereign immu-
nity for liability for torts, but only to the extent specified in this act. Ac-
tions at law against the state or any of its agencies or subdivisions to re-
cover damages in tort for money damages against the state or its agencies
or subdivisions for injury or loss of property, personal injury, or death
caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the
agency or subdivision while acting within the scope of his office or employ-
ment under circumstances in which the state or such agency or subdivi-
sion, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with
the general laws of this state, may be prosecuted subject to the limitations
specified in this act.
Id.
38. FLA. STAT. § 768.28(2) (Supp. 1980).
(2) As used in this act, "State agencies or subdivisions" include the execu-
tive departments, the Legislature, the judicial branch, and the independent
establishments of the state; counties and municipalities; and corporations
primarily acting as instrumentalities or agencies of the state, counties, or
municipalities.
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individual under like circumstances, but liability shall not include
punitive damages or interest for the period prior to judgment.
Neither the state nor its agencies or subdivisions shall be liable to
pay a claim or a judgment by any one person which exceeds the
sum of $50,000 or any claim or judgment, or portions thereof,
which, when totaled with all other claims or judgments paid by the
state or its agencies or subdivisions arising out of the same incident
or occurrence, exceeds the sum of $100,000. However, a judgment
or judgments may be claimed and rendered in excess of these
amounts and may be settled and paid pursuant to this act up to
$50,000 or $100,000, as the case may be, and that portion of the
judgment that exceeds these amounts may be reported to the Leg-
islature, but may be paid in part or in whole only by further act of
the Legislature. The limitations of liability set forth in this sub-
section shall apply to the state and its agencies and subdivisions
whether or not the state or its agencies or subdivisions possessed
sovereign immunity prior to July 1, 1974.39
Because municipalities had not shared the same immunities as the
state and its other subdivisions prior to the enactment of section
768.28, the statute's applicability to municipalities was questioned. The
Attorney General responded40 by saying that "the state's waiver of sov-
ereign immunity contained in § 768.28 does not operate to limit in any
substantive way the tort liability of municipalities under the doctrine of
respondeat superior."" In 1977,11 responding to the Attorney Gen-
eral's opinion, the legislature added the last sentence of section
768.28(5) which is italicized above.43 Thus the legislature mandated
that municipalities were included not only in the waiver of immunity,44
39. FLA. STAT. § 768.28(5) (Supp. 1980) (emphasis added). The amount recov-
erable has been increased to $100,000 for a single claimant and $200,000 per occur-
rence. Ch. 81-317, 1981 Fla. Laws 1488.
40. Fla. Atty. Gen. Ann. Rep. 70-71 (1976).
41. Id. at 71 (emphasis in original).
42. Ch. 77-86, § 1, 1977 Fla. Laws 162.
43. In the preamble of chapter 77-86 of the Florida Laws, the legislature stated
that "the Attorney General, in his opinion number 076-41, dated February 23, 1976,
failed to recognize the basis for the limitation of liability set forth in subsection (5) of
section 768.28, Fla. Statutes. . . " Ch. 77-86, 1977 Fla. Laws at 161. Recognizing the
need for clarification, the legislature amended § 768.28(5).
44. Ch. 77-86, 1977 Fla. Laws 161-62.
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but also in the limitation of liability,4 5 even though they had not en-
joyed the same immunities as the state and other subdivisions prior to
July 1, 1974.
Despite apparently broad statutory waiver of immunity in 1975 via
Section 768.28, Florida's courts were unsure of its scope. Faced with
this uncertainty, the Florida Supreme Court in Commercial Carrier
Corp. v. Indian River County,46 reconciled the statute with common
law immunity. In this landmark decision the court articulated Florida's
present test which affords immunity for acts involving planning or pol-
icy decisions since these were found to be beyond statutory waiver. In
contrast, under Commercial Carrier, operational or implementing ac-
tivities were found to be within the statute and not immune from tort
liability. Although the case involved actions brought against a county,
rather than a municipality, Commercial Carrier clarified the status of
immunity as it pertained to the state and all its subdivisions.
The case, accepted on certiorari, was a consolidation of two sepa-
rate cases out of Florida's Third District Court of Appeal: Commercial
Carrier Corp. v. Indian River County,47 and Cheney v. Dade County.4
In Commercial Carrier the original plaintiff brought a wrongful death
action based on a fatal collision at an unmarked intersection in Indian
River County in which the Florida Department of Transportation
(DOT) and Indian River County were named third party defendants.
The complaint alleged the county was negligent for failing to maintain
a stop sign and that DOT was negligent for failing to paint the word
"STOP" at the intersection. At first blush it would appear that under
the broad language of section 768.28 tort immunity had been waived.
However, the trial court found failure to maintain a traffic signal not
45. Id.
46. 371 So. 2d 1010 (Fla. 1979). See also Drake & Oldham, The King is Dead,
Long Live the Emperor: Commercial Carrier Decision and the Status of Governmental
Immunity in Florida, 53 FLA. B.J. 504 (1979); Comment, Torts - The Doctrine of
Sovereign Immunity is Alive and Well - Commercial Carrier Corp. v. Indian River
County, 371 So. 2d 1010 (Fla. 1979), 8 FLA. ST. L. REv. 377 (1980).
47. 342 So. 2d 1047 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1977), rev'd and remanded, 371 So.
2d 1010 (Fla. 1979).
48. 353 So. 2d 623 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1977), rev'd and remanded, 371 So.
2d 1010 (Fla. 1979).
6:1982 Dollar Limits on Tort Recoveries
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actionable and dismissed the third party complaint.49 The dismissal was
upheld by the appellate court.
In Cheney the petitioner alleged Dade County negligently main-
tained a traffic signal which directly caused the accident and injury to
the plaintiff in the original action. The city moved to dismiss the com-
plaint on grounds of sovereign immunity and the trial court granted the
motion. The appellate court upheld the dismissal, finding that Florida's
statutory waiver of immunity would not create liability in this case
under Modlin and that the duty owed Cheney was that owed to the
public in general. 50
In the consolidated action the Florida Supreme Court invalidated
the special duty-general duty test of Modlin, 1 and then focused its at-
tention on legislative intent for the scope of waiver under section
768.28. The court acknowledged the Federal Tort Claims Act 52 as the
basis for section 768.28 but noted Florida's statute, unlike the federal
act, did not expressly exempt discretionary acts from liability. How-
ever, the court found, despite the absence of express statutory lan-
guage, other jurisdictions had recognized a discretionary exception. Af-
ter looking at other jurisdictions for guidance, the court recognized a
discretionary exception in Florida. The more difficult second step was
to determine how "discretionary functions" could be identified.
Since the term appeared elusive of any universal definition, other
jurisdictions developed tests to help identify a discretionary function.
The Washington Supreme Court, in Evangelical United Brethren
Church v. State,53 developed a test consisting of four questions which
Commercial Carrier adopted as its guide.
(1) Does the challenged act, omission, or decision necessarily in-
volve a basic governmental policy, program, or objective? (2) Is the
questioned act, omission, or decision essential to the realization or
accomplishment of that policy, program, or objective as opposed to
one which would not change the course or direction of the policy,
program, or objective? (3) Does the act, omission, or decision re-
49. 371 So. 2d at 1013; 342 So. 2d at 1049.
50. 371 So. 2d at 1014; 353 So. 2d at 626.
51. 371 So. 2d at 1016.
52. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1975).
53. 67 Wash. 2d 246, 407 P.2d 440 (1965).
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quire the exercise of basic policy evaluation, judgment, and exper-
tise on the part of the governmental agency involved? (4) Does the
governmental agency involved possess the requisite constitutional,
statutory, or lawful authority and duty to do or make the chal-
lenged act, omission, or decision? 5 '.
The Florida Supreme Court commended case-by-case utilization
of this test in Florida 5 and adopted "the analysis of Johnson v. State
...which distinguishes between the 'planning' and 'operational' levels
of decision-making by governmental agencies.1 56 The discretionary
54. 371 So. 2d at 1019 citing 67 Wash. 2d at -, 407 P.2d at 445. Instructing the
lower courts on application of this guide, the Washington Supreme Court said if all
questions could be answered affirmatively, then the questioned act could reasonably be
classified as discretionary. If one or more could be answered negatively, further inquiry
would be necessary to determine whether the act was in fact discretionary.
55. Many courts have not used the test adopted in Commercial Carrier and a
possible reason for this may have been articulated in Wallace v. Nationwide Mut. Fire
Ins. Co., 376 So. 2d 39 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1979). That court found "the new test
substituted in Commercial Carrier. . .to be a complex four point test, which might
with some judicial straining, be construed either to exempt each and every governmen-
tal action, or alternatively, exclude none of them." Id. at 40 (footnote omitted).
56. 371 So. 2d at 1022. The court was referring to Johnson v. State, 69 Cal. 2d
782, 447 P.2d 352, 73 Cal. Rptr. 240 (1968). In Johnson, plaintiff's complaint alleged
that plaintiff was requested by the state's employee Mr. Baer to provide a foster home
for a particular youth. Further, defendant's employee negligently allowed a youth with
homicidal tendencies and a history of violence and cruelty to be placed in plaintiff's
home without notice of these propensities. Plaintiff allegedly suffered injuries as a re-
sult of this negligence. The state moved for summary judgment on the ground of im-
munity. The trial judge granted the motion and plaintiff appealed. Id.
Looking to a statute which expressly immunizes public employees for discretionary
acts, the Supreme Court of California was faced with a determination of whether im-
munity would attach under the facts of this case. Recognizing that some discretion
would be involved in any official act, the court acknowledged that further analysis
would be necessary. The court articulated a distinction between "planning" and "oper-
ational" functions. Under this distinction, those planning functions which involved poli-
cymaking would be immunized while the implementation of that policy would not be
immunized. Id.
In applying that distinction to this case, the court found that the decision to parole
a youth would be a policy consideration deserving immunity. However, once the deci-
sion to parole is made, any action to place the parolee with a family is merely a minis-
terial act and not deserving of immunity. Id.
The court cited numerous cases which immunized policy decisions but not the acts
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function exception would apply only to planning level functions but not
to operational level functions: "planning level functions are generally
interpreted to be those requiring basic policy decisions, while opera-
tional level functions are those that implement policy."17 Thus, plan-
ning functions are generally equated with purely governmental func-
tions, whereas operational functions are generally equated with
proprietary or ministerial functions.
Having accepted these distinctions, the court found that mainte-
nance of traffic signals and painting the word "STOP" were opera-
tional functions and consequently were not within the discretionary
function exemption. Therefore, the county was not immunized from lia-
bility, and both Cheney and Commercial Carrier were remanded to the
district court with instructions for remand to the respective trial courts
for further proceedings.
Although Commercial Carrier provided guidelines for courts to
identify discretionary functions, the guidelines appear susceptible to in-
congruous results. Illustrative of this incongruity is Ferla v. Metropoli-
tan Dade County.5" Concerning an accident on Rickenbacker Cause-
way, plaintiffs alleged the county was negligent in four areas: (1) the
design of the median strip, (2) the determination of the speed limit, (3)
the width of the lanes and (4) the failure to erect a barrier. Using the
"planning" level/"operational" level distinction, the court found item
(1) was an "operational" level decision; items (2) and (3) involved
"planning" level decisions and item (4) would have to be factually de-
veloped before a determination could be made. In reaching this deci-
sion, the court stated,
The distinction we feel compelled to draw between the median de-
sign and the lane width situations, the essential basis of which is
difficult indeed to articulate, well illustrates the self-acknowledged
"deficiencies" and "lack of certainty and predictability," Commer-
cial Carrier Corp. v. Indian River County, . . . involved in the
analysis contained in Johnson v. State. . ., which our court specif-
which carried out the decision and stated that most of the cases involved a "failure to
warn of foreseeable, latent dangers flowing from the basic immune decision." Id. at _,
447 P.2d at 362, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 250 (footnote omitted).
57. 371 So. 2d at 1021 (footnote omitted).
58. 374 So. 2d 64 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
Nova Law Journal
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ically adopted in the Commercial Carrier case.
59
Constitutionality of Recovery Limits as Applied to
Municipalities
While Commercial Carrier ostensibly clarified the status of immu-
nity and recognized a discretionary function exception, questions re-
mained regarding the constitutionality of statutory limitations placed
on recoveries against municipalities. Two years after Commercial Car-
rier, Cauley v. City of Jacksonville,6" held constitutional that portion
of section 768.28(5) providing monetary limitations on tort recoveries.
Cauley concerned an area in which municipalities had never been
afforded immunity, the negligent maintenance of streets.61 The facts of
the case were undisputed. Mrs. Cauley alleged the existence of a dan-
gerous condition in the road for a period of time and the city's negli-
gence in not repairing the condition or giving adequate warning of it.
Mrs. Cauley further alleged that she was injured as a result of the
city's failure to repair or warn of the condition. The jury awarded her
$400,000 in damages, and her husband $200,000 for loss of consor-
tium. Because Mrs. Cauley was found seventy-five percent responsible
for her injury, the judgment was accordingly reduced to a total of
$150,000. The city motioned for reduction of the judgment to $100,000
as limited by section 768.28(5).2 The trial court granted the motion
and expressly held section 768.28(5) constitutional.
In Cauley, appellants challenged the constitutionality of section
768.28(5) which limited their recovery on a judgment against the City
of Jacksonville. Prior to enactment of the state's waiver of immunity,
together with its limitations on recovery, the Cauleys would have been
entitled to an unlimited recovery. Florida's Supreme Court stated the
issue in Cauley "concern[ed] the validity of that portion of Sec.
59. Id. at 68 n.1 (citations omitted).
60. 403 So. 2d 379 (Fla. 1981).
61. Since the maintenance of streets has been consistently held to be a duty of
the city, the city traditionally did not have immunity for this proprietary function. See
note 16 supra.
62. The limitations have since been increased to $100,000 for a single claimant
and $200,000 per occurrence. See note 39 supra.
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768.28(5) which limits compensatory damages against municipalities
for negligent performance of operational-level or proprietary func-
tions." ' Admittedly the court narrowed the issue to deal exclusively
with municipalities because it stated (without demonstrating) that
Commercial Carrier found section 768.28(5) constitutional, as it re-
lated to the limitation on recoveries against the state and its counties."
The majority in Cauley ultimately held the cap on recovery
against municipalities as constitutional. The appellants had alleged sev-
eral grounds of constitutional error: due process and equal protection
rights had been violated; denial of access to the courts and jury trial;
the statute violated the separation of powers; and circuit court depriva-
tion of power to issue necessary writs. The majority considered these
allegations of constitutional error and summarily stated, "[w]e reject
all these contentions.1
6 5
Striking appellants' constitutional arguments, the Cauley majority
relied on Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group,
Inc.66 to justify legislative imposition of recovery limits. But the major-
ity failed to explain why it relied on Duke Power Co., a factually dis-
tinguishable North Carolina case holding constitutional a federal stat-
ute limiting recovery on nuclear reactor accidents. In addition, the
63. 403 So. 2d at 381. The court had jurisdiction to hear the issue under article
V, § 3(b)(1) of the Florida Constitution which provides the supreme court "[s]hall
hear appeals . . . from orders of trial courts . . . initially and directly passing on the
validity of a state statute . . . ." Fla. Const. art. V, § 3(b)(1) (1972).
64. Chief Justice Sundberg, who wrote the majority opinion in Commercial Car-
rier, states in the dissent in Cauley that Commercial Carrier decided only the scope of
the waiver under § 768.28. Therefore, it would appear to this writer that if Commer-
cial Carrier held § 768.28(5) to be constitutional, it was by implication only. The court
merely reversed the dismissals of Commercial Carrier's and Cheney's third party com-
plaints. The respective trial courts had found immunity attached when a county failed
to maintain traffic controls, but the supreme court found to the contrary. It determined
the granting of immunity for decisions regarding traffic control maintenance in the past
was no longer valid under the dictates of § 768.28, since immunity was found to exist
only for discretionary functions at the planning level and not for operational or mainte-
nance functions. By so doing, the court determined only the scope of the waiver under §
768.28 and not the constitutionality of any monetary limitations on recovery as pro-
vided in § 768.28(5).
65. Id. at 384.
66. 438 U.S. 59 (1978). The dissent questioned the application of this case. See
notes 82 and 83 and accompanying text infra.
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majority stated that it previously found legislation restricting recovery
in the workmen's compensation and no-fault automobile insurance ar-
eas constitutional. 67 The arguments rejected in these earlier cases were
"[s]ubstantially the same"68 as the attacks rejected in Cauley.
The majority opinion considered and rejected appellants' argument
that Kluger v. White69 disposed of the case sub judice. In Kluger, Flor-
ida Statute Section 627.73870 was held unconstitutional when chal-
lenged on the ground that it did not comply with the Florida Constitu-
tion, article I, section 21. Florida's Constitution provides "[t]he Courts
shall be open to every person for redress of any injury, and justice shall
be administered without sale, denial or delay. '7 1 The issue in Kluger
was whether this constitutional guarantee "bar[red] the statutory abo-
lition of an existing remedy without providing an alternative protection
to the injured party. 71 2 The Kluger court held
that where a right of access to the courts for redress for a particu-
lar injury has been provided by statutory law predating the adop-
tion of the Declaration of Rights of the Constitution of the State of
Florida, or where such right has become a part of the common law
of the State pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 2.01, F.S.A., the Legislature is
without power to abolish such a right without providing a reason-
able alternative to protect the rights of the people of the State to
redress for injuries, unless the Legislature can show an overpower-
ing public necessity for the abolishment of such right, and no alter-
native method of meeting such public necessity can be shown.73
67. Walker & LaBerge, Inc. v. Halligan, 344 So. 2d 239 (Fla. 1977) (workmen's
compensation); Lasky v. State Farm Ins. Co., 296 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1974) (no-fault auto-
mobile insurance). The dissent distinguishes both cases. See notes 84-86 and accompa-
nying text infra.
68. 403 So. 2d at 384.
69. 281 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1973).
70. The statute provided that an action for recovery of property damage result-
ing from an automobile collision could only be maintained if two conditions occurred:
first, if the owner had chosen not to buy insurance protection against property damage
and second, if the damage exceeded five hundred and fifty dollars. The imposed mini-
mum dollar amount of the statute precluded the appellant from maintaining an action
because the value of her car was only two hundred and fifty dollars.
71. Fla. Const. art. I, § 21.
72. 281 So. 2d at 3.
73. Id. at 4.
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The Cauley majority, however, rejected Kluger as inapposite. 4
The court's rejection was based on the belief that no statutory right to
recovery against a municipality for its negligence existed prior to Flor-
ida's adoption of the constitutional declaration of rights. In addition the
court found no common law right pursuant to Florida Statute Section
2.01. 7
The majority viewed section 768.28 as a way of bringing "fairness,
equality and consistency to an area of the law which ...has been
beset with contradiction, inconsistency and confusion. '70 The court rec-
ognized that treating municipalities in parity with state and counties
provided a benefit not outweighed by possible harm to individual plain-
tiffs who would no longer be entitled to unlimited recoveries. Munici-
palities, which had become more like other subdivisions of the state,
and are governmental entities, should not be treated as "partial out-
casts."77 Further, treating municipalities equally eliminates the need to
determine which rules apply when actions against city and county are
consolidated as in Cauley. However, even-handed application of section
768.28(5) to all the state's subdivisions actually results in a modified
immunity for municipalities. In areas where a municipality did not re-
ceive immunity prior to enactment of section 768.28, they will now be
protected by monetary limitations on recovery. It is this capping of a
previously unlimited recovery, without providing what is viewed as a
reasonable alternative, which formed the basis of Cauley's dissent.
Chief Justice Sundberg, writing for the dissent, stated that "the
majority has misconstrued case law and blurred traditional distinctions
between immunity for state, county and municipal governments. 78 He
found the first such misapplication in the majority's reliance on Com-
mercial Carrier9 which Sundberg, its author, viewed as having decided
only the scope of section 768.28 waiver for the state and counties.80
74. 403 So. 2d at 385.
75. Id. However, the dissent strenuously opposed this interpretation of Kluger.
For a discussion of the basis for this opposition, see note 89 and accompanying text
infra.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 386.
78. Id. at 387.
79. Id.
80. Id.
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The Chief Justice asserted Commercial Carrier recognized municipal
rules for determining immunity were not to be applied to the state and
counties and that Commercial Carrier did not expressly discard the
rules governing municipal liability.81 The dissent viewed the imposition
of a cap on recovery as an unjustified protection for municipalities in
an area where protection had previously not been enjoyed, specifically,
in disputes arising from allegations of negligent performance of propri-
etary or operational functions.
Sundberg buttressed his dissent by criticizing as well majority reli-
ance on Duke Power Co., a case dealing with a federal act providing
no-fault recovery for injuries resulting from a nuclear accident.8 2 A
compelling interest in Duke necessitated change in traditional tort re-
coveries. Moreover, Duke was a federal decision and there is no
analagous counterpart in the Florida constitutional provision for access
to the courts.8 3 Lastly, Chief Justice Sundberg found the majority mis-
placed reliance on Halligan4 and Lasky,85 which were distinguishable
from Cauley since these cases dealt with providing a remedy without
requiring proof of fault.8 "
Chief Justice Sundberg believed Kluger applicable87 and control-
ling8 of Cauley. He asserted that common law action against a munic-
ipality existed prior to adoption of Florida's Constitution 9 and that
Florida embraced this cause of action via Florida Statute Section
81. Id.
82. In support of the dissent's disagreement with the reliance placed on this case,
let it be added that besides placing a limit on recovery at $560 million in the event of a
nuclear accident, a fund was set up to make sure that amount was readily available.
The fund protects prospective plaintiffs since any one nuclear reactor would not be able
to raise $560 million on their own. Thus the statute presently provides potential plain-
tiffs with ready access to a guaranteed $560 million; Congress recognized that the
amount can be increased should the need arise.
83. 403 So. 2d at 388-89.
84. 344 So. 2d 239 (Fla. 1977).
85. 296 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1974).
86. 403 So. 2d at 388.
87. Id. at 387.
88. Id.
89. Chief Justice Sundberg found the common law cause of action espoused in a
legal maxim which propounds that the law gives a remedy with full and just compensa-
tion for the negligent injuries caused by another. Id. at 388.
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2.01.190 Therefore, applying the strictures of Kluger, one of two condi-
tions must be present for valid abolition of a cause of action: either the
legislature must 1) provide a reasonable alternative for recompense or
2) show an overpowering public necessity and no other method of meet-
ing the public need. The dissent found neither condition present and
viewed "[tihe effect of Section 768.28(5) [as] . . . forc[ing] a plaintiff
to give up a common law right and receive nothing in return.""1 Al-
though the plaintiff is entitled to some monetary recovery under the
statute, Chief Justice Sundberg evidently did not view this as a reason-
able alternative within the purview of Kluger. Therefore, applying the
holding of Kluger to the facts of Cauley, the dissent advised that the
portion of section 768.28(5) limiting recoveries be held "unconstitu-
tional as applied to municipalities." 92
Conclusion
Municipalities may breathe easier knowing their financial expo-
sure is limited. However, the court has explained little of the reasoning
it used in determining that the ceiling on municipal tort recoveries was
constitutional. The majority silenced the arguments presented under
the access to courts mandate of article I, section 21 of the Florida Con-
stitution by declaring Kluger inapplicable. Consequently, the majority
deftly avoided having to determine whether section 768.28(5) provided
the alternative right to recompense necessary for the valid abolition of
an existing remedy.
By its action, the Florida Supreme Court has made it clear that a
plaintiff suing a municipality must look to the legislature for any
amount awarded exceeding the statutory limitations. 93 It may be a
hollow victory, for the plaintiff who is awarded a large verdict must
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Ch. 73-317, § 1, 1973 Fla. Laws 711, as originally enacted, provided that
insurance coverage above the statutory limitations of § 768.28(5) served to expand
recovery to the extent of coverage. Id. at 712. See § 768.28(10). However, that provi-
sion was repealed by ch. 77-86, 1977 Fla. Laws 161. Thus at present, a plaintiff may
only recover more than the limitations of § 768.28(5) through further act of the
legislature.
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then expend more time and energy trying to convince the legislature it
is deserved. 4 The Florida Supreme Court may one day be forced to
address a separation of powers issue because the legislature has, in es-
sence, set itself up as the last judge and jury.
Mary Ava Bobko
94. While claims bills have been very successful, there are a series of procedures
which must be followed before the plaintiff may be able to recover the full amount of
their judgment. First, the claims bill must be prepared and submitted. Next, a hearing
is conducted by a Special Master, who in turn prepares a final report and recommenda-
tion for the Committee on Judiciary. If the claim is reported favorably by the commit-
tee, it must then pass in the House, the Senate, and finally reach the Governor. See M.
ROBINSON, INTRODUCTION OF CLAIMS BILLS, POLICIES, PROCEDURES AND INFORMA-
TION (January 1982) (Prepared for Representative Hamilton Upchurch, Chairman,
Committee on Judiciary).
3531
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Harmless or Reversible Error? Florida's Rule
3.390(a)
Introduction
The Florida Constitution1 confers a quasi-legislative role upon the
Supreme Court of Florida authorizing it to adopt uniform practice and
procedural rules applicable to the state's courts. Pursuant to this power
the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure were adopted in 1967 in order
"to provide for the just determination of every criminal proceeding.
They shall be construed to secure simplicity in procedure and fairness
in administration."'2 However, in some instances the rules have failed to
promote the requisite simplicity: Rule 3.390(a)3 is an example of a ju-
dicial rule which does not effectuate such simplicity. This tenet's appli-
cation, both in its original and amended version, has caused confusion
as is made apparent by judicial misinterpretations in the lower courts.
In essence, Rule 3.390(a) established the right of either party to
have the jury instructed on the maximum and minimum sentence
which could be imposed with an adjudication of guilt. Controversy
arose concerning the semantic interpretation given the language of the
rule. Was the requirement that the judge on request instruct the jury
directory or mandatory? Further, if instruction giving is mandatory,
does its omission constitute reversible or harmless error? This note ad-
dresses these questions. First the rule's history and purpose will be ex-
amined. Later, developing caselaw and legal analysis will be described
to illustrate its application in Florida's courts.
1. Article V, section 3 of the Florida Constitution was adopted November 6,
1956 in a general election. It states, "[t]he practice and procedure in all courts shall be
governed by rules adopted by the Supreme Court." Fla. Const. art. V, § 3.
2. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.020.
3. The original and amended versions will be given in their chronological devel-
opment later in the text.
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Historical Perspective
In order to fully comprehend both the scope and implications of
the minimum-maximum sentencing rule, a historical viewpoint illus-
trating the development of the rule is imperative. Prior to granting the
Florida Supreme Court authority to codify rules of procedure, the leg-
islature enacted statutes specifying such procedural guidelines. Many
of these statutes, including Rule 3.390(a) evolved into specific Florida
Rules of Criminal Procedure.4 When the Florida State Legislature en-
acted The Criminal Procedure Act,5 in 1939, Statute 918.10 (entitled
"Charge to Jury") Section (1) provided, "[t]he presiding judge shall
charge the jury only upon the law of the case at the conclusion of the
argument of counsel."17 The statute was amended in 1945, adding, "and
must include in said charge the penalties fixed by law for the offenses
for which the accused is then on trial."8
The Supreme Court of Florida first interpreted the statute in Sim-
mons v. State.9 The basis for the appeal was the judge's failure to
charge the jury as required by Florida Statute 918.10. The court recog-
nized uncertainty in the statutory language: it was unclear whether the
charge was mandatory or directory. In deciding the issue, the court
relied strongly on the general premise that the jury's sole function is to
determine issues of fact and apply the appropriate law in rendering its
decision. Contrarily, the court's function is to instruct the jury on the
law pertinent to the factual situation. "[I]f the court is required to de-
part from this course and discuss matters having no bearing on the true
function of the jury, the trial necessarily is disconcerted and
impeded." 10
4. In fact, as Albert Datz noted in 1968, "most of the rules are patterned after
statutes which were in existence at the time the rules were adopted; and in many in-
stances the statutes were lifted verbatim and placed into rules." Datz, Rules of Crimi-
nal Procedure, 42 FLA. B.J. 285 (1968).
5. The Criminal Procedure Act became effective October 19, 1939. The criminal
courts were then governed with a uniform procedural act until the adoption of the
Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure.
6. 1940 Fla. Laws 239 (1940).
7. Id.
8. 1945 Fla. Laws 239 as amended by FLA. STAT. § 918.10 (1969).
9. 160 Fla. 626, 36 So. 2d 207 (1948).
10. Id. at -, 36 So. 2d at 208.
1356 Nova Law Journal 6:1982 1
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The supreme court also scrutinized the constitutionality of the
statute, focusing on the separation of powers doctrine. In the court's
view the enactment attempted to mandate a new procedural role for
the courts by altering their discretionary authority to instruct the jury.
The court conceded that while the legislature has the power to establish
guidelines in procedural areas, primary judicial power and discretion
cannot be hindered by legislative regulation.
The Simmons opinion seemed to suggest the rule was unconstitu-
tional, yet the court avoided direct pronouncement on this question.
Taking a different route, the court construed the rule in a light
designed to prevent constitutionally fatalambiguity and applied a sav-
ing judicial gloss:
It will be observed that statute 918.10, in directing the court to
charge upon the penalty, uses the word "must", rather than
"may". If the statute be interpreted as an unqualified mandate that
the court in every criminal case include in the charge the penalty
which might be imposed, rather than a mere grant of the privilege
to so charge, it becomes an unreasonable infringement of the inher-
ent power of the court to perform the judicial function because it
burdens the court with doing an empty and meaningless act."
The court reasoned that the legislature is presumed to intend con-
stitutional enactments. Thus the legislature must have intended the
trial judge to retain discretion in using the additional charge. To this
end, the court further concluded that "shall" in legislative enactments
usually connotes a "grant of authority" which is subject to limitations
of power. Through the interpretation of the words "must" and "shall' ' 12
11. Id.
12. The problem with defining 'shall' and 'must' is that the courts across the
nation have placed different interpretations on the meaning of the words depending
upon the context. Some courts interpret 'shall' to be mandatory. Swift v. Smith, 110
Colo. 126, 201 P.2d 609, 614 (1948); Brown v. Hecht Co., 137 F.2d 689, 692 (D.C.
Cir. 1943); State v. Bradley, 147 Ga. App. 569, 249 S.E.2d 365, 366 (1978). Others
agree with the Florida Supreme Court and assert that it depends on the construction of
the statute. Wirlis v. 'Seeley, 33 Ohio Op. 287, 68 N.E.2d 484, 485 (1946); Faunce v.
Carter, 26 Wash. 2d 219, 173 P.2d 526, 528 (1946); Barkely v. Pool, 102 Neb. 799,
169 N.W. 730, 732 (1918); In Re Dupont Borough Wards, 36 Pa. Commw. Ct. 504,
387 A.2d 1367, 1369 (1978).
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to mean "may," 13 the court determined that the statute should be ap-
plied in a discretionary, not mandatory, manner.
Adoption of the Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.390(a)
When the Supreme Court of Florida adopted the Florida Rules of
Criminal Procedure in 1967, Section 918.10(1)14 of the Florida Stat-
utes became Rule 3.390(a). 15 Since the wording of this statute did not
clearly indicate whether the rule was mandatory or directory the Sim-
mons rational appeared dispositive. Nevertheless, the point became
multilitigous.
In 1974, the Supreme Court of Florida interpreted the new rule in
Johnson v. State.,' The defendant had been convicted of second degree
murder. The defense counsel requested in writing that the judge in-
struct the jury on the maximum penalties, which the judge refused.
The Second District Court of Appeal affirmed the lower court denial by
relying upon the Simmons rationale that the rule was directory rather
than mandatory. The supreme court explained the distinction stating,
"[i]f the requirements of the rule are mandatory, it must be complied
with by the trial judge; if, however, such language is directory only, the
granting or denying of a request for such instruction would rest within
the sound discretion of the trial judge. ' ' 17 In its affirmance the court
relied primarily on the argument that because sentencing was not a
'Must' also has been construed as mandatory. State v. Reese, 365 Mo. 1221; 274
S.W.2d 304, 308 (1954). However, the majority of the courts have interpreted in con-
text. In Re Atkins Estate, 121 Cal. App. 251, 8 P.2d 1052, 1054 (1932); Robinson v.
City of Saginaw, 267 Mich. 557, 255 N.W. 296 (1934).
13. The court's interpretation of "shall" as "may" is a direct contradiction to the
1977 amendment interpretation. See note 27.
14. Section 918.10 had been slightly reworded to state that "[a]t the conclusion
of argument of counsel the court shall charge the jury. The charge shall be only on the
law of the case and must include the penalty for the offense for which the accused is
being charged." FLA. STAT. § 918.10(1) (1967). Interestingly, the legislature did not
repeal this statute when the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure were adopted.
15. FLA. R. CRIM. P. Jury Instructions 3.390(a) provides: "The presiding judge
shall charge the jury only upon the law of the case at the conclusion of argument of
counsel, and must include in said charge the penalty fixed by law for the offense for
which the accused is then on trial."
16. 308 So. 2d 38 (Fla. 1974).
17. Id. at 39.
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jury function it was not the trial court's function to give instructions on
penalties to be imposed. Bolstering its rationale, the court pointed to
the consistency of their Simmons and Johnson decisions with Florida's
Standard Jury Instruction:
[T]he language of Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases
2.14 (as validated by Rule 3.985 of the Florida Rules of Criminal
Procedure) which instructs the jury that it is not to be concerned
with the imposition of any penalty if it reaches a verdict of guilty,
except as it may be connected with a recommendation of mercy.18
However, in using the Simmons decision as a precedent, the Johnson
court in essence contradicted itself. In Simmons, interpretation of the
statute was overshadowed by the possible violation of the separation of
powers doctrine. Avoiding the constitutional issue, that court inter-
preted the statute broadly in order to alleviate its potential interference
with judicial responsibilities. But in 1967, when the supreme court
adopted the the identical language of the statute into Rule 3.390(a), it
obviated any claim of legislative interference. Therefore, "the decision
amounted to a de facto amendment of the rule by substituting 'may'
for 'must'." 19 The courts continued to follow this interpretation until
the 1977 amendment.
1977 Amendment to Rule 3.390(a)
In 1977, Rule 3.390(a) was amended 20 as follows:
The presiding judge shall charge the jury only upon the law of the
case at the conclusion of argument of counsel and upon request of
either the State or the defendant the judge shall include in said
charge maximum and minimum sentences which may be imposed
(including probation) for the offense for which the accused is then
on trial.2 '
18. Id. at 40.
19. Yetter, The Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure: 1977 Amendments, 5
FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 243, 302 (1977).
20. The Fla. Bar. Re Fla. Rules of Crim. Proc., 343 So. 2d 1247, 1261 (Fla.
1977).
21. Id.
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Due to the altered language of the 1977 amendment lower courts were
uncertain of its interpretation. Since the previous rule had not been
construed by its plain meaning it was unclear which direction the su-
preme court would pursue. In other words, what did "shall" 22 mean?
The district courts' interpretations of the new rule followed contra-
dictory patterns of logic as illustrated in two leading cases, Tascano v.
State23 and Murray v. State.24 The First District Court of Appeal, in
Tascano, stated "in light of the previous judicial decisions construing
the term 'must' as 'may', we are hesitant to conclude that the rule, by
use of the term 'shall', means what it says and is accordingly
mandatory. ' 25 The court then held that the rule was discretionary and
not mandatory even though "shall" is mandatory language. In 1980,
the Fifth District Court of Appeal decided Murray, which differed
from the semantic interpretation given "shall" in Tascano. The Mur-
ray court felt that a change in the language signalled that the interpre-
tation had been altered, and therefore concluded that "shall" was
meant to be mandatory, as indicated in Webster's New Collegiate Dic-
tionary.26 Although this interpretation was at variance with Tascano, it
did little to alter the outcome. The court invalidated the mandatory
language utilizing instead the Johnson rationale that the Florida Stan-
dard Jury Instruction 2.1527 required the jury to disregard penalty in
determining guilt or innocence. Thus, the court concluded, a judge's
22. "Shall" has been interpreted by Florida courts to have a mandatory meaning.
Holloway v. State, 342 So. 2d 966 (Fla. 1977); Neal v. Bryant, 149 So. 2d 529 (Fla.
1962); J.W.H. v. State, 345 So. 2d 871 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
23. 363 So. 2d 405 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
24. 378 So. 2d 111 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
25. Id. at 407.
26. Id. at 112.
27. Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 210(a) provides:
(A) You are to disregard the consequences of your verdict. You are im-
paneled and sworn only to find a verdict based upon the law and the evi-
dence. You are to consider only the testimony which you have heard
(along with other evidence which has been received) and the law as given
to you by the court.
You are to lay aside any personal feeling you may have in favor of, or
against, the state and in favor of, or against, the defendant. It is only
human to have personal feeling or sympathy in matters of this kind, but
any such personal feeling or sympathy has no place in the consideration of
your verdict. When you have determined the guilt, or innocence, of the
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failure to adhere to the literal language of Rule 3.390(a) cannot be
reversible error, for it is illogical to reverse a conviction "upon the basis
that the jury was not afforded information which it was then obligated
to disregard. '28 If courts were required to follow such contradictory
principles it would be "suggestive of a Lewis Carroll fantasy flight back
and forth through the legal looking glass."29 Therefore, even if the stat-
ute is mandatory, it loses much of its strength since failure to comply
does not warrant reversal.
Subsequently, the Supreme Court of Florida reviewed Tascano3
The court decided that if the amendment was to have the prior direc-
tory meaning, the 1977 alteration would have been "meaningless and
accomplished nothing.""1 Thus, the court concluded that it is
mandatory, upon the request of either counsel, to instruct on maximum
and minimum sentences which may be imposed. Justice Alderman, in
his dissent, agreed with the district court in Murray that Rule 3.390(a)
was inconsistent with the Florida Standard Jury Instructions. 32 Consis-
tent with the Murray rationale he sought to invoke the harmless error
doctrine because the instruction required the jury to disregard the
mandatory penalty instruction; failure to give this instruction would
have no bearing on the determination of guilt. Additionally, Justice Al-
derman noted that in amending this tenet, no commentary indicated an
intent to overrule the Johnson decision. The dissent's disdain for the
confusion created by the amendment is obvious:
If a majority of this court intends that, when requested, an instruc-
tion on penalties is mandatory, then the court should promulgate a
new rule that clearly and directly tells judges and lawyers of this
state that the rule is mandatory and not directory."
In deciding Tascano, the court declared the decision prospective,u
accused, you have completely fulfilled your solemn obligation under your
oath.
28. 378 So. 2d at 112.
29. Id.
30. 393 So. 2d 540 (Fla. 1980).
31. Id. at 541.
32. Id. at 542.
33. Id.
34. The court could have made the decision retroactive but decided to make it
36 IError & Rule 3.390(a)
153
et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue
Published by NSUWorks, 1982
362 Nova Law Journal 6:1982 1
and reversed for a new trial. The various state's attorneys disagreed
with the decision that the conviction was reversible. In future cases, it
was contended, failure to adhere to Rule 3.390(a) would be a harmless
error.35 The various district courts were confronted with the dilemma of
whether they should proceed upon the precedent established in Tas-
cano3 6 or follow the narrow, mandatory interpretation by relying on the
rationale in Murray.3 7 The supreme court ended the dilemma by re-
viewing the district court's decision in Murray. Recognizing the obvi-
ous conflict with Tascano, the court quashed the Murray decision to
facilitate consistency. The harmless error doctrine was found inapplica-
ble because, "this mandatory duty could be circumvented on the basis
of the harmless error rule, [and] the effects of the mandatory provision
in the rule would be negated."3 8 To be consistent the court reviewed
Knight v. State39 and Allen v. State,4" both of which relied on the ap-
pellate decision in Murray. The court clarified its position on pending
cases when it reaffirmed that "the defendant, as well as all others who
have preserved this point on appeal, received the benefit of this inter-
pretation of the rule."'"
As broad as the rule appears, it is narrowed by the fact that de-
fense counsel must make formal objection in order to preserve the point
for appeal.42 In Welty v. State43 the supreme court continued to con-
prospective and "applicable to all cases in which a jury trial is commenced on or after
the effective date of this opinion." Id. at 541.
35. FLA. STAT. § 59.041 (1979) states that:
No judgement shall be set aside or reversed, or new trial granted by any
court of the state in any cause, civil or criminal, on the ground of misdirec-
tion of the jury or the improper admission or rejection of evidence or for
error as to any matter of pleading or procedure, unless in the opinion of
the court to which application is made, after an examination of the entire
case it shall appear that the error complained of has resulted in a miscar-
riage of justice. This section shall be liberally construed.
36. See Moyers v. State, 400 So. 2d 769 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Wesley
v. State, 400 So. 2d 175 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
37. 378 So. 2d 111 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
38. 403 So. 2d 417 (Fla. 1981).
39. 394 So. 2d 997 (Fla. 1981).
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. FLA. R. CRIM. P. Jury Instruction Rule 3.390(a) states:
No party may assign as error grounds of appeal the giving or the failure to
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strict the rule. The defendant argued for reversal since the judge failed
to adhere to Tascano. The district court refused to reverse:
On several occasions during the trial the jury was advised that the
maximum penalty for murder in the first degree was death and the
minimum penalty was life imprisonment. The trial court failure to
again advise the jury on what it had already been told was not a
reversible error.44
The Welty decision revealed the court's flexibility in applying Rule
3.390(a). Since the possible penalties were presented to the jury, al-
though not specifically in the instructions, the court refused to reverse a
conviction on a technical procedural error.
Perspective
The developing interpretation of Rule 3.390(a) illustrates the
court's authoritative power in its quasi-legislative role. Because the
court has rejected application of the harmless error doctrine when in-
struction has been incorrectly withheld, the state has been compelled to
retry a convicted defendant in an overworked criminal justice system.
Judges and district attorneys are frustrated. As Marc Gorden, an As-
sistant State Attorney, stated, "[t]here are at least 20 cases in all and
at least half a dozen major cases that we've had to rehandle because of
a technical error . . . .It's created a substantial problem for us."'45 He
also said that the cost to the criminal justice system is hard to deter-
mine. In Florida today, with the increasing crime rate, both the cost of
criminal justice and popular indignation over protecting a criminal with
procedural technicalities, is mounting.
When the court adopted the rule, no commentary rationalized the
give an instruction unless he objects thereto before the jury retires to con-
sider the verdict, stating distinctly the matter to which he objects, and the
grounds of his objection. Opportunity shall be given to make the objection
out of the presence of the jury.
The court also held that this applies to the Tascano decision. Kelly v. State, 389 So. 2d
251 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
43. 402 So. 2d 1159 (Fla. 1981).
44. Id. at 1160.
45. Fort Lauderdale News, Dec. 27, 1981, § B, at 1, col. 2.
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stringent guidelines. This could be explained by the increasingly diffi-
cult task faced by jurors who weigh the factual evidence and apply the
complex laws given in jury instructions. Considering the degree of re-
sponsibility given jurors, is it not imperative that they understand the
gravity of their decision and know that the death sentence, life impris-
onment or probation is possible? The gravity of the situation should
inspire greater consciousness in jury deliberations.
Alderman, in his dissent in Tascano, recognized that the court
could have prevented confusion by clearly and explicitly stating the in-
tention of the amendment. He noted that the court failed to adhere to
precedent in its interpretation of "must" and "shall. ' 46 The court's in-
decision has resulted in a number of cases requiring reversal based on
the rule. Alderman's position is supported by the Conference of Circuit
Courts which asked the supreme court to reverse the decisions based on
the rule. Judge Futch, of Broward County, observing the contradiction
in the rule said, "[h]ow can a jury disregard the consequences of a
verdict when you tell them the penalties? It's asking too much of the
jury to disregard it. They're human too.' 7
Opposition has been unsuccessful in changing the supreme court's
costly interpretation of this rule. The tenet has been clearly defined as
its guidelines have been explicitly stated for the lower courts. With pre-
cedent established, the court in Welty indicated that less than strict
adherence would suffice. The court will not reverse a lower court's deci-
sion on a purely procedural mistake if the lower court complies with
the essence of the rule. The outer limits of the court's flexibility remain
untested; presently it is clear only that the jury must be fully aware of
the possible penalties or the decision will be reversed. It seems ironic
that judges, by failing to give requested, written instructions, will gen-
erate an otherwise avoidable source of judicial waste.
Roberta Stanley Kaib
46. 393 So. 2d at 541, 542.
47. Fort Lauderdale News, Dec. 27, 1981, § B, at 4, col. 2.
6:19821Nova Law Journal
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Nurse Practitioners: Here Today . . . Gone
Tomorrow?
Today's nurse practitioners are fair game for malpractice lawsuits.
These specialized nurses provide primary care services such as diagno-
sis, prescription and treatment for lower fees than physicians.' During
the past decade, the dramatic increase in the number of nurse practi-
tioners has been accompanied by a growing recognition of the legal
ramifications of their practice. The number of nurse practitioners is
certain to increase dramatically in the next few years.2
In 1965, training programs were initiated for nurse practitioners.3
Later, governmental interest focused on this new health care provider
as a promising answer to the shortage of physicians providing primary
care to rural or poor urban areas. Federal action included the Nurse
Training Act of 19714 and the Comprehensive Health Manpower Act
of 1971, 5 which directed funds toward training nurse practitioners.6
The Nurse Training Act of 19757 continued federal support for train-
ing. In 1978, although the nurse training amendments failed, funding
for nurse practitioner training programs was extended another year
1. See, e.g., Kissam, Physician's Assistant and Nurse Practitioner Laws: A
Study of Health Law Reform, 24 KAN. L. REv. 1 (1975); M. CAZALAS, NURSING AND
THE LAW 98-100 (3d ed. 1978); Sox, Quality of Patient Care by Nurse Practitioners
and Physician's Assistants: A Ten-Year Perspective, 91 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED.
459 (Sept. 1979).
2. Scheffier, Yoder, Weisfeld & Ruby, Physicians and New Health Practition-
ers: Issues for the 1980s, 16 INQUIRY 195, 218 (Fall 1979).
3. The first educational program for nurse practitioners was started in 1965 at
the University of Colorado Medical Center by Loretta Ford and Dr. Henry Silver to
train pediatric nurse practitioners. Feinstein, Physician Extenders in Florida, 68 J.
FLA. MED. A. 371 (May 1981).
4. Pub. L. No. 92-150, 85 Stat. 416 (1971).
5. Pub. L. No. 92-157, 85 Stat. 431 (1971).
6. President Nixon, Message to Congress Relative to Building a National Health
Strategy, Feb. 18, 1971, reprinted in 117 Cong. Rec. 3119, 3122 (1971).
7. Pub. L. No. 95-63, 92 Stat. 3818 (1978).
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under a continuing appropriations resolution.8 Even after the Nurse
Training Amendments of 1979 also met with failure,9 the nurse practi-
tioner movement continued to gain strength.
State legislatures responded by enacting laws that recognized
nurse practitioners and permitted their practice. At present nurse prac-
titioners are practicing in roughly 35 states. 10
A flurry of legislative activity has evolved over the last few years
as state legislatures, aware of the exigency for clarification of the role
of nurse practitioners, have revised or developed their nurse practice
acts to provide both a legal basis for the nurse practitioners' functions
and a definitive framework for regulating the scope of their practice.
Although the ostensible and intended purpose of these statutes is to
promote expanded delegation of powers to nurse practitioners, as ap-
plied most statutes tend to unduly restrict, or to leave unresolved, the
scope of authorized delegations.
In 1979 Florida's Legislature added a new section to the Nurse
Practice Act.11 This statute recognized such categories of advanced
8. S.B. 2416, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
9. The Nurse Training Amendments of 1979, if passed, would have directed ap-
propriations for nurse training programs, including nurse practitioner programs. Pub.
L. No. 96-76, 93 Stat. 579 (1979).
10. Miami Herald, May 20, 1981, § E at 1, col. 1.
11. FLA. STAT. § 464.012 (1979): Certification of advanced registered nurse
practitioners; fees.-
(1) Any nurse desiring to be certified as an advanced registered nurse
practitioner shall apply to the department and submit proof that he holds a
current license to practice professional nursing and that he meets one or
more of the following requirements as determined by the board:
(a) Satisfactory completion of a formal postbasic educational program
of at least I academic year, the primary purpose of which is to prepare
nurses for advanced or specialized practice.
(b) Certification by an appropriate specialty board.
(c) Graduation from a program leading to a master's degree in a
nursing clinical specialty area with preparation in specialized practitioner
skills.
(2) The board shall provide by rule the appropriate requirements for
the following categories:
(a) Nurse anesthetist.
(b) Nurse midwife.
(c) Family nurse practitioner.
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registered nurse practitioners as anesthetist, midwife, family, family
(d) Family planning nurse practitioner.
(e) Geriatric nurse practitioner.
(f) Pediatric nurse practitioner.
(g) Adult primary care nurse practitioner.
(h) Clinical specialist in psychiatric mental health nursing.
(i) Other categories as may be determined by rule of the board.
(3) An advanced registered nurse practitioner shall perform those
functions authorized in this section within the framework of an established
protocol. A practitioner currently licensed under chapter 458, chapter 459,
or chapter 466 shall maintain supervision for directing the specific course
of medical treatment. Within the established framework, an advanced reg-
istered nurse practitioner may:
(a) Monitor and alter drug therapies.
(b) Initiate appropriate therapies for certain conditions.
(c) Perform additional functions as may be determined by rule in ac-
cordance with s. 464.003(3)(c).
(4) In addition to the general functions specified in subsection (3), an
advanced registered nurse practitioner may perform the following acts
within his specialty:
(a) The nurse anesthetist may, to the extent authorized by established
protocol approved by the medical staff of the facility in which the anes-
thetic service is performed, perform any or all of the following:
1. Determine the health status of the patient as it relates to the risk
factors and to the anesthetic management of the patient through the per-
formance of the general functions.
2. Based on history, physical assessment, and supplemental laboratory
results, determine, with the consent of the responsible physician, the ap-
propriate type of anesthesia within the framework of the protocol.
3. Order under the protocol preanesthetic medication.
4. Perform under the protocol procedures commonly used to render
the patient insensible to pain during the performance of surgical, obstetri-
cal, therapeutic, or diagnostic clinical procedures. This shall include order-
ing and administering regional, spinal, and general anesthesia; inhalation
agents and techniques; intravenous agents and techniques; and techniques
of hypnosis.
5. Order or perform monitoring procedures indicated as pertinent to
the anesthetic health care management of the patient.
6. Support life functions during anesthesia health care, including in-
duction and intubation procedures, the use of appropriate mechanical sup-
portive devices, and the management of fluid, electrolyte, and blood com-
ponent balances.
7. Recognize and take appropriate corrective action for abnormal pa-
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planning, geriatric, pediatric, adult primary care, clinical specialist in
tient responses to anesthesia, adjunctive medication, or other forms of
therapy.
8. Recognize and treat a cardiac arrythmia while the patient is under
anesthetic care.
9. Participate in management of the patient while in the postanesthe-
sia recovery area, including ordering the administration of fluids and
drugs.
10. Place special peripheral and central venous and arterial lines for
blood sampling and monitoring as appropriate.
(b) The nurse midwife may, to the extent authorized by established
protocol approved by the medical staff of the health care facility in which
midwifery services are performed, perform any or all of the following:
1. Perform superficial minor surgical procedures.
2. Manage patient during labor and delivery to include amniotomy,
episiotomy, and repair.
3. Order, initiate, and perform appropriate anesthetic procedures.
4. Perform postpartum examination.
5. Order appropriate medications.
6. Provide family-planning services.
7. Manage the medical care of the normal obstetrical patient.
(c) The family nurse practitioner may perform any or all of the fol-
lowing acts:
1. Manage selected medical problems.
2. Order physical therapy.
(d) The family-planning nurse practioner may provide family-plan-
ning services.
(e) The geriatric nurse practitioner may perform any or all of the
following:
1. Manage selected medical problems.
2. Order physical therapy.
(f) The pediatric nurse practitioner may perform any or all of the
following:
1. Initiate, monitor, or alter therapies for certain uncomplicated, acute
illnesses within the framework of the standing protocol.
2. Initiate childhood immunizations.
(g) The adult primary care nurse practitioner may perform any or all
of the following:
1. Initiate appropriate medications by defined protocol.
2. Initiate immunizations.
3. Monitor and manage patients with stable chronic diseases.
4. Initiate treatments and medications and alter dosage within the es-
tablished protocol.
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psychiatric mental health and others. 2 The statute allows registered
nurses with additional education,'3 training and special licenses to per-
form expanded duties as authorized by professional licensing boards.
These so-called "physician extenders" or "representatives of ex-
panded nursing" have consistently sought more independence in func-
tion and decision-making. Although Florida Statute Section 464.012
opened the way for expanded delegation of medical functions, it leaves
uncertainty as to the permissible limits of delegation. There has been
(h) The clinical nurse specialist in psychiatric mental health nursing
may perform the following:
1. Establish behavioral problems diagnosis and make treatment
recommendations.
2. Monitor and adjust dosages of prescribed psychotropic medications
as indicated within the framework of the established protocol.
(5) The board shall certify, and the department shall issue a certifi-
cate to any nurse meeting the qualifications in this section. The board shall
establish an application fee not to exceed $100 and a biennial renewal fee
not to exceed $50. The board is authorized to adopt such other rules as
may be necessary to implement the provisions of this section.
12. See also, State of Fla. Dep't of Prof. Reg., Bd. of Nursing, ch. 210-11, Ad-
ministrative Policies Pertaining to Certification of Advanced Registered Nurse
Practitioners.
210-11.21 (1) In addition to these categories of Advanced Registered Nurse Prac-
titioners specified in Sec. 464.012 (2), F.S., the following categories are created by the
Board: Emergency Nurse Practitioner, OB/GYN Nurse Practitioner, Maternal Child
Health/FP Nurse Practitioner, College Health Nurse Practitioner, and Diabetic Nurse
Practitioner.
210-11.20 (9) Established Protocol: Written guidelines or documentation outlin-
ing the therapeutic approach which should be considered. Such protocol shall be mutu-
ally agreed upon by the ARNP and the practitioner.
210-11.20 (16) Supervision: General supervision whereby a practitioner autho-
rizes procedures being carried out but need not be present when such procedures are
performed. The ARNP must be able to contact the practitioner when needed for con-
sultation and advice either in person or by communication devices.
13. Nurse practitioner education programs in Florida are approximately one aca-
demic year in length and include:
a) University of Miami: midwifery, adult primary care, geriatrics and family practice;
b) University of South Florida: adult primary care;
c) University of Florida: adult health, child health, family health, pediatrics, and
obstetrics-gynecology;
d) Shands Hospital (Gainesville): nurse anesthetist; and
e) Bay Memorial Medical Center (Panama City): nurse anesthetist.
161
et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue
Published by NSUWorks, 1982
1370 Nova Law Journal 6:1982 1
no case construing this statute, indeed, no case in any state in which a
nurse practitioner has been independently sued for malpractice. In light
of the fierce legislative activity in the states during the past few
months, this article evaluates the statutory controls over this emerging
practice and suggests methods to impede a nurse practitioner malprac-
tice suit. The Florida statute will be the focus of the discussion.
Nurse Practitioners In Florida
The role of the nurse practitioner embraces many functions not
within the traditional scope of nursing practice such as testing, diagno-
sis, prescription and treatment. The last three are traditionally medical
functions, and are the center of the controversy. These functions were
the exclusive domain of the physician and, therefore, beyond the pe-
riphery of lawful practice for a nurse. Now a nationwide movement has
emerged to establish legal authority for nurse practitioners to perform
such "medical" functions free from repercussion.
Florida statutes allow registered nurses who meet the requirements
for a nurse practitioner category to perform expanded duties as author-
ized by professional licensing boards; i.e., in accordance with rules and
regulations issued by an administrative agency such as the board of
nursing and/or medicine. The statute is, therefore, an administrative-
type statute,14 as compared to other regulatory 15 and traditional stat-
14. Administrative statutes promulgate rules and regulations determined by
appropriate state regulatory agencies-the State Boards of Nursing and
Medicine-which are most familiar with nursing practices. ALA. CODE § 34-21-2
(1977); ALASKA STAT. § 08.68.410(5) (1978); ARZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-1661
(1976) and § 32-1601 (Supp. 1980); ARK. STAT. ANN. § § 72-746(e), -754(0 (Repl.
Vol. 1979), § 72-756.1 (Supp. 1981); FLA. STAT. § 464.012 (1981); IDAHO CODE § 54-
1402 (1979); IND. CODE ANN. § 25-23-1-1(b)(8) (Burns Supp. 1978); IOWA CODE §
152.1 (Supp. 1981); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-1113 (1980); Ky. REV. STAT. § 314.011
(Supp. 1980); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37.913 (West Supp. 1981); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 32, § 2102 (1978); MD. Occ. & PROF. CODE ANN. § § 7-305 -504 (Supp.
1981); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112 § § 80B-C (Supp. 1981); MIss. CODE ANN. §
73-15-5 (Supp. 1980); NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-1,132.05 (R.S. Supp. 1980); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 632.010 (1979); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 326-B:2 (1979); N.C. GEN. STAT. §
90-171.10 (1981); N.D. CENT. CODE § 43-12.1-05 (1981); ORE. REV. STAT. § §
678.375,
-.380, -.385, -.390 (1979); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 212 (Purdon Supp. 1981); S.C.
CODE § 40-33-10 (1977); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § § 36-9A-1, -9A-12 (Supp.
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utes.16 Florida's statute, compared to other nurse practitioner statutes,
appears to be one of the most comprehensive and detailed, enumerating
the permissible duties for each of the eight types of nurse practition-
ers.17 However, the statute employs vague terminology which has the
ultimate effect of restricting rather than expanding nurse duties.
Florida Statute Section 464.003(3)(c) defines "advanced or spe-
cialized nursing practice." The advanced registered nurse practitioner
may perform:
.. . acts of medical diagnosis and treatment, prescription, and op-
eration which are identified and approved by a joint committee
.. . such acts shall be performed under the general supervision of
a practitioner . . . within the framework of standing protocols
which identify the medical acts to be performed and the conditions
for their performance.
This restrictive phraseology inhibits and even prohibits independent
1981); UTAH CODE ANN. § § 58-31-4, -31.9.1 (Supp. 1979); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, §
1572 (Supp. 1981); VA. CODE § 54-367.2 (1978); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 18.88.030
(Supp. 1981); Wyo. STAT. § 33-21-101 (1977); See also Trandel-Korenchuk &
Trandel-Korenchuk, Current Legal Issues Facing Nursing Practice, 5 NURSING AD. Q.
37 (Fall 1980); Kissam, supra note 1, at 25 n.168.
15. Regulatory statutes authorize nurses to perform additional acts beyond the
traditional definition of nursing. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § § 2725, 2834, -37 (Deer-
ing Supp. 1981); COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-38-103 (Supp. 1980); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 20-87a (West Supp. 1981); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 148.171 (West Supp. 1981);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:11-23 (West 1978); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 61-3-3 (Repl. Vol.
1981); N.Y. EDuC. LAW § § 6902 (Consol. 1979); See also Kissam, supra note 1, at
26 n.177.
16. Traditional statutes do not legally encompass diagnosis, treatment, or pre-
scription and prohibit the performance of any medical act by a nurse. DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 24, § 1902 (1975); GA. CODE ANN. § § 84-1001, -1001(a) (1979); HAWAII REV.
STAT. § 457-2 (Repl. Vol. 1976); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111, § 3405 (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1981); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § § 333.16121 et seq., -.17210, -17221 et seq. (Supp.
1981); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 335.016 (Vernon Supp. 1981); MONT. CODES ANN. § 37-8-
102(2)(a) (1981); OHio REV. CODE ANN. § § 4723.01, -.06 (Page Supp. 1980); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 59, § 567.3 (West 1981); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 5-34-1 (1976); TENN.
CODE ANN. § § 63-731, -740, -760 (Supp. 1980); TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN., art.
4513 (Vernon 1981); W. VA. CODE § 30-7-1 (1980); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 441.01 (West
Supp. 1981).
17. See note 11 supra.
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judgment and decision-making by nurse practitioners. Florida thus en-
sures the dependency of nurse practitioners upon physicians.
This same statute, incorporating "nursing diagnosis and nursing
treatment" within the scope of advanced or specialized nursing prac-
tice, defines the terms:
d) "Nursing diagnosis" means the observation and evaluation of
physical or mental conditions, behaviors, signs, and symptoms of
illness, and reactions to treatment and the determination as to
whether such conditions, signs, symptoms, and reactions represent
a deviation from normal.
e) "Nursing treatment" means the establishment and implementa-
tion of a nursing regimen for the care and comfort of individuals,
the prevention of illness, and the education, restoration, and main-
tenance of health. 8
The obvious purpose of the statute is to distinguish "nursing" diagnosis
and treatment from "medical" diagnosis and treatment. Articulating
satisfactory criteria to accommodate the conflicting factions is a recur-
rent challenge. 9
Legislation and regulations vary among the states, but almost all
states require physicians to supervise, become involved with and be le-
gally responsible for the activities of nurse practitioners. Only two
states20 provide independent prescriptive authority for nurse practition-
ers. It appears that the majority of nurse practitioner statutes intend to
permit prescription or treatment only in a subordinate capacity. The
physician's control is manifested in: (1) the determination and promul-
gation of rules and regulations by joint boards of medicine and nursing;
(2) the requirement that certain practices be performed within the
scope of protocols, policies and procedures, standing orders and stan-
dardized procedures written in accord with the supervisory physician,
18. FLA. STAT. §§ 464.003(3)d and e (1979).
19. See 81 AM. J. OF NURSING 1558 (Sept. 1981).
20. ORE. REV. STAT. § § 678.375, -.380, -.385, -.390 (1979) and WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 18.88.030 (Supp. 1981). See also Trandel-Korenchuk & Trandel-
Korenchuk, How State Laws Recognize Advanced Nursing Practice, Nursing Outlook,
Nov. 1978, at 713.
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and (3) the necessity of a written agreement between the physician(s)
and the nurse, submitted to the Board of Nursing, regarding the details
of the supervision of the nurse. 1 Whereas Florida requires that the acts
be performed "under the general supervision" of a physician and
"within the framework of standing protocols," several states22 permit
nurse practitioners to work "in collaboration" with physicians. These
states have effected a valiant attempt to situate nurse practitioners in
parity with physicians.23
Legislative Unrest: New Controls Proposed
Presently, individual physicians establish standing orders or proto-
cols with their respective nurse practitioners. This is a joint effort by
two professionals, allowing each to contribute accordingly. Nurse prac-
titioners perform the initial assessment, diagnosis and treatment of pa-
tients with uncomplicated illnesses; i.e., those necessary techniques with
the least risk of malpractice. 4 Physicians perform the diagnosis and
treatment of complicated illnesses or give further treatments to patients
initially examined and treated by the nurse practitioner who have not
responded to treatment or who have developed complications beyond
the area of nurse practitoner expertise. This sequence frees the over-
worked physician from routine procedures, permitting him to concen-
trate on more complicated cases and to attend to a greater number of
patients.25
In Florida, this cooperative ideal is colored by the physicians' and
nurse practitioners' battle for economic supremacy. This legislative bat-
tle bears the semblance of protecting the public from nurses who would
practice medicine without a physician's supervision and assistance; but
it is also an economic war as to who will reap the rewards of patient
21. Trandel-Korenchuk & Trandel-Korenchuk, State Nursing Laws, 5 NURSE
PRACTITIONER 39 (Nov./Dec. 1980). See also 81 AM. J. OF NURSING 910 (May 1981);
33 ASS'N OF OPERATING ROOM NURSES J. 31 (Jan. 1981).
22. ORE. REv. STAT. § § 678.375, -.380, -.385, -.390 (1979); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ § 58-31-4, -31-9.1 (Supp. 1979); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 326-B:2 (1979). See also
81 AM. J. OF NURSING 1448 (Aug. 1981).
23. See 81 AM. J. OF NURSING 910 (May 1981).
24. Miami Herald, May 20, 1981, § E at 1, col. 1; Kissam, supra note 2, at 198.
25. See Kissam, supra note 1, at 7-9; Scheffier et aL, supra note 2, at 198.
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health care.26 Senate Bill 889 and House Bill 90327 were drafted and
introduced by the Florida Medical Association at the 1981 Florida
Legislative Session. Although debated, both bills were defeated in com-
mittee hearings in late May of 198 1.28 These bills would have instituted
the following control measures for physicians working with nurse
practitioners:
1) A physician could not enter into a supervisory agreement with
a nurse practitioner until the Board of Medical Examiners ap-
proved each of the medical acts the nurse would perform and how
closely each would be monitored.
2) A nurse practitioner would have to practice in the same com-
munity as the supervisory doctor.
3) A doctor could supervise no more than two nurse
practitioners.29
These bills were reintroduced at the 1982 legislative session as House
Bill 239 and Senate Bill 500. The 1982 proposals would not apply to
nurse midwives or nurse anesthetists. If passed, the first requirement
may result in delay, chaos and possible abuse of discretion. Since there
has been no documentation to date of any major problems with the
protocol system as it presently exists, such a provision cannot be
justified.
The second requirement, that nurse practitioners practice in the
same community as the physicians with whom they work, may also re-
duce the level of service.30 Presently, the majority of nurse practioners
26. See note 25 supra; Kissam, supra note 1, at 17, 51.
27. FLA. S.B. 889 (1981) and its companion, FLA. H.B. 903 (1981), died in com-
mittee without being heard. The bills were drafted by the medical association and pro-
posed in the Senate by Senator Mattox Hair and in the House by Representatives
Thomas Danson and James Ward.
28. See note 24 supra.
29. FLA. S.B. 889 (1981); FLA. H.B. 903 (1981).
30. 81 AM. J. OF NURSING 633 (Apr. 1981); Tennant, Sorenson, Simmons &
Day, A Study of the Economic Viability of Low-Cost, Fee-For-Service Clinics Staffed
by Nurse Practitioners, 95 PUB. HEALTH REP. 321 (July/Aug. 1980); Rosenblatt &
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practice in physical proximity or in the same community as their re-
spective participating physicians. Those nurse practitioners serving the
health needs of patients in rural or poor urban areas have established
telephone communications with their physicians; the absence of physi-
cians in these areas leaves no other alternative.3 1 Florida's physicians
could justify this new proposal since it would prevent nurse practition-
ers from capitalizing on the physician's absence by performing medical
acts outside their permissible scope of practice. However, such abuse is
rare, and has been successfully dealt with under existing statutes.3 2 In
Hernicz v. State of Florida, Department of Professional Regulation,3
an appellate court affirmed the nursing board's decision to suspend a
nurse practitioner's license for treatment of two patients without spe-
cific authorization for the treatment from a licensed physician.
A third requirement of these bills limits a physician to supervising
a maximum of two nurse practitioners. This provision would appear to
enable physicians to more closely supervise the acts of nurse practition-
ers, thus protecting the patient from any abuse of practice. Three fac-
tors dispell the need for this legislation. First, other controls have
proved successful, as noted above. Second, there are approximately
1,437 nurse practitioners in Florida and approximately 18,500 physi-
cians; overstaffing is unlikely to be a real threat. Third, no literature
exists which describes this problem, even though these programs have
existed for several years.
Other states in which physicians have launched legislative attacks
against nurse practitioners include Oregon and Arkansas. Oregon, one
of the forerunners of the nurse practioner movement, gives nurse prac-
titioners the most independence, permitting them to practice in "collab-
oration with" rather than "under the direct supervision of" physi-
Huard, The Nurse Practitioner as a Physician Substitute in a Remote Rural Commu-
nity-A Case Study, 94 PUB. HEALTH REP. 571 (Nov./Dec. 1979); Kissam, supra note
1, at 64.
31. See note 24 supra. See also Kutait & Busby, New Health Practitioners and
Arkansas, 76 J. OF THE ARK. MED. Soc'Y 353 (Feb. 1980); Banahan III & Sharpe,
Attitudes of Mississippi Physicians Toward Nurse Practitioners, 1979 J. Miss. ST.
MED. ASS'N 197 (Sept. 1979).
32. See note 24 supra. See also Leggett v. Tennessee Bd. of Nursing, 612
S.W.2d 476 (Tenn. 1981).
33. 390 So. 2d 194 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
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cians.3 4 In addition, Oregon allows nurse practitioners to individually
prescribe many medications without any specific protocols with physi-
cians.3 5 However, the Oregon Medical Association is presently sponsor-
ing a bill that would limit these privileges, narrowing the scope of prac-
tice for nurse practitioners on the ground that "it is not in the public
interest for nurse practitioners to work independently of a physician."36
The Oregon bill is analogous to the Florida bill in that the state medi-
cal board would have the ultimate authority to define the nurse practi-
tioners' relationship with physicians and to determine the protocol for
practice.37 The Oregon bill, however, is even more restrictive, giving
the state medical board the ultimate authority to establish the formu-
lary from which practitioners prescribe, to set all the educational re-
quirements for prescription-writing privileges and to control directly
the screening and approval of applicants."'
In Arkansas, the State Nurses Association recently instituted suit
against the State Medical Board and the Arkansas Medical Society
alleging that both boards had violated antitrust laws and pursued a
conspiracy to restrain trade in the provision of health care services and
to fix, control and raise the price of such services.3 9 This litigation re-
sulted from the passage of regulations limiting a physician to supervis-
ing or employing no more than two nurse practitioners at any one time.
This provision is analogous to the proposed Florida bills. Like the Flor-
ida bills, the Arkansas regulations require the physician to explain to
the medical board how the nurse practitioner will be utilized and to
describe her credentials.40
34. ORE. REv. STAT. § 678.385 (1979).
35. Id. § § 678.375, -.385, -.390.
36. S.B. 410 (1981), sponsored by the Ore. Med. Ass'n. See 81 AM. J. OF NuRS-
ING 653 (Apr. 1981).
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. 81 AM. J. OF NURSING 934 (May 1981). In addition to the above allegations,
the Arkansas State Nurses Association alleged that the actions of the medical boards
violate constitutional and contractual rights "by restricting the nurse practitioners' lib-
erty and property rights, their right to practice their chosen profession [and their] right
to be free from interference with their contractual relationships." Id.
40. See text accompanying note 29 supra.
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Obstacles to Independence
Although their training, experience and licensure prepares them
for primary care techniques, nurse practitioners are confronted with
several major obstacles: physician reluctance,41 inadequate malpractice
insurance coverage,42 physician's assistant competition, 3 and potential
malpractice litigation. These obstacles must be overcome or nurse prac-
titioners, recently considered "here today," will be "gone tomorrow."
Therefore, an analysis of each of these obstacles is requisite.
Physicians fear that in employing and supervising nurse practition-
ers, they risk increased exposure to lawsuits." Their fear may be well-
founded. The physician's liability increases with his level of control
over the nurse or nurse practitioner. If "a nurse's services are simply
ministerial in character, she is not regarded as the doctor's borrowed
servant, but rather as the servant of the hospital, so that the latter may
be vicariously liable."' 45 With the appearance of nurse anesthetists, who
had special training and greater responsibility, the issue of control in
the hospital setting became less clear. One view is that a nurse anesthe-
tist who obeyed a doctor's order by following a standard hospital proce-
dure was still not a borrowed servant.46 Since the doctor "did not actu-
ally supervise or control the acts of"'47 the nurse anesthetist, he was not
responsible for the outcome. Another approach is the "right of control"
theory, illustrated in a case where the doctor was held responsible for
the act of an anesthetist over whom "he had the authority to cancel
41. See Freund & Overstreet, The Economic Potential of Nurse Practitioners, 6
NURSE PRACTITIONER 47 (Mar./Apr. 1981); Little, Physicians' Attitudes Toward Em-
ployment of Nurse Practitioners, 3 NURSE PRACTITIONER 26 (Nov./Dec. 1978);
Robyn & Hadley, National Health Insurance and the New Health Occupations: Nurse
Practitioners & Physicians' Assistants, 5 J. OF HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 447 (1980);
Edmunds, Nurse Practitioner-Physician Competition, 6 NURSE PRACTITIONER 49
(Mar./Apr. 1981).
42. See Trandel-Korenchuk & Trandel-Korenchuk, Nursing Malpractice Insur-
ance, 4 NURSE PRACTITIONER 11 (Sept./Oct. 1979).
43. See Kissam, supra note 1 at 57.
44. See id. at 45.
45. Beaches Hosp. v. Lee, 384 So. 2d 234, 237 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
46. Hughes v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 401 So. 2d 448 (La. Ist Cir. Ct.
App. 1981).
47. Id. at 450.
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and thereby control procedures at any time."' 8 Several states require
nurse anesthetists to work only in the physical presence of their super-
vising physician . 9 Florida restricts the nurse anesthetist to performing
only "to the extent authorized by established protocol."50
Control is important in the hospital setting where the doctor may
have relatively close actual control and yet may escape liability because
the nurse anesthetist is the servant of the hospital. The work of the
nurse practitioner in the community or office removes this safety net of
hospital responsibility. This creates a dilemma for the physician. If he
exerts more control over the nurse practitioner, his liability is more
firmly fixed. If he promotes independent action for the nurse practi-
tioner, his state-imposed responsibility may still make him liable for
acts he does not actually control. The problem requires an analysis of
the true increase in risk to the physician and the alternate methods of
compensation.
The "nurse practitioner as a malpractice-aggravator" concept may
be outweighed by a "nurse practitioner as a malpractice-alleviator"
concept. Medical studies show that nurse practitioners tend to provide
more personal attention to patients than do physicians in comparable
situations,51 fostering improved patient/primary care provider relation-
ships and fewer malpractice suits. One leading reason for the malprac-
tice crisis is the short time physicians spend with patients, which pro-
motes strained feelings in the patients and results in their increased
propensity to consider litigation. The nurse practitioner as a malprac-
tice alleviator would probably be a welcome relief to the burdensome
workload of the physicians, and improve the level of patient care.52
Another obstacle to the nurse practitoner movement for indepen-
48. Schneider v. Albert Einstein Medical Center, 257 Pa. Super. 348, 361; 390
A.2d 1271, 1278 (1978).
49. E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § § 72-746(e), -754(0, -756.1 (Repl. Vol. 1979 &
Supp. 1981).
50. FLA. STAT. § 464.012 (1979).
51. Robyn & Hadley, supra note 41, at 447; Kissam, supra note 1, at 18. The
high cost of physician's services relative to the cost of nonphysician's services suggests
that much-expanded delegation may be economically feasible. Recent economic evalua-
tions of nurse practitioners indicate that gains in physician productivity from effective
use of full-time nurse practitioners are likely to be far in excess of thirty-three percent.
Id. at 7. See also A. HOLDER, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LAW 401 (2d ed. 1978).
52. See Scheffler, supra note 2, at 219. See also A. HOLDER, supra note 51.
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dence from physician supervision revolves around the inadequacy of
malpractice insurance coverage. We enter this line of analysis with the
assumption that there will be patients injured by nurse practitioners
just as by any health care providers, and that these negligently injured
patients deserve compensation. Physicians usually have professional lia-
bility insurance and nurses are generally insured through the hospital's
malpractice insurance policy as long as they are acting within the scope
of their employment. However, nurse practitioners, whose independent
medical judgment and functions may result in legal claims similar to
those against physicians, may not have adequate means of compensat-
ing an injured patient. Currently, there are only a limited number of
policies made available to nurse practitioners .5 Even these policies are
ambiguous regarding the extent of coverage and tend to leave nurse
practitioners in a legal limbo. One inherent weakness of these policies
is that they are traditional nursing policies that only cover the nurse
practitioner for "nursing" acts of negligence, not for "medical" acts.5
But, as nurse practitioners are, in essence, performing "medical" acts
of primary care, their policies ought to explicitly cover "medical" acts
of negligence as well.55
Only recently has there been a breakthrough in third party reim-
bursement to nurse practitioners by insurers. 58 Florida has joined this
movement by establishing some reimbursement under the Medicaid
program.5 7 Previously, physicians reimbursed nurse practitioners for
their services from the fees and insurance reimbursements they person-
ally received. Independent payment may be regarded as a step to inde-
pendent practice.
Physicians have been reluctant to relinquish their traditional diag-
nostic, treatment and prescriptive authority.58 This reluctance is mani-
fested by the restrictive regulations established by medical boards. In
Florida, the Department of Health was given the power to "make such
rules and regulations as it may deem necessary for regulating the prac-
53. Robyn & Hadley, supra note 41, at 452.
54. Id. See also Trandel-Korenchuk, supra note 42.
55. Robyn & Hadley, supra note 41, at 452.
56. 81 AM. J. OF NURSING 653 (Apr. 1981); Scheffier, supra note 2, at 222-23.
57. Miami Herald, May 20, 1981, § E at 1, col. 1.
58. See note 41 supra.
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tice of midwifery. ' 59 It drafted an application for licensure form which
required more detailed information about past nursing practice than
was required by the statute. The court found that if the information did
not bear a direct relationship to the "skill, competence and fitness of an
applicant" the specific requirements of the statute limited the inquiry.60
Interprofessional role conflicts, as between medical boards and practi-
tioners, appear to be increasing." Professional opposition may be the
inevitable reaction to the fear of competition from the nurse practi-
tioner movement.
Gender discrimination is another obstacle which nurse practition-
ers will have to surmount. 2 Some physicians may view the present wo-
men's liberation movement as a threat to their status quo. The past,
however, does evince a gradual adaptation to the changing role of
women. Therefore, time may conquer this handicap.
Withstanding competition from physicians' assistants is another
obstacle. 63 Physicians' assistants are another type of physician ex-
tender, analogous to nurse practitioners in development and responsibil-
ities. Their function is to assist physicians. The first program for physi-
cians' assistants began in 1965.4 However, this category of health care
worker was and is predominantly male, made up primarily of medical
corpsmen returned to civilian life.65 In Florida, only one educational
training program exists.66 Physicians are required to supervise physi-
cians' assistants and are generally held legally reponsible for physi-
cians' assistants' acts pursuant to the Medical Practice Act.67 Physi-
cians' assistants may neither sign prescriptions nor utilize prescriptions
presigned by a physician. 8 Yet no restrictive measures similar to the
59. FLA. STAT. § 485.051 (1979).
60. State v. McTigue, 387 So. 2d 454, 456 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
61. See Johnson, I Don't Want to Be a Test Case, 5 NURSE PRACTITIONER 7
(May/June 1980).
62. See Edmunds, Gender and the Nurse Practitioner Role, 5 NURSE PRACT-
TIONER 42 (Nov./Dec. 1980).
63. Nurse practitioners question why recent proposed restrictions have not been
aimed at physicians' assistants. See also Feinstein, supra note 3.
64. See id.; Scheffler, supra note 2, at 216.
65. Scheffler, supra note 2, at 216.
66. Id.
67. FLA. STAT. § 458.347 (1979).
68. Id. See also Kissam, supra note 1, at 18, 21, 50; Scheffier, supra note 2, at
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proposed regulations for nurse practitioners have been proposed for
physicians' assistants.6 9 As the two physician extenders are similar in
many ways, 70 it appears that Florida physicians seek to eliminate nurse
practitioners, while retaining physicians' assistants.
One final obstacle to nurse practitioners' independence is medical
malpractice litigation. Case law concerning nurse practitioners other
than nurse anesthetists71 is scant. The problem in suits against nurse
practitioners is determining the standard of care for a newly created
profession. While the general standard of care for professionals in Flor-
ida is ". . . that level of care, skill and treatment which is recognized
by a reasonably prudent similar health care provider as being accept-
able under similar conditions and circumstances;" 7 the actual standard
for nurse practitioners is difficult to define given the diversity of prac-
tice and the small number of practitioners. In the case of nurse anes-
thetists it has been defined in terms of their greater training and re-
sponsibility. "They have expertise in an area which is akin to the
practice of medicine."7' 3 But comparison with the practice of medicine
is also incorrect. Speaking of the California nurse practitioner statute
and its consequences in tort suits against these professionals, the court
said "'In amending this section . .. the Legislature recognizes that
nursing is a dynamic field, the practice of which is continually evolving
to include more sophisticated patient care activities. . . .It is the legis-
lative intent also to recognize the existence of overlapping functions be-
tween physicians and registered nurses. . . .' The Legislature, how-
ever, did not expand the role to include the practice of medicine or
surgery.'74 Thus the jury instruction that the standard of care for a
nurse practitioner is that of a physician was improper.
216.
69. FLA. S.B. 889 (1981) and its companion FLA. H.B. 903 (1981).
70. See Scheffler, supra note 2, at 218.
71. See Mohr v. Jenkins, 393 So. 2d 245 (La. 1980); Hughes v. St. Paul Fire &
Marine Ins. Co., 401 So. 2d 448 (La. 1981). See also 16 The Regan Report on Nurs-
ing Law 9 (1976); 46 J. AM. Ass'N NURSE ANESTHETISTS 630 (1978).
72. FLA. STAT. § 768.45(1) (1981); Caputo v. Taylor, 403 So. 2d 551 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
73. E.g., Whitney v. Day, 100 Mich. App. 707, 711, 300 N.W.2d 380, 382
(1980).
74. Fein v. Permanente Medical Group, 121 Cal. App. 3d 135, 161-62, 175 Cal.
Rptr. 177, 192 (1981).
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Solution: Minimize the Risks
Nurse pactitioners have so far successfully eluded the malpractice
specter. The present legal climate is favorable, but certainly subject to
change.
One method to minimize the dangers of malpractice claims is to
promote an increase in the number of nurse practitioners in order to
provide proper insurance coverage for "nursing" and "medical" acts at
reasonable rates.75
Another means of minimizing the risks is to provide for well-estab-
lished and documented protocols outlining the therapeutic approach to
be considered. These should be clearly written and mutually agreed
upon by the nurse practitioner and the physician. A parallel approach
would include instituting well-defined and documented job descriptions
for all nurse practitioners at the inception of each particular position."6
These protocols and job descriptions would attempt to eliminate any
subsequent questions about the scope of practice of nurse practitioners
and would promote the proper degree of independent practice. But
since the physician would have to authorize the established protocols
and job descriptions, he may expose himself to potential liability. This
would tend to make his protocols conservative, which would protect the
nurse practitioner, but would be self defeating of the long range goal.
A balance must be worked out.
Conclusion
The concept of nurse practitioners is relatively new, and has been
recognized only recently in statutes. The medical-legal community and
state legislatures are faced with an enormous task, one that involves the
hurdling of traditional concepts and views of nursing which have
weathered decades of litigation. All states will soon be charged with a
duty to appraise or reappraise their nurse practitoner acts, since the
75. F. KEETON, INSURANCE LAW § 2.8(a) (1971). "In the marketing of any
product or service, economy can be achieved through high-volume dealings .... By
adjusting premiums to the average level of risk among the large number of partici-
pants, the insurer can maintain a financially sound plan." Id.
76. See also M. Edmunds, The Position Description, 4 NURSE PRACTITIONER 45
(July/Aug. 1979).
1382 6:1982 1Nova Law Journal
174
Nova Law Review, Vol. 6, Iss. 2 [1982], Art. 1
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol6/iss2/1
6:1982 Nurse Practitioners 383
general welfare is not served by relegating these health care providers
to an inferior status. Legislators should look behind the proffered ratio-
nales for proposed amendments and examine the underlying motiva-
tions. Broad restrictions should not be enacted where unnecessary.
Indeed, expansion of the powers of nurse practitioners may be the
better course of action. Under a cooperative effort between doctors and
nurse practitioners, the field could flourish. With increased numbers the
nurse practitioners could provide needed services protected by reason-
ably priced insurance geared to the scope of the practice. This would
benefit the patients, the practitioners and the physicians.7 7
Sheryl Havens
77. During publication of this note, House Bill 239 was passed, approved by the
Senate, and signed by the governor. The bill becomes effective July 1, 1982.
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